Bridges of hope? : Canadian voluntary agencies and the Third World by Herbert-Copley, B. et al.
BRIDGES 
01 HOPE? 
Canadian Voluntary Agencies 
and the Third World 
IN BHODHEAD BRIM HEHBEHTUP11Y 
with ANNE-MAHIE EAMBEHI, Reseodksoualo 
as ; 1HE NOH1H SOU1H INS111U1E 
MA ̀. 
ITIM INSTITUTE /rINSTITUT ZIOW-90- 
55 Murray, Suite 200, Ottawa, Canada KIN 5M3 (613) 236-3535 
Bridges of Hope? Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third World 
by Tim Brodhead and Brent Herbert-Copley 
with Research Associate Anne-Marie Lambert 
An independent assessment by the North-South Institute. 
The Institute wishes to acknowledge the generous, 'no-strings' 
financial assistance provided for the researching and writing of this 
study by the following agencies: 
Alberta Agency for International Development 
Canadian International Development Agency 
CUSO 
Aga Khan Foundation Canada 
Clifford E. Lee Foundation 
World University Service of Canada 
Calmeadow Foundation 
Canadian Organization for Development through 
Education 
Development and Peace 
Fondation Jules et Paul-Emile Leger 
USC Canada 
United Church of Canada 
Horizons of Friendship 
Inter Pares 
Canadian Hunger Foundation 
OXFAM-Canada 
Canadian Red Cross Society 
Mennonite Central Committee 
The study is available directly from the North-South Institute or 




Canadian Voluntary Agencies 
and the Third World 
11M HHODHEAD HHENT HEHHEHHOP11Y 
with the research colMoratioo of 
ANNE-MARIE MET 
n 
THE NOH1H-SOUTH INS111UTE Ottawa, Canada 
11 
The North-South Institute 
The Institute is a non-profit corporation established in 1976 to provide 
professional, policy-relevant research on the 'North-South' issues of rela- 
tions between industrialized and developing countries. The results of this 
research are made available to policy makers, interested groups and the 
general public to help generate greater understanding and informed 
discussion of development questions. The Institute is independent and 
non-partisan, and cooperates with a wide range of Canadian, overseas 
and international organizations working in related activities. 
The contents of this report represent the finding and views of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the North-South Institute's Board of Directors or supporters, 
nor of any of the institutions or individuals who were consulted during its 
preparation. 
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data 
Brodhead, Tim, 1943- 
Bridges of hope? : Canadian voluntary agencies and the Third World 
Issued also in French under title: Ponts de 1'espoir? 
Bibliography: p. 157 
ISBN 0-920494-72-2 
1. Associations, institutions, etc., Canadian - Developing countries. 2. Economic assis- 
tance, Canadian. 3. Associations, institutions, etc. - Canada. 4. International cooperation - Societies, etc. I. Herbert-Copley, Brent, 1960- . II. North-South Institute (Ottawa, Ont.). 
III. Title. 
HC60.B761988 338.91'71'01724 C88-090051-2 
Editor: Moyra Tooke 
Copy Editor: Rowena Cunningham 
Production: Claire Paulin 
Cover Design and Graphics: Edwards Design 
Typesetting and Layout: Graph Comp Design 
© The North-South Institute/Llnstitut Nord-Sud, 1988 
Price: $14.00 
Additional copies in English or French may be ordered directly from the 
Institute, 55 Murray Street, Suite 200, Ottawa, Canada KIN 5M3, 
or from booksellers. 
iii 
Bridges 
There are many kinds of bridges. 
There are bridges of the mind - 
conceptual and philosophic bridges. 
There are bridges of the heart - 
bridges of love, bridges of friendship 
and of the spirit. 
There are bridges of vision - 
bridges to the future, bridges of hope 
and of promise. 
The building of a bridge begins - 
not from one side, but from each side. 
Flexibility is a must - 
a rigid bridge will not long endure. 
Patience is a necessity - 
for to design a lasting structure 
takes time. 
What makes the best foundation? 
Where shall it be placed? 
Why? 
Nations build bridges - 




People build bridges - 
use bridges 
are bridges 
to the future. 
Raymond Moriyama Architect 
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Preface 
Canadians have a long tradition of voluntary action to achieve their social 
goals. Thinly scattered across a vast land, tested by an often inhospitable 
nature, Canadians have been nourished less on an ideology of aggressive 
individualism than on an understanding of the practical benefits of 
cooperation. From the Antigonish movement in the East through the 
Desjardins credit unions in Quebec to the diverse cooperatives of the West, 
Canadians have relied on themselves, on mutual assistance, for their 
survival and progress. 
Since World War II, government has absorbed many of the traditional 
roles of the voluntary sector in providing social services, but voluntary 
action is still a pervasive factor of Canadian life. Statistics Canada reports 
that in 1980 there were 40,000 registered charities' operating in Canada, 
with more being created every day. 
The trend in Canada reflects the reality in many industrialized countries. 
Ralph Kramer, in a study of voluntary agencies in the United States, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands and Israel, refers to a "parallel process in Western 
democracies of the simultaneous expansion of the public and the private 
sectors in the economy and in society, and a blurring of the boundaries 
between them";z a resultant 'mixed economy' in the social services 
makes traditional distinctions between them obsolete. 
The 1980s have witnessed an apparent shrinking of the governmental role 
because of fiscal constraints, a mushrooming demand for social services 
(and consequent spiralling costs), and, at least in some instances, dissatis- 
faction with the quality of state-provided services. Clearly, the voluntary 
sector is a permanent feature of Western societies, functioning not only as 
a provider of services, but also as a policy advocate and educator. 
In modern societies based on self-interest, with their dominant institu- 
tions organized along bureaucratic, centralized and depersonalized lines, 
and with individual relationships primarily regulated by contract, volun- 
tary agencies serve a corrective function. They are oriented to meeting the 
needs of others, they embody the principle of collective responsibility, and 
they express an ideal of pluralism springing from a healthy scepticism of 
I Statistics Canada, "An Overview of Volunteer Workers in Canada," The Labour Force 
(May 1981). 
z Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State (Berkeley: University of Califor- 
nia Press, 1981), p.3. 
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authority. In the words of Paul Sherry, "the primary role of voluntary 
organizations is to continuously shape and re-shape the vision of a more 
just social order. 113 
Within Canada some three million people express their needs and inter- 
ests and plan action through voluntary organizations which operate 
outside government to solve a problem, advance a cause or provide a 
service; voluntary agencies have been created to engage in women's 
interests for example, consumer protection, health care priorities, envi- 
ronmental and social justice issues, and the arts. All of these are non- 
profit organizations; most are incorporated as charitable organizations 
governed by boards of directors made up of volunteers. Voluntary agen- 
cies are not necessarily staffed entirely, or even in part, by volunteers: they 
are 'voluntary' in the sense that people choose to come together to pursue 
a cause or goal. 
This study examines one part of the Canadian voluntary sector, those 
agencies working mainly or entirely in the field of international develop- 
ment. It excludes organizations such as labour movements, universities 
and colleges, and professional associations that conduct international 
development activities as part of a broader mandate. 
In this book, the term non-governmental organization (NGO) refers ex- 
clusively to any voluntary, non-profit agency involved in the field of 
international development cooperation, or in education and policy ad- 
vocacy activities related to international development. It is an awkward 
term and on its own reveals little. There have been periodic attempts to 
find a new, more positive name: in the United States, the term private 
voluntary organizations (PVOs) predominates, while others have sug- 
gested private development agencies (PDAs). NGO, however, has the 
advantage of wide acceptance not only in the United Nations' system 
where it originated, but also in most industrialized countries and in many 
regions of the Third World. While there are limitations in the term, it 
remains the most widely understood means of referring to voluntary 
agencies in the field of international development. 
The Study 
Over the past 15 years development NGOs have expanded their activities 
dramatically, with the result that as a whole they now constitute a major 
factor in Canada's relations with developing countries. Yet information 
about development agencies and their programs is lacking both in quan- 
tity and quality, consisting largely of NGO promotional materials or, 
occasionally, evaluations of specific agencies or activities. 
3 Paul Sherry, "America's Third Force," Journal of Current Issues (July-August 1970). 
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In 1985 the North-South institute launched an intensive two-year study 
of Canada's NGOs, both to introduce them more fully to the Canadian 
public and to provide more detailed evaluative material of interest to the 
NGOs themselves and to other development specialists. 
The study has four broad objectives: 
to examine the distinctive features of the role of NGOs in inter- 
national development cooperation - their relief and development 
assistance to Third World countries as well as their educational and 
advocacy work in Canada; 
to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in helping to meet develop- 
ment needs and in mobilizing and channelling public support for 
international development; 
to identify some of the strengths and weaknesses of Canadian NGOs, 
with a view to improving their capacity to play a positive role in 
overall Canadian relationships with the Third World; and 
to formulate conclusions and recommendations that will be useful to 
NGO planners, the government and to the broader public. 
Methodology 
From the outset, our goal was to arrive at general conclusions applicable, 
as far as possible, to the development NGO community as a whole, within 
a structure that recognizes the important differences among agencies. In 
order to do this, we organized our research around a set of broad 
statements which NGOs use to describe themselves and what they do. 
In November 1985, following an extensive review of the literature and 
some preliminary interviews, we sent a questionnaire to 220 develop- 
ment agencies across Canada. It had two purposes: first, it elicited back- 
ground information on agency programs, structures and staffing; second, 
it asked respondents to rate 27 statements about NGOs in terms of their 
applicability to their own agency. 
The responses - which eventually numbered 129 (see Appendix 1) or 
almost 60 percent of the original sample - were then analyzed. Eleven 
of the statements on which there was greatest agreement formed the 
'articles of faith 14 for Canadian NGOs around which we organized our 
research. The 11 statements are outlined on pages 29-30. 
4 The notion of NGO 'articles of faith' was first used by Judith Tendler in a 1982 study 
carried out for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Tendler 
identified seven characteristics used by NGOs to describe their work: reaching the poor; 
participation of beneficiaries; concern with process rather than simply outcome; working 
on a people-to-people basis; flexibility and experimentation; support for local voluntary 
institutions; and low cost. See Judith Tendler, 714rning Private Voluntary Organizations into 
Development Agencies: Questions for Evaluation (Aid Program Evaluation Discussion Paper 
No. 12), Washington, D.C., April 1982. 
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This approach had several advantages. First, it provided the common 
ground for evaluation which allowed us to profile the Canadian NGO 
community as a whole rather than simply its constituent parts. Second, 
and equally important, the approach allowed the NGOs themselves to set 
the themes for the study rather than having the criteria for evaluation 
imposed from outside. The key here is that these 11 statements are self- 
descriptions, reflecting how NGOs themselves perceive their role in inter- 
national development. 
In conducting the research we were struck by the dynamic tension 
between the principles which underlie all voluntary action (and which 
are reflected in the NGOs' articles of faith) and the need for development 
agencies to adapt them constantly to a rapidly changing international 
environment. Those basic principles are summed up in the five themes 
around which this report is organized and which serve as titles to the 
chapters in Part II. 
Between March and June 1986, the research team undertook six field 
trips of approximately one month each, covering seven countries in all: 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Haiti, Jamaica, Mali, Peru and Zimbabwe. 
Canadian voluntary development agencies support a wide range of activ- 
ities in each of these countries, and the team made an attempt to cover the 
work of a representative sample differing in programming styles, sectors 
and project sizes. In all, the research team visited 51 projects supported by 
Canadian NGOs (Appendix 2), and held further interviews with repre- 
sentatives of indigenous NGOs, national government officials and Cana- 
dian Embassy staff in the area. Within Canada, we also interviewed a 
cross-section of 31 NGOs that support development education programs 
for Canadians (Appendix 3), and a wide range of other participants in 
(and observers of) the voluntary development community. 
Our research was designed to profile the broad range of Canadian NGO 
activities rather than provide in-depth analysis of a few individual agen- 
cies or projects. Therefore, we chose representative rather than random 
sampling for both overseas visits and in-Canada interviews, and balanced 
first-hand research with a variety of secondary source materials. The 
majority of projects visited overseas were either actually in progress or 
only recently completed; while this may have made generalizations about 
the long-term impact of projects more difficult, we saw it as crucial to 
understanding how development projects work, rather than just what 
they had or had not achieved. 
Organization of the Report 
This report is structured around the research criteria we have described - 
the NGOs' self-descriptions or articles of faith. In other words, rather than 
focusing on specific activities, such as relief, development projects, and 
development education, we have tried to evaluate the validity of the broad 
characteristics claimed by a majority of NGOs to give them a unique role 
in the development field. These characteristics were identified through 
responses to our questionnaire, modified in the light of other concerns 
expressed in interviews with NGO representatives. 
Part I of the report provides a brief introduction to the Canadian NGO 
community, looking both at its evolution over the past decades and its 
current status. Part II, the main evaluative section of the report, assesses 
the validity of the central NGO self-perceptions which we have linked to 
five enduring principles underlying all voluntary activity. These linked 
principles are: 
altruism (NGOs respond to the needs of others); 
autonomy (NGOs are distinctive from and independent of govern- 
ments) ; 
participation (NGOs provide channels for Canadians to participate 
in international development); 
efficiency (NGOs' mobilize and use resources in a cost-effective 
fashion); and 
cooperation (NGOs have unique relationships with beneficiary com- 
munities). 
Part III of the report evaluates perhaps the single most important argu- 
ment for NGOs' unique role in development and the most important 
determinant of their future effectiveness: their capacity for innova- 
tion and flexibility as they respond to a rapidly changing development 
environment. 
On Being Critical 
Throughout this report, while some specific positive or negative examples 
are cited, we have chosen on the whole not to refer to agencies and 
projects by name, particularly in our analysis of what we perceive as 
failures. We felt that to name agencies would single some out for praise or 
criticism and reduce the incentive for others to apply that critical assess- 
ment to their own work. It is for the same reason that the report treats the 
voluntary development community in broad terms rather than focusing 
on the structure and activities of a few individual agencies. 
Our research has been guided both by our faith in the uniqueness and 
potential of the Canadian non-governmental development community, 
and our understanding that faith does not obviate the need for criticism. 
The criteria for this research - the self-descriptions outlined above - set 
high standards for NGOs. If the tone of the report is overly critical, it is 
because we take small successes for granted and concentrate instead on 
the broader challenges that NGOs must face. 
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As in any undertaking of this scope, the final product is the result of the 
hard work and encouragement of many individuals and institutions. In 
the first place, we are indebted to our financial sponsors, governmental 
and non-governmental, who saw the value of an in-depth, independent 
assessment of Canadian NGOs. Research assistance was provided by 
Maureen Hollingworth and Fielding Yost, and an advisory committee 
(Jean Brodeur, Mardele Harland, Marc Laporte, Pat Mooney, James 
Morrison, Betty Plewes, Raymond ven der Buhs, Bob Vokey and John 
Wieler) met several times to review work and offer suggestions for im- 
provement. We are also grateful to the staff of the North-South Institute, 
particularly Roger Young, Bernard Wood and Maxwell Brem, and to our 
editor, Moyra Tooke. Finally, a note of thanks is due to the many individu- 
als and agencies in Canada and abroad who responded to our question- 
naire, answered our questions, and allowed us to visit their projects. Their 
candor, patience and insight have been crucial to our work. 
Part I 
The Voluntary Development 
Community in Canada 

3 
1 The Evolution of the Canadian 
Voluntary Development 
Community 
Canadian voluntary development agencies were active in what is now 
called the Third World long before government. Canadians were engaged 
in missionary work overseas before the turn of the century; the first 
Canadian official aid program dates only from the Colombo Plan of the 
early 1950s. 
In the years following World War II a number of refugee and relief 
agencies were created in Canada, often to serve as fundraising branches 
of European or American organizations (e.g., CARE, OXFAM, Foster 
Parents Plan). The final burst of decolonization in the 1960s saw the 
setting up of agencies like CUSO/SUCO to send volunteers to the emerg- 
ing nations. International cooperation moved away from its missionary 
origins and became 'secularized', and a large number of Canadian volun- 
tary development agencies were established. Many of the Canadian 
branches of foreign organizations became more independent and some, 
such as OXFAM and the Canadian Save the Children Fund (CANSAVE), 
loosened or severed their links with their parent bodies. 
In fact, the 1960s represented the coming of age of the voluntary develop- 
ment community in Canada. The creation of the Canadian Council for 
International Cooperation (CCIC) was the first step toward inter-agency 
cooperation and was followed in the 1970s by the founding of a number 
of provincial coordinating councils. 
In the 1960s also, the Canadian government began to give direct financial 
support to development NGOs. Canada was one of the first western aid- 
giving countries to establish a program specifically to support the involve- 
ment of its citizens in international development by matching pri- 
vate donations to voluntary development agencies. In 1968, the federal 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) set up a Non- 
Governmental Organizations division with the mandate to promote citi- 
zen participation in development activities, provide development assis- 
tance to emerging nations through non-governmental channels (by 
means of matching grants), and tap the expertise and resources of the 
non-governmental sector for development purposes. CIDA recognized 
the importance of exempting the voluntary sector from the sort of con- 
straints imposed on government-to-government aid, such as tying aid to 
expenditures on Canadian goods and services, country and sector pri- 
orities, and the need to obtain prior approval from a host country govern- 
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ment (although NGO proposals are routinely cleared through the Cana- 
dian mission in the country concerned). In 1981, CIDA's matching grant 
program was re-organized to include responsibility for the participation 
of universities, colleges, unions, professional associations, and cooper- 
atives; many of the large volunteer-sending NGOs were transferred to a 
separate program, the Institutional Cooperation and Development 
Services (ICDS) divison. 
In its first year, the NGO division disbursed some $5 million to 
50 development projects carried out by 20 agencies. By the mid-1980s, 
matching funds were being provided to almost 200 agencies in support of 
2,400 projects. Nor is support restricted to NGO division/ICDS channels; 
development agencies also received funding from the matching grants 
programs of several provincial governments (though in recent years, 
these programs have been in decline). CIDA's International Humanitarian 
Assistance (IHA) division funds relief and recovery projects and, in- 
creasingly, the bilateral division of CIDA offers a number of special fund- 
ing arrangements for NGOs. Indeed, it is a paradox that within Canada 
the single dominant presence on the non-governmental scene since the 
late 1960s has been the federal government. Government funding, pol- 
icies and procedures for NGOs, more than any other single factor, have 
determined the pattern of Canadian NGO activity. On the whole, it has 
been a rather benign, non-coercive influence, though not without its 
conflicts. 
In the 1960s also, there was a surge of energy and resolve among develop- 
ment workers. Thldeau's 'just society' liberalism, the return to Canada of 
CUSO/SUCO and other agency volunteers now sensitized to the inter- 
relationships of Third World poverty and global economic and political 
structures, and intellectual influences ranging from liberation theology to 
the works of Paolo Freire, Andre Gunder Frank, and Ivan Illich, created a 
critical mass of Canadians anxious to "bring the message back home." In 
the words of Jean Christie, 
... they realized that meaningful development would require a 
distribution of power as well as of resources; that it would have to 
deal with trade as well as aid; that it would necessitate a revamping of 
unjust structures and relationships - between nations and within 
nations ... they realized that global changes would require changes 
in Canada: in attitudes, actions and structures.' 
Partly in response to these pressures, though perhaps more directly 
motivated by a wish to increase public support for Canada's aid program, 
CIDA launched a matching grant scheme for development education, 
called the Public Participation Program (PPP). PPP was a pioneering 
1 
' Jean Christie, "A Critical History of Development Education in Canada," Canadian and 
International Education, 12:3 (1983), p.9. 
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venture in government support for autonomous citizens' groups to play a 
role in public education and policy advocacy. Although the level of fi- 
nancial support has always been a fraction of that given to overseas pro- 
jects, it was crucial to some of the early steps in creating a development 
education community in Canada - such as the funding of regionally- 
based animators through the Development Education Animators Program 
(DEAP) in the early 1970s, or the 1972 tour of the mobile learner centre, 
which spread the work and experience of the London Learner Centre 
(originally set up by CUSO), and thus laid the groundwork for a national 
network of community-based educational groups. Local development 
education programming has been supplemented by a number of national 
programs, often carried out by agencies that also work overseas. 
Changes in Development Theory and Practice 
A review of the key events of NGO history tells only part of the story. The 
shifting pattern of values, concepts and theories over the years provides 
the best clues as to the nature of Canadian voluntary development 
agencies and their potential for evolution. 
Development agencies serve three functions: the first is meeting human 
needs in poor countries; the second is stimulating awareness and support 
for international development among the Canadian public; and the third 
is promoting public policies conducive to the creation of a more just and 
equitable world order. Although not all agencies embrace all of these 
goals, and some focus on one to the exclusion of the others, there is a 
widespread recognition that all are legitimate and necessary activities for 
NGOs. Over time, however, the balance between these functions has 
shifted, and the nature of the specific development programs that serve 
them has changed dramatically. To some extent, this reflects changes in 
how people have come to understand 'development'. 
In the post-World War II era, it was widely assumed that 'development' 
was synonymous with 'modernization', a basically imitative and auto- 
matic process in the course of which poor countries would become more 
and more like industrialized ones. Economist W. Arthur Lewis likened 
the process of development to a snowball: "Once the snowball starts to 
move downhill, it will move of its own momentum, and will get bigger 
and bigger as it goes along." Development theory, as such, only came into 
being when it became clear that the snowball was not rolling downhill, 
that development was not happening. A succession of schools of thought 
about development then came into vogue, each contributing new ideas 
and analysis. 
Dependency theory asserted that the major obstacles to development are 
external, embedded in exploitative trade and other exchanges whereby 
the centre systematically appropriates the surplus produced by the pe- 
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riphery. Basic needs theory arose from the failure of trickle-down concepts 
of growth, leading development practitioners (notably the World Bank) 
to target the poor for such essential services as clean water, sanitation, 
health and education. The notion of interdependence, argued forcefully in 
the 1980 Brandt Report, highlighted the transnationalization of econo- 
mies and linked an increase in the purchasing power of the poor develop- 
ing nations to a re-launching of economic growth in the industrialized 
world, to the benefit of each. 
NGOs, while influenced to some extent by these differing strands in 
development theory, pursued an approach rooted in their own ethical and 
philanthropic traditions and conditioned by their position as outsiders - 
bit players in terms of resources and power. They adopted from the 
beginning a resolutely 'grass-roots' approach, not necessarily or solely 
because of any immunity from the supposed paternalism or assumptions 
of cultural and technological superiority often attributed to aid givers, but 
because of practical limitations imposed by small budgets and staff, and 
uncertain funding. Consequently, they preferred small-scale, often iso- 
lated or even scattered projects; they sought a contribution from the 
indigenous community, both to demonstrate community support and to 
keep costs low; and they encouraged local initiative in originating pro- 
jects, both because their own management tended to be somewhat loose 
and because, over time, confident and trusting relationships developed 
between 'donors' and 'recipients'. 
In the period before 1970 NGOs, by and large, shared the dominant faith 
of the postwar era that progress could be equated with economic growth: 
development was a relatively linear process of adoption of Western values 
and technology. This belief was reflected in their programs, emphasizing 
direct assistance to individuals and families in need. Material assistance, 
child and family sponsorship, and emergency relief were the order of the 
day. Development education and advocacy, to the extent they existed at all, 
centred on providing factual information about the Third World, and on 
building public support for the aid program in general and NGOs in 
particular. 
By the mid-1970s, faith in this approach began to be challenged on 
several fronts. First, economic progress in the industrialized world fal- 
tered under the shocks of the oil price rise, stagflation, soaring unemploy- 
ment and shifting patterns of economic production. People returning 
from working in Third World countries joined others in asking whether 
the Western industrial model, greedy in its demands on cheap energy and 
the environment, was sustainable for the West itself, let alone viable for 
the rest of the globe. Second, people in Third World countries began to 
form producer cooperatives, peasant associations, and a variety of formal 
and informal community-based self-help groups - and to demand a 
greater say in what the objectives of development were to be and the 
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means by which they could be attained. And finally, NGOs themselves 
came to recognize that in the face of an exploding population and the 
sheer magnitude of human needs, an approach based on taking care of 
one child at a time could not begin to master the myriad factors contribut- 
ing to human misery and impoverishment. 
As a result, NGOs began to shift the objectives of their overseas program- 
ming toward longer-term development, emphasizing small, self- 
contained projects, appropriate technology, and efforts to organize and 
animate local communities in order to strengthen capacities for self- 
reliance. 
This change toward a developmental approach overseas was paralleled by 
an evolution in educational work at home in Canada. The straightforward 
dissemination of information about the Third World began to be replaced 
by a more critical analysis of structural causes of underdevelopment and 
the inter-relationships between North and South. In the 1970s much of 
the most innovative education and policy advocacy was conducted simul- 
taneously on specific local community concerns and on major interna- 
tional issues: trade, food, jobs, and the implications of a new international 
economic order. 'Think globally, act locally' was the watchword of the 
times. In their advocacy work, as well, agencies began to concentrate on 
mobilizing public opinion against Northern trade and aid policies which 
they saw as injurious to the type of development they favoured. 
Today the process of change continues. In the mid- and late-1980s, a 
further evolution is leading NGOs toward a new "strategic" orientation 
that promises profound changes in the way NGOs operate. NGOs' history 
has always been in the active voice, as 'doers'. But now their counterparts 
in the South - inevitably - are taking this role on for themselves. As 
always, the shift is neither automatic nor painless. NGOs, historically the 
activists of development, must now adapt to changes in the international 
development community. Indigenous self-reliance, preached for so long 
by Northern benefactors, is becoming a reality, not in the sense of au- 
tarchy (an increasingly irrelevant concept in an era of 'world product 
mandates' and global communications) but in the sense of a new division 
of labour in the international NGO community. At the same time, Cana- 
dian NGOs are also changing their approach to their other missions - 
development education and advocacy - as the limitations of past policies 
become increasingly apparent. The chapters which follow chart these 
developments and their implications for Canadian NGOs. 
2 David C. Korten, "Micro-Policy Reform: The Role of Private Voluntary Development 
Agencies" (Working Paper No. 12), National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and 
Administration, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1986. 
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Although NGO approaches and activities have shifted over the years, 
there remains an essential self-defining core to which all development 
NGOs aspire: altruistic in motivation, independent in status, participatory 
in structure and methodology, respectful of the rights and dignity of 
individuals and collectivities, and capable of mobilizing resources effec- 
tively. The ultimate test of NGOs' flexibility and innovativeness (and hence 
their effectiveness) lies in their capacity to harness these principles to 
effective action in a constantly changing environment, strategically using 
their limited resources to bring about real change in the search for a more 
just and humane world. It is this tension between continuity - in princi- 
ples, values and beliefs - and change in the environment for NGO work, 
and the methods adopted to deal with this environment, which provides 
the context for NGO activity and for this study. 
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2 The Canadian Voluntary 
Development Community Today 
Despite occasional media coverage and a barrage of fundraising appeals, 
most Canadians know relatively little about voluntary development 
agencies. Even individuals who support a particular organization seldom 
know much about its programs. Some agencies, of course, are well 
known, and a few - CUSO, CARE, the Red Cross or the Jules and Paul- 
Emile Leger Foundation - are familiar names,' but broader knowledge of 
the structures and activities of the voluntary development community as 
a whole is almost non-existent. 
This chapter provides a profile of NGOs through analyzing their struc- 
tures, activities and the environment in which they work. For the most 
part, the profile is based on information gathered in 1986 from responses 
to a questionnaire completed by 129 executive directors (or equivalent 
representatives) of Canadian NGOs representing a good cross-section of 
the Canadian development community. 
Who Are the NGOs? 
This study, as noted in the preface, is confined to those voluntary agencies 
whose primary activity is international development. Some 220 Cana- 
dian development agencies, of widely different origins, sizes and pur- 
poses, fit this definition. In terms of annual operating budgets for exam- 
ple, respondents range from World Vision Canada and World University 
Service Canada (WUSC), with annual budgets each over $25 million, to 
the Christian Farmers Federation of Alberta and the Comite de solidarite 
Tiers Monde, whose combined budgets in 1984-85 added up to less than 
$100,000. Of the 97 agencies that provided financial information, 36 per- 
cent had a 1984 budget of less than $250,000, 24 percent between 
$250,000 and $1 million, 24 percent between $1 million and $5 million, 
and 16 percent over $5 million. 
Despite this diversity it is possible to make some broad generalizations 
about Canadian NGOs. 
I A 1980 opinion poll, carried out for CIDA by Adcom Research Ltd., reveals some 
interesting results. Respondents were asked to name agencies working in the field of 
international development. Not surprisingly, long-established NGOs were relatively well 
known, ranging as high as 27 percent of all respondents in the case of the Red Cross 
(compared to only 6 percent for CIDA). On the other hand, only seven agencies (Red Cross, 
UNICEF, CARE, churches, OXFAM, CUSO and the Salvation Army) were mentioned by 
more than 5 percent of respondents nationally. See Adcom Research Ltd. A Report On 
Canadians' Attitudes Toward Foreign Aid (Hull: CIDA, November 1980), p. 53. 
10 
First, despite the importance of religion and missionary work in the 
early days, most Canadian development NGOs - 72 percent - could be 
defined as secular, only 13 percent as 'religious but non-denominational', 
and 14 percent as 'denominational'. The province of Quebec is somewhat 
of an exception in that there are still a large number of agencies of 
religious origin. Even here, as Gabrielle Lachanced has noted, the 'secu- 
larization' of Quebec society since 1945 has meant that traditional mis- 
sionary work is increasingly called into question. Many agencies have 
either moved away from their church roots, or have relegated pastoral 
work and proselytization to secondary importance. 
Moreover, unlike NGOs in some countries in Western Europe (for exam- 
ple, the Netherlands), Canadian NGOs do not split along religious lines: a 
large number of inter-church committees and working groups span the 
Christian denominations; the national NGO umbrella group - CCIC - 
and its provincial counterparts, include both religious and secular groups. 
A second general observation concerns the proportion and importance of 
foreign-based agencies to overall Canadian NGO activity. As was men- 
tioned in Chapter 1, many of the Canadian agencies founded before 1960 
were essentially branches of foreign (usually British or American) NGOs, 
including Foster Parents Plan, CARE, OXFAM, and Save the Children 
Fund, to name just a few. Even in Quebec, where language might be 
assumed to be a barrier, five of seven organizations formed before 1960 
were of foreign origin.3 Over the years, the relative importance of foreign 
control decreased, as some agencies (for example, OXFAM-Canada and 
CANSAVE) became independent of their former head offices, and as an 
increasing number of indigenous Canadian agencies sprang up. In fact, 
the balance has now clearly swung away from foreign-based agencies: 
only 12 percent of agencies founded since 1971 channel the funds they 
raise to an international parent or affiliate, compared with 46 percent of 
those formed in the period 1946-1960. Figure 2.1 illustrates the declining 
importance of foreign-based NGOs. 
Nonetheless, local affiliates of foreign-based agencies still make up a 
sizeable portion of the Canadian NGO community: fully 25 percent of 
agencies responding to the questionnaire are linked to a foreign head 
office (while formally, of course, responsible to an independent Canadian 
board of directors). The role of the Canadian branches has primarily been 
that of fundraisers: they are among the most efficient in the entire 
Canadian NGO community, often surpassing the per capita fundraising 
ability of the parent organization. Some of them, such as World Vision 
2 Gabrielle Lachance, "La cooperation au developpement: le point de vue des organisa- 
tions non-gouvernementales quebecoises," Revue Canadienne d'Etudes du Developpe- 
ment/Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. VII, no. 1 (1986), pp. 124-125. 
3 Ibid., p. 118. 
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Canada, CARE Canada and Foster Parents Plan of Canada, are among the 
largest recipients of Canadian private and public funds. Foreign-based 
agencies, however, pay less attention to other aspects of development 
work: for instance, they are usually not engaged in development educa- 
tion except for brief donor newsletters, even though parent agencies are in 
some cases moving increasingly in this direction. And while a few, such as 
CARE Canada, have taken steps to increase their role in development 
programming, agency head offices are usually responsible for operations 
in the Third World. There is, of course, a certain logic in this sort of 
centralization. For example, Foster Parents Plan International, located in 
Rhode Island, U.S.A., has a large staff working on planning, program- 
ming and evaluation, and is thus able to develop far more expertise than 
its national branches. For the Canadian offices, however, specialization 
has meant that programming expertise has developed slowly, if at all. As 
will be noted in Chapter 3, this poses problems, particularly in areas such 
as emergency relief. 
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A third generalization is that although NGOs are located in all regions of 
Canada, their distribution is uneven. As Figure 2.2 shows, just over half of 
all agencies that responded to our questionnaire are in Ontario, while 
only two respondents (1.6 percent) are from Atlantic Canada. The dis- 
parity in relative size and scope of programs is even more striking. Most of 
the large, national NGOs are based in Ontario; however, Ontario has 
surprisingly few local and regional agencies, most of which are concen- 
trated in Quebec and the Prairies. The strength of the local voluntary 
sector in these regions should come as no surprise. The Prairies in 
particular have a strong tradition of voluntary action, reflected in higher- 
than-average rates of charitable donations and a higher level of volunteer 
work than in many other provinces.4 Development education has flour- 
ished on the Prairies, with learner centres playing a key role in both urban 
and rural areas. Quebec has, logically, developed its own regional 
community because many national organizations have no francophone 
presence: some of these regional agencies have cultivated a broader con- 
stituency, particularly among French-speaking Canadians living 
outside Quebec. 
What Do NGOs Do? 
As noted earlier, NGO work falls into three broad categories: overseas 
projects and programs, development education and public policy ad- 
vocacy. These encompass, however, a wide range of activities and ap- 
proaches. For example, we visited projects that ranged from agricultural 
extension work in Bangladesh to handicraft production and marketing in 
Peru, and the production of breakfast cereal in Jamaica. A comparable 
variety of activities and approaches exists in development education and 
advocacy work. 
Overseas Activities 
As a result of the NGOs' slow but steady evolution toward a more 
integrated developmental approach to issues of poverty and under- 
development, welfare activities - the provision of material assistance 
(clothing, medical supplies) or the sponsoring of children and families - 
have declined in relative importance. Current NGO work is clearly a mix 
of welfare and development, as Figure 2.3 shows. Similarly, although 
emergency relief is still an important (and highly visible) activity for 
many agencies, the emphasis on longer-term development work is 
increasing. 
4 A 1984 Gallup poll, for example, found that per capita donations to charity were higher 
in the Prairies than in any other region, and that the incidence of volunteer work in the 12 
months preceding the survey was highest in the Prairies and British Columbia. See Cana- 
dian Gallup Poll Ltd., Financial Support for Non-Profit Organizations 1984: A Study of the 
Behaviour and Attitudes of Canadians. Narrative Report. November 1984, pp. 44, 99. 
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Figure 2.2 
Distribution of Questionnaire Respondents by Region 
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This shift from welfare to development has led agencies to adopt a 
'project-centred' approach. Instead of the relatively straightforward do- 
nation of financial or material resources to indigenous Third World 
groups or individuals, most overseas work now consists of distinct proj- 
ects designed to carry out specific activities within a given period of time. 
Even agencies with substantial sponsorship programs, such as Foster 
Parents Plan, generally carry out sponsorship within the framework of a 
broader community development project. This change has been given 
impetus by the increasing levels of CIDA funding to NGOs and CIDA's 
demands for accountability and measurement of outputs, which are 
easier to meet within a project format. 
Increasingly, however, NGOs are beginning to realize the limitations of an 
approach stressing small, self-contained projects, no matter how effec- 
tively managed. As pressures mount to demonstrate broader develop- 
ment impact, NGOs are moving toward the support of more integrated 
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Figure 2.3 
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Source: Questionnaire responses. Figures are raw averages, which do not take into account the relative 
sizes of various agencies. Development education and in-Canada administrative expenses are 
excluded. 
development programs. Local indigenous partners, meanwhile, are 
pressing Canadian agencies to provide not just funds for specific projects, 
but core funding for ongoing operations. CIDA, for its part, is moving 
more and more toward funding programs rather than projects, and 
providing multi-year funding for established NGOs, at least partially in 
order to decrease its own administrative costs. In 1985-86, fully two- 
thirds of CIDA's NGO division disbursements were in the form of multi- 
year or program grants. But in spite of this shift, the development project 
remains the primary unit of operation for NGOs, as for most other donors. 
In terms of geographical distribution, NGOs' overseas activities are fairly 
evenly spread among regions (see Table 2.1). Since the inception of CIDA's 
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NGO program in 1968, the percentage of disbursements going to Africa 
has increased markedly, while Asia's share has fallen. Latin America and 
the Caribbean still receive a large share of total disbursements; to a certain 
degree, this reflects Canada's historical ties with the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, which, given its small population, receives a disproportionate 
share of both NGO and government-to-government assistance. Despite 
the increased emphasis on Africa, it is important to note that the activities 
of Canadian NGOs are not focused exclusively on the poorest countries. 
In 1984-85, just over one-third of CIDA's NGO and ICDS divisions dis- 
bursements to NGOs went to the 31 countries designated by the United 
Nations as 'least developed' - a figure not appreciably different from the 
percentage of total Canadian government-to-government aid going to 
these countries. NGOs focus their work on poverty alleviation at a 'micro' 
(rather than national) level. Priorities are set not just by need but by 
historical ties, availability of funding, and familiarity with local partners; 
as a result GNP per capita is a poor predictor of the level of NGO activity in 
a given country. 
What is the nature of NGO projects? Table 2.2 provides a breakdown by 
sector of projects funded by CIDA's NGO and ICDS divisions in 1985-86. 
As can be seen, 'social' projects, particularly in the fields of education and 
health, predominate. Projects centred on agriculture and food production 
account for a slightly smaller percentage of disbursements, while other 
non-farm productive activities represent only a small portion of total 
NGO activities.5 The table also shows the large percentage of total dis- 
bursements that are essentially multi-sectoral in nature ('institutional 
support and management', 'economic and financial support'). To some 
degree, this is merely an accounting convenience, since development 
projects are often difficult to catalogue by sector, but it also represents the 
growing tendency among NGOs to work in an integrated fashion, and in 
some cases to move beyond specific projects toward program support for 
institutions and groups. 
One final point should be made regarding NGOs' role in overseas projects. 
The dominant public image, influenced by such high profile groups as 
CUSO, is that of Canadians - often volunteers - working hand-in-hand 
with Third World citizens on development projects, in schools, health 
clinics, or rice paddies. In reality, this kind of direct operational role 
5 Unlike NGOs in the United States, Canadian agencies are not heavily involved in the 
support of small-scale, informal sector entrepreneurs. A 1984 report for CIDA, for example, 
concluded that with a few exceptions, Canadian NGOs have relatively little capacity (and 
often only lukewarm interest) in developing small-scale credit programs for micro-enter- 
prises, a conclusion supported by our own field work. See Robert Mitchell and Francine 
TYempe, Canadian NGOs and Small Scale Enterprise Development: An Analysis of Present Capabili- 
ties and Future Potential (Hull: CIDA, November 1984). Where NGOs are involved in such 
income-generating activities, it often takes place within a multi-sectoral community devel- 
opment program and, as a result, does not show up in statistics. 
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Table 2.1 
NGO and ICDS Division Disbursements by Regiona 
1969-70 1974-75 1979-80 1984-85 
Asia 40.0 39.4 28.5 25.7 
Anglophone Africa 11.7 15.9 22.1 21.0 
Francophone Africa 3.3 13.3 16.1 15.2 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
45.0 31.4 33.3 38.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Excluding all disbursements not allocable by country (e.g., multi-regional, in-Canada, PPP); previous 
to 1977-78 - disbursements to several large cooperant-placement agencies (CUSO, CESO, CWY) were 
also not allocable by country or region. 
Source: CIDA, Evaluation Division, Policy Branch, "Evaluation Assessment of the NGO Program: 
Volume 1, Program Profile" Draft, Hull, May 1983, Table 3; additional data supplied by Special 
Programs Branch, CIDA. 
Table 2.2 
Sectoral Breakdown of NGO and ICDS Division Disbursements, 1985-86 
($ millions of current year) 
NGO ICDS Total 
Health, Nutrition and 22.0 3.7 25.7 
Population (including water 
and sanitation) 
(34.2%) (6.1%) (20.6%) 
Education and Human 9.3 26.3 35.6 
Resource Development (14.5%) (43.6%) (28.6%) 
Agriculture and Food 9.4 13.9 23.3 
Production (14.6%) (23.1%) (18.7%) 
Institutional Support 2.8 15.1 17.9 
and Management (4.4%) (25.0%) (14.4%) 
Economic and Financial 16.8 - 16.8 
Support (26.1%) - (13.5%) 
Other Production (energy, 1.5 0.9 2.4 
forestry, industry, 
mines, fisheries) 
(2.3%) (1.5%) (1.9%) 
Other Non-production 0.3 0.1 0.4 
(communications, 
transportation) 
(0.5%) (0.2%) (0.3%) 
Unknown 2.2 0.4 2.6 
(3.4%) (0.7%) (2.1%) 
TOTAL 64.3 60.3 124.6 
(100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) 
Source: Adapted from information supplied by Special Programs Branch, CIDA. 
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represents only a small part of NGO work overseas. In a given country, 
NGOs may be active in a variety of ways. In Peru, to take one example, a 
few Canadian agencies, such as CUSO, WUSC, CANSAVE, or les Ailes de 
1'Esperance, have their own field personnel (both Canadian and locally- 
engaged staff) responsible for planning, monitoring and implementing 
projects. Other agencies, such as CARE Canada or the Canadian UNICEF 
Committee, work through international affiliates, with the Canadian role 
of these agencies in Peru primarily that of funder, with less responsibility 
for planning or monitoring. Finally, a large number of Canadian NGOs 
channel funds via local Peruvian NGOs; this is the case, for example, for 
the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP), 
OXFAM-Canada, the Leger Foundation, the Inter-Church Fund for Inter- 
national Development (ICFID), MATCH International, or the Canadian 
Hunger Foundation (CHF). In this situation, the extent of Canadian 
involvement in planning and evaluation can vary widely, depending on 
the relationship built up between the Canadian and local NGO. In some 
cases local control is almost complete: CCODP, for example, even en- 
trusted evaluation of its Peru program to a local agency, the Centro de 
Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo (DESCO), with only periodic Cana- 
dian input. 
In recent years, there has been some increase in direct Canadian NGO 
involvement overseas. Expanded CIDA funding has allowed some agen- 
cies such as WUSC and the Canadian Centre for International Studies and 
Cooperation (CECI) to build a greater direct project implementation 
capacity. At the same time, there has been a decrease in the importance of 
international affiliates. At least in part as a response to CIDA pressure to 
'Canadianize' their operations, some foreign-based agencies have begun 
to delegate some programming responsibility to the Canadian offices: 
CARE Canada, for example, has been designated 'lead agency' in several 
countries where CARE works, giving it prime responsibility for planning 
and monitoring. In the longer term, however, it appears to be the third 
strategy, i.e., working via indigenous NGOs, which is gaining ground. 
Development Education 
In terms of total budget, development education remains a small part of 
the work of the NGO community: in 1984-85, CIDA/PPP disbursements 
represented perhaps 3 percent of total ODA funds channelled to NGOs. 
Other measures, however, indicate that the importance of development 
education is substantially larger than this. Staffing figures, for example, 
show that over 10 percent of NGOs' total staff work specifically on 
development education, and this percentage has increased since 1975. 
Questionnaire data reveals that 77 percent of respondents do some devel- 
opment education, and 20 percent are exclusively involved in this work. 
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The term 'development education' has always been difficult to define, but 
broadly speaking it encompasses at least three categories of activities 
which, while often lumped together, have distinct goals and desired 
outcomes: 
Information: Much of what is called development education is actually 
the straightforward dissemination of factual information about Third 
World countries, or about the activities of NGOs, through agency news- 
letters, donor reports, sponsorship updates, etc.. For many large fund- 
raising agencies, this is the only form of development education in which 
they are involved, and its primary objective is fundraising or constituency 
building. Some NGOs, however, are trying to convert traditional news- 
letters into more effective tools of education. 
Education: For most development education groups, education implies 
more than the mere provision of factual information. Development 
education must be a critical, analytical process of reflection upon that 
information. Examples of this type of work vary widely, from the 
Common Heritage Programme's design of teaching materials for Cana- 
dian schools, to a Third World film festival and lecture series organized by 
the Edmonton Learner Centre. 
Advocacy: Finally, much development education is geared to encourag- 
ing specific action by the public. This can take a variety of forms, from 
lobbying politicians to public campaigns to raise awareness of specific 
issues, such as the infant formula boycott organized by NGOs from 
Canada and other countries, or the campaign against war toys by the 
Association quebecoise des organismes de cooperation internationale 
(AQOCI) and other Quebec NGOs. 
These categories, it should be noted, are not watertight compartments - 
one agency may well be involved in all three categories, and a given 
activity might, for example, aim at both education and advocacy. And 
while there is a progression of sorts implicit in this scheme (advocacy 
should be based upon education, which in turn demands reliable infor- 
mation) it is not intended to suggest a ranking of the effectiveness of 
activities, but rather to recognize that development education has a 
number of different objectives, and that different means to achieve these 
are appropriate - and, by implication, different standards of assessment 
must be applied. 
Much of Canadian NGO development education takes place at the local 
level, through learner centres and other community-based groups, but 
there are a number of national programs, run by agencies such as the 
YMCA, OXFAM-Canada and CUSO. One such national program is run by 
the inter-church body Ten Days for World Development which works 
through local parishes and church groups. 
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The Umbrella Organizations 
There is a constant tension in the NGO community between agencies' 
desire to preserve their individualism, and their recognition of the prac- 
tical benefits of cooperation. The very diversity of NGOs makes coordinat- 
ing activities difficult. Over the years, a variety of coordinating structures 
and networks have evolved, both in Canada and in the field. 
At the national level, Canadian NGO activities are coordinated by the 
Canadian Council for International Cooperation based in Ottawa. The 
council has over 110 institutional members from across the country, 
comprising both development agencies and those specializing in develop- 
ment education. Its mandate has evolved over the years, but now focuses 
on a mixture of service to members, representation and defence of NGO 
interests, and promotion of information-sharing among NGOs. In the 
area of overseas cooperation, for example, CCIC channels information to 
members on current issues and trends, and provides a contact point with 
their counterparts in other countries. It also administers a Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction Fund, which approves post-disaster projects for CIDA 
funding. In the field of government relations, CC IC monitors government 
policy and engages in advocacy work on behalf of the NGO community. 
Much of CCIC's work takes place via inter-agency working groups, 
organized along geographic lines (Francophone Africa, Southern Africa, 
Latin America) or functional lines (development and disarmament, 
women and development, and microtechnology). Again, these groups 
promote networking and information-sharing among agencies with sim- 
ilar interests, and also organize more specific activities (e.g., a national 
conference on Canada and South Africa; follow-up to the UN's Nairobi 
conference on women). CCIC also has regional committees in British 
Columbia, the Prairies, Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic provinces: these 
committees provide a forum for interaction and information-sharing on a 
provincial/regional basis, and are particularly oriented to development 
education.6 
In addition to CCIC, there are also NGO provincial councils in four 
provinces. The oldest of these are in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Orig- 
inally set up to administer provincial government matching grants 
schemes, they have gradually taken on new activities, particularly in the 
coordination of development education activities, and in provincially- 
based advocacy. More recently, reductions in provincial funding of NGOs 
have decreased the importance of the funding role somewhat. AQOCI, 
founded in 1976, has several areas of activity, dealing with overseas 
cooperation, development education and government relations. The 
newest of the councils is DECCA, the Development Education Coordinat- 
6 For more information, see Cooperative d'Animation et de Consultation, Evaluation of 
CCIC: Final Report, Montreal, September 1984. 
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ing Council of Alberta. Unlike the others, its role is solely in the field of 
development education, and its membership is limited to those agencies 
with education programs. DECCA was born out of a split between devel- 
opment education and overseas agencies in Alberta, which led to the 
demise of the Alberta Council for International Cooperation (which was 
similar in membership and structure to its Manitoba and Saskatchewan 
counterparts).' 
In recent years, a number of more focused forms of inter-agency coopera- 
tion have been created. There are now a number of regionally-based 
groups - South Asia Partnership - Canada, Solidarite Canada Sahel, 
Partnership Africa Canada - becoming involved in joint planning, project 
selection, and even, in some cases, programming. In the development 
education field as well, specialized agencies are being created, including 
the Learner Centres Association of Ontario, and the Manitoba-based 
Agencies for International Development Education (AIDE), which bring 
together groups working with the formal education system. As will be 
pointed out in Chapter 6, inter-agency coordination, whether in Canada 
or in the field, is increasingly a matter of specialized and often ad hoc 
networking. 
How Large Is the NGO Community? 
There are a variety of measures of the size of the Canadian NGO com- 
munity, all stressing a different feature of the community; at best, each 
provides an approximation, since data are notoriously unreliable. Yet 
regardless of the unit of measurement chosen, two points are clear: first, 
the NGO 'sector' is larger than often assumed; and second, the com- 
munity has grown considerably over the past decade, and continues 
to grow. 
Number of Agencies 
As Figure 2.4 shows, the number of NGOs involved in development 
increased slowly in the first 60 years of this century, but grew at a 
phenomenal rate during the 1960s and 1970s, and continues to grow 
during the 1980s. Fully 16 percent of questionnaire respondents reported 
that their agency had been founded between 1980 and 1985, and even 
this figure may be understated, since some new agencies were not in- 
cluded in the original mailing list. In fact, the 1984-85 African crisis gave 
rise to a large number of new NGOs, not all of whom were included in the 
study. As was stated earlier, we have estimated the total NGO community 
to number some 220 agencies. 
7 For more detail on the activities of the councils, see Manitoba Institute of Management/ 
Cooperative d'Animation et de Consultation, Evaluation Study of Provincial Councils of Non- 
Governmental Organizations, Winnipeg, January 1985. 
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Figure 2.4 
















Source: Questionnaire Data. 




Despite the constant formation of new agencies, the average size of 
agencies has also increased. According to questionnaire responses, the 
average number of staff per agency almost doubled between 1975 and 
1984, increasing from six to 11 full-time equivalents. This does not 
include volunteer staff, or field staff outside Canada. The average figures 
conceal wide variations in number of staff, several agencies employ no 
paid staff, while some, such as CUSO, employ over 100 people in their 
Canadian offices. 
It is difficult to arrive at a reliable figure for the number of Canadians 
directly involved in NGO work, but some tentative figures can be put 
forward. Based on the average figures presented above, total full-time 
paid staff in Canada number approximately 2,400. To this figure must be 
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added field personnel working outside Canada. Based on questionnaire 
responses, we can conclude that the number of Canadians working 
overseas with NGOs is at most some 500 (not counting missionaries, who 
are dealt with below). Most of these, however, work for the international 
parent of a Canadian agency, and thus have little contact with the 
Canadian office, or work on specific projects. In fact, only some 10 to 
15 respondent agencies (out of a total of over 100 with overseas projects) 
have their own field staff officers responsible for project identification and 
monitoring. 
If volunteer staff are included, the number of Canadians working for 
NGOs increases considerably. On average, questionnaire respondents 
count on the support of some 135 volunteers in Canada (full-time and 
part-time), which translates into a total figure of almost 30,000.8 Volun- 
teers working overseas (or 'cooperants', as they are often called) might 
add another 5,000 to this figure - almost 1,400 through volunteer place- 
ment agencies such as CUSO, CECI, WUSC, the Mennonite Central 
Committee (MCC) and the Organisation canadienne pour la solidarite et 
le developpement (OCSD); a further 550 young people on short-term 
exchanges through Canada World Youth (CWY) and Canadian Cross- 
roads International (CCI); and perhaps 3,000 missionaries doing pri- 
marily development (as opposed to pastoral) work.9 In total, then, be- 
tween 35,000 and 40,000 people may be directly involved in the work of 
Canadian NGOs. This does not include those who donate money to such 
agencies, or who are members of groups such as the YM/YWCA or the 
churches. 
Funding 
Funding for NGO activity comes primarily from two sources: private 
donations from individuals, corporations and foundations, and govern- 
ment grants. 
As Table 2.3 shows, government funding of NGO activity has increased 
markedly over the past decade. For the most part, these funds are part of 
the official development assistance (ODA) budget, channelled through 
CIDA or provincial government matching grants programs; in addition, a 
8 This figure is consistent with other available data. A 1984 survey of development 
education groups in Saskatchewan, for example, arrived at a "conservative estimate" of 
3,500 volunteers working on development education alone in the province, or an average of 
56 volunteers per agency. See Saskatchewan Council for International Cooperation, A Sur- 
vey of Development Education in Saskatchewan, Regina, 1984. 
9 A 1985 study of Catholic missionaries arrived at a figure of 3,633 in total, of whom some 
2,073 were primarily involved in development work. See Canadian Religious Conference 
(CRC), Canadian Catholic Missionaries: 1985 Statistics, Ottawa, 1985. Similar figures are not 
available for non-Catholic missionaries, but we can assume that there are at least 1,000 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































few agencies receive funding from other federal and provincial govern- 
ment programs not included in the ODA budget. There are several chan- 
nels of ODA funding of NGOs. 'Regular' programs, such as NGO, ICDS, 
PPP, provincial government contributions and food aid, make up the 
lion's share of the total; these programs are all 'responsive', with govern- 
ment support in the form of matching grants to projects developed by the 
NGOs. Emergency relief funds (which are also responsive) are channelled 
through CIDA's IHA division, and more recently through a special fund 
for Africa. Finally, CIDA's four bilateral branches, primarily responsible 
for government-to government disbursements, have in recent years be- 
gun to channel some funds to NGOs, via contracts and so-called country 
focus projects. 
In 1984-85, the total volume of ODA funds received by all NGOs (includ- 
ing universities, collleges, unions and professional associations not in- 
cluded in this study) was in the order of $250 million; in 1985-86, the 
total dipped slightly, largely as a result of a freeze on discretionary 
expenditures imposed by the government during the last three months of 
the fiscal year. Of the 1984-85 total, perhaps $35 million goes to univer- 
sities, colleges, unions and professional associations, for a revised total of 
$215 million (or 10.2 percent of ODA). This does not include bilateral 
contracts or country focus projects managed by the bilateral branches, 
which together might add another $30 million to the total. 
Added to this are private contributions to NGOs. Questionnaire data 
suggests that for each dollar of ODA funds received by NGOs in 1984, an 
average of $1.14 was raised from private sources. Using this figure, we can 
calculate that NGOs raised almost $280 million from private sources in 
1984-85, bringing their total resource base to somewhere in the order of 
$525 million. 
While such absolute figures are perhaps impressive, it is more enlighten- 
ing to look at the NGO contribution relative to total ODA. If we add 
privately raised funds to total ODA, we arrive at a figure of $2.38 billion 
in total Canadian aid flows (official and non-official) in 1984-85. At 
$525 million, NGOs accounted for some 22 percent of the total. By way of 
comparison, government-to-government disbursements accounted for 
$875 million (37 percent), multilateral programs $690 million (29 per- 
cent), and the remainder was made up by the international Development 
Research Centre (IDRC), Petro Canada International, and miscellaneous 
programs. It is thus clear that NGOs are a major player in Canada's aid 
relationships, even measured in volume terms. 
The volume of funds channelled to Canadian NGOs also appears im- 
pressive in comparison with other major donor countries. Table 2.4 
presents comparative statistics for members of the OECD's Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1985. Such figures are admittedly in- 
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Table 2.4 
NGO Resources for Development and Relief Activities, 1985 
Private Grants 
Extended by NGOs 
DAC Members' Official 
Contributions to NGOs 
US$million US$million Percentage 
equivalent $ per capita equivalent of total ODA 
Australia 52 3.30 13 1.7 
Austria 18 2.38 13 1.7 
Belgium 23 2.38 - - 
Canada 171 6.74 142 8.7 
Denmark 16 3.13 7 1.6 
Finland 13 2.65 4 1.9 
France 65 1.18 43 1.1 
Germany 424 6.95 174 5.9 
Ireland 22 6.18 2 5.1 
Italy 8 0.14 39 3.6 
Japan 101 0.84 41 1.1 
Netherlands 98 6.77 69 6.1 
New Zealand 8 2.46 1 1.9 
Norway 52 12.54 34 5.9 
Sweden 78 9.34 41 4.9 
Switzerland 54 8.27 41 13.6 
United Kingdom 169 2.98 28 1.8 
United States 1,513 6.32 803a 8.5 
TOTAL, 
DAC COUNTRIES 2,885 4.13 1,510b 5.1 
a Fiscal year. Includes $327 million related to food aid, excludes an additional $243 million for 
emergency programs administered by private voluntary organizations. Also includes subcontracting of 
the latter in addition to matching grants. 
I In addition, the Commission of the European Communities contributed $32 million for co-financing 
NGO projects (and $44 million for food aid, as well as $35 million for emergency aid channelled through 
NGOs). 
Source: Elena Borghese, "Third World Development: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations, 
OECD Observer, 145 (April/May 1987), p. 11. 
complete, since they are based only on projects submitted for co-funding 
by official aid agencies. They do, however, show some interesting 
comparisons. In volume terms, Canada ranks third (behind the United 
States and West Germany) for both government funding of NGOs 
(US$142 million) and private contributions (US$171 million). It ranks 
second (following Switzerland) in terms of percentage of ODA channelled 
to NGOs, despite the fact that some channels of government funding 
(humanitarian assistance, bilateral contracts, some country focus pro- 
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jects) are not included. On the other hand, Canada drops to seventh place 
in terms of per capita private contributions (US $5.30). While this is above 
the DAC average (and while there may be some reporting inaccuracies), it 
appears that Canadian NGOs have been less successful in attracting non- 
governmental resources than some of their counterparts in other donor 
countries. 
Questionnaire data reveal that although private contributions to Cana- 
dian NGOs have grown considerably over the past decade - easily out- 
stripping the rate of inflation - they have not kept pace with the tremen- 
dous expansion of government funding of NGO work. As a result, there 
has been a shift in the relative importance of private and public sector 
funding of Canadian NGOs: from almost 60 percent of total NGO re- 
sources in 1975, private sources had fallen to just over 50 percent in 1984. 
This trend has important implications for the NGO community, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Part II 




As stated in the preface, our research has been based as much as possible 
on NGOs' own perceptions of their role and characteristics. The question- 
naire responses highlighted a series of statements, or 'articles of faith', 
widely used by NGOs to describe their work. These statements, however, 
reflect not only the perceptions of Canadian development NGOs, but also 
certain broader principles of voluntary action in general; partly charac- 
teristics which set voluntary agencies apart from governments or for- 
profit enterprises, partly ideals toward which they strive. In the following 
chapters, we have organized our analysis around five such principles. 
These are given below together with the questionnaire responses - the 
articles of faith - from which the principles are derived. 
Altruism: NGOs respond to the needs of others 
"NGOs respond to local needs rather than imposing their own solutions" 
"NGOs are sensitive to cultural factors, and concerned that their intervention 
should be appropriate to local beliefs and values" 
Autonomy: NGOs are distinctive and independent from governments 
"NGOs operate people-to-people rather than through government or other 
bureaucratic institutions" 
"NGOs can reach needy groups which are not accessible through official 
channels" 
Participation: NGOs provide channels for Canadians to participate in 
international development 
"A major role of NGOs is to enable ordinary Canadians to participate directly 
in international development activities" 
"NGOs aim to increase Canadians' awareness of development issues, by 
providing factual information on the basis of which people can form their 
own opinions" 
Efficiency: NGOs mobilize and use financial and other resources in a cost- 
effective fashion 
"NGOs are cost-effective, and can achieve results at much less cost than official 
aid agencies" 
Cooperation: NGOs have distinctive relationships with beneficiary popu- 
lations. 
"NGOs break patterns of dependency by helping people to help themselves" 
"NGOs represent a new model of North-South relationships based on shar- 
ing and dialogue among equals" 
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"NGOs strengthen local voluntary institutions in the communities in which 
they are working" 
One final statement received broad support from questionnaire respon- 
dents: "NGOs demonstrate innovativeness and flexibility in their programs. " In 
light of this, this report does more than assess to what extent the various 
self-descriptions are borne out in the programs of Canadian NGOs. It also 
considers how these characteristics are reinterpreted as the environment 
of NGO work has changed. The pages which follow, therefore, examine 
the validity of the articles of faith for NGO work, the way in which they 
have evolved over time, and their implications for future NGO activities. 
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3 Altruism: Acting on Principle 
It is the duty of every person, regardless of means, without anticipating any 
return, to be charitable, that is to say to help those in misery recover their 
honour. - Immanuel Kant 
I felt impelled to do it out of a sense of rage and shame. Shame was the over- 
riding thing. I felt ashamed that we allowed these things to happen to 
others. - Bob Geldof 
Most voluntary agencies come into being from a sense of compassion or 
injustice, a burning vision of a wrong to be righted, or a new perception of 
the world to be expressed and acted upon. Their goals, unlike those of 
government or business, are altruistic: they seek to benefit others rather 
than themselves. This institutional disinterestedness is both a strength 
and a weakness of voluntary agencies. A strength because it draws upon 
the tremendous energy inherent in the noblest of human urges for justice, 
compassion, and service; a weakness because it seems somehow to place 
such organizations above critical assessment of their own motivation and 
operations. 
But organizations exist to translate ideals into action, and actions are 
subject to assessment. Ranslating ideals into action entails choices, com- 
promises and, inevitably, disagreement and conflict. As Barbara Harrell- 
Bond notes in a study of emergency assistance to refugees in Sudan, 
"discussion of aid programmes conducted under the banner of human- 
itarianism concentrates ... not on reasons for failure, but on competing 
claims to moral rectitude. The struggle for moral supremacy can be fierce 
indeed."' To overcome this tendency it is necessary, in Jorgen Lissner's 
phrase, to "demythologise organised altruism, 112 in other words to ask (in 
this case, of Canadian NGOs) what are the motivations for NGO activity; 
how are these expressed in development and relief work; how and by 
whom are needs identified; and to whom are the helpers accountable? 
The Aid Motivation 
Most NGOs are created from a sense of mission, clear and unambiguous: 
to feed the hungry, to care for the sick, to assist refugees and others in 
i B.E. Harrell- Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1986), p. 26. 
2 Jorgen Lissner, The Politics of Altruism (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 1977), p. L 
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distress. For a new agency, the initial emphasis is on direct assistance, or 
provision of services such as health or education. In time, however, the 
inadequacies of a response-to-needs approach become apparent. The 
sheer magnitude of the problems which an agency seeks to address 
compared with its resources, the need to shift initiative to indigenous 
people rather than have them rely indefinitely on external support, even 
the sense that the services being provided are more properly the responsi- 
bility of the local government, all prod the agency to re-assess its role and 
strategy. It begins to see that a humanitarian motivation emphasizes its 
role as the 'helper' and cements a welfare or caritative approach which 
has a limited and short-term perspective. Faced with these contradictions, 
the agency moves toward a model of development that emphasizes the 
strengthening of indigenous people's capacity to confront and solve their 
development needs. Agency rhetoric now extolls 'help for self-help', and 
it relies more heavily on local NGOs to interpret community needs. 
The difficulty which this evolution poses for the development agency is 
that the early welfare approach is the reason why it receives much of its 
support from the public. Indeed, the agency's fundraising and publicity 
material projects this self-image, successfully highlighting tangible and 
immediate needs: famine victims, homeless children, people ravaged by 
disease. Such graphic images evoke a powerful response, and there are 
sometimes strong internal pressures to retain this public message even 
though it may increasingly be at variance with the more 'developmental' 
approach being adopted as the agency re-thinks its role and re-deploys its 
resources. An example of this is provided by some child sponsorship 
agencies whose message has changed only subtly in recent years but 
whose programs have shifted significantly away from welfare or individ- 
ual sponsorship, toward broadly based community development. 
Nevertheless, in examining our sample of the work of Canadian agencies 
over the decade 1975-85 a clear pattern emerges: in 1975, 17 agencies 
supported child sponsorship (accounting on average for 42.7 percent of 
their program budgets); ten years later, 13 of these agencies had cut the 
child sponsorship share of their program budgets, often drastically; two 
remained at approximately the same level, and two had increased their 
sponsorship programs (but one of these was Foster Parents Plan, which 
increasingly does community development under the rubric of child 
sponsorship). If we look at agencies specializing in direct material as- 
sistance, such as providing blankets, clothing or medical supplies, we find 
a similar pattern: 12 agencies of the 18 (66 percent) doing such work in 
1975 had reduced their involvement over the next 10 years, many of them 
eliminating it altogether. And, despite prominent attention paid to emer- 
gency needs by the media, there is a similar trend away from relief 
projects. 
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For most agencies, this evolution of strategy has been reflected in changes 
in their structures and procedures: initial zeal has become tempered by a 
greater concern for procedures and planning; ad hoc actions have been 
transformed into ongoing commitments; increased funding has imposed 
needs for more systematic controls and accountability, and individual 
initiative has been shaped by collective responsibility. In short, institu- 
tions are born. 
The Manitoba Institute for Management, in its 1985 evaluation of the 
provincial councils for international cooperation, presented a typology of 
NGOs moving from infancy, "dramatically underfunded, understaffed, 
and very vulnerable," through maturity marked by a "results orientation 
and a strong administrative system ... but the urgency is gone," to 
bureaucracy "... forms, procedures, and paperwork. Nothing gets 
done. 113 This progression is, of course, over-simplified, but it captures the 
sense of growing institutionalization as organizations mature. 
This evolution should not be seen as smooth, clearly defined or irreversi- 
ble. A new disaster, fundraising imperatives, the internal dynamics within 
an NGO, personnel changes, all influence NGO behaviour, and within 
one agency a spectrum of activities from service delivery to support for a 
redistribution of power or resources in a community may be carried out 
simultaneously. In fact, change in the NGO community is not so much a 
linear progression as wave-like. As agencies become established and 
mature, new organizations come into existence, in a sense re-occupying 
the ground recently vacated by the older bodies. This perhaps testifies to 
the strength of some of the original motivations for voluntary develop- 
ment work, and to the tenacity of some of the basic conceptions of aid, 
which NGOs have embodied, as servicing the needs of the poor. Thus, 
despite the trend on the part of most established NGOs, away from 
welfare and direct material assistance, new agencies created since 1980 
devote a significantly larger proportion of their budgets to relief and 
material supplies (more than twice as much as for agencies founded 
before 1980). (See Table 3.1) 
Ironically, the evolution in motivation and approach of such agencies 
generates concern as well as approval. Larger budgets and more spe- 
cialized knowledge may have significantly reduced the role of volunteers, 
concentrating decision-making power in the hands of staff. Increasing 
reluctance to take risks and greater reliance on established procedures 
may have made NGOs more predictable, and therefore more acceptable 
partners of government; they may also have become vulnerable to crit- 
icism that they have grown too ponderous, protective and rigid. 
3 Manitoba Institute of Management/Cooperative d'Animation et de Consultation, Eval- 
uation Study of Provincial Councils of Non-Governmental Organizations. 
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Table 3.1 
Overseas Activities of Questionnaire Respondents (percent) 




All Agencies Since 1980 
Type of Activity (n=121) (n=20) 
Relief and Emergency Assistance 10.5 22.7 
Development Assistance Projects 58.9 47.0 
Placement of Canadians Overseas 12.6 7.9 
Child and Family Sponsorship 9.3 2.6 
Material assistance (e.g., medical supplies) 8.0 20.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Source: Questionnaire data. Figures are raw averages, not weighted by relative sizes of agencies. 
Development education and other in-Canada programs are excluded. 
Relief 
The most unambiguous example of altruism in action is the humanitarian 
response to disasters. The public's response to the Indo-Chinese boat 
people in 1979, the Mexico City earthquake in 1985, and of course the 
African famine, demonstrated Canadians' compassion for the victims of 
tragedy. NGOs were among the first to react, presenting themselves as a 
way to channel money, supplies and other forms of assistance speedily 
and efficiently. 
Canadian NGOs have delivered emergency relief either through their 
international affiliates (such as the World Council of Churches, UNICEF 
or OXFAM-UK), through local voluntary organizations in the affected 
regions, or directly through their own field staffs. Most have tended to use 
the first or second of these options where available: in the recent response 
to famine in Africa, for example, 50 percent of the matching funds 
disbursed by Africa Emergency Aid (AEA) in the first or 'emergency' 
phase, were channelled through international head offices; 37 percent 
went through such local organizations as the Christian Relief and Devel- 
opment Agency in Ethiopia, Sudanaid, or the Relief Society of Tigray; 
7 percent of funds were spent by local government structures, mainly 
for water supply or food distribution, or because the work was being car- 
ried out in countries like Angola where there is little NGO activity; 
only 4 percent of the funds were spent by Canadian agencies in the field 
(see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 
African Emergency Aid: Disbursements on Relief Projects, 
by Type of Implementing Agency 
Type of Implementing 
Agency Number of Projects 
Value of Projects 
($ thousands) 
International NGO 60 (46.9%) 15,252.5 (50.5%) 
Local NGO 50 (39.1%) 11,281.3 (37.3%) 
Local Government 10 (7.8%) 2,057.3 (6.8%) 
Canadian NGO 4 (3.1%) 1,289.4 (4.3%) 
Uncertain 4 (3.1%) 339.0 (1.1 %) 
TOTAL 128 (100.0%) 30,219.5 (100.0%) 
Source: Adapted from data in Africa Emergency Aid, Africa Emergency Aid: Final Report of the Activities of 
Canadian NGOs Responding to The Famine, Ottawa, March 1986. 
The heavy reliance on international or 'off-shore' affiliates is not surpris- 
ing. In 1975 fully three-quarters of the agencies which were funding relief 
activities were the Canadian affiliates of international church structures or 
of U.S. or European NGOs. Many of them had been created originally as 
the Canadian fundraising arm for a parent body itself heavily involved in 
disaster relief, thereby benefiting from being part of an international 
network, with access to a pool of relatively experienced relief workers, a 
ready-made delivery system, and resource sharing. Relief recipients, too, 
benefited from the degree of coordination made possible by channelling 
aid flows from several sources through a single international structure 
(particularly the churches, WCC for the Protestant agencies, or CARITAS 
for Catholic agencies). 
The familiar refrain that 'our experienced relief workers are on the spot'- 
designed to reassure the public as to the probity and efficacy of the 
operation - normally refers to the staff of the international agency rather 
than of the Canadian agency actually soliciting funds. This in itself is in no 
way harmful: where suffering exists the first priority must be to distribute 
necessities and help people to re-build their lives. However, since the role 
of Canadian 'branch plant' agencies has been largely that of fundraising, 
few of them have have become expert in coping with the effects of 
disasters: most of them (and consequently most Canadians) mistakenly 
see disasters as episodic crises, often inexplicable acts of God. Given that 
most agencies doing relief work are tied to their international affiliates 
and respond 'vertically' to their appeals, little has been accomplished to 
improve 'horizontal' planning and coordination among the Canadian 
agencies themselves. There is, for example, no body equivalent to the 
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) in the U.K., which represents the 
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major British agencies, decides when disasters have occurred and then 
undertakes a single joint appeal, with the proceeds divided up among the 
participating agencies. 
In Canada, disasters tend on the contrary to spark a highly competitive 
race for donor dollars, and the public has little objective basis for judging 
the relative merits of various claimants. The episodic treatment of relief 
activities discourages systematic planning, such as the development of 
early warning systems, as well as an understanding of the potential for 
linking immediate relief with longer-term development needs (that is 
preventive rather than remedial action). It offers little direct experience of 
the complexity of implementing effective relief, which allows agencies to 
place disasters in the environmental and cultural context in which they 
have occurred. 
The criticism of an episodic treatment of relief in favour of planning and 
experience may sound utopian. Emergencies by their very nature suggest 
urgency, improvisation, the primacy of action over analysis. But through 
many years of experience, particularly in such overwhelming disasters 
as Biafra, Bangladesh's independence war, Kampuchea, the Bihar and 
African famines and others, important lessons have been learned. 
William Shawcross in his study of the Kampuchean relief operation, The 
Quality of Mercy, refers to the often inexperienced' and short-term staff 
thrown into emergency relief work, procurement decisions made hastily 
without adequate information, and mistakes made under pressure to 
disburse funds rapidly.4 
Levels of relief spending by agencies will of course fluctuate depending 
upon whether or not a major disaster occurs in any given year, yet relief 
activity over time exhibits the same wave-like pattern mentioned above. 
Twenty-four of the agencies surveyed funded relief projects in 1975, 
devoting on average 21.7 percent of their program budgets to this activity; 
by 1984, 13 of these agencies, including such prominent actors as World 
Vision, Horizons of Friendship and the Adventist Development and Relief 
Agency Canada (ADRA), had reduced proportions of their budgets ear- 
marked for relief. During this same period, however, a number of new 
agencies were created, in many cases specifically in response to a new 
disaster situation. By 1984, 10 new agencies had become involved in relief 
work, none of them Canadian offices of'off-shore' or international NGOs. 
Moreover, a number of other organizations have been established since 
1984 in the wake of publicity about the Africa crisis. 
4 The OXFAM consortium raised a total of £21 million for Kampuchea and spent all but 
£2 million of it by the end of 1980; this left little for longer-term development aid, and public 
concern for Kampuchea had by then largely evaporated. See William Shawcross, The Quality 
of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). 
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This apparent contradiction in trends reminds us that the genesis of many 
Canadian NGOs lies in the humanitarian concern to relieve suffering, 
seen most starkly and poignantly in times of overwhelming disaster; any 
perception that Canadian NGOs are not adequately doing this- in spite of 
their own publicity to the contrary - leaves a gap that is quickly filled by a 
new agency, possibly one with an exclusive focus on a particular area of 
need. 
Ironically, some established agencies may themselves be seen by outsiders 
as 'part of the problem': their lack of direct involvement, concern not to 
act too precipitously or to ride roughshod over local government or non- 
government agencies (all lessons learned from hard experience) may be 
interpreted by others as remoteness, bureaucratic indifference and an 
attitude of business-as-usual. Most tellingly, established agencies may be 
perceived as closed preserves. People who are motivated to 'do some- 
thing' (ironically, in part due to the very success of efforts to mobilize 
public response) are often frustrated by their inability to get involved, and 
so determine to work 'directly' on the problem by setting up a new 
institution - more open, participatory and community-based than the 
established ones! 
Village twinning is a recent example. The twinning concept is an updated 
and more sophisticated version of child sponsorship, equally personal but 
less individualistic. A recent magazine article says: 
Voluntary agencies may be very good at what they are supposed to be 
good at - the work in the field - but they may not be good at the task 
of creating links between the communities involved, the donors and 
the recipients. To do that job well requires building a solid base in the 
donor community and a level of communication at least as good as 
the other media competing for a citizen's attentions 
In effect, the 'twinners' and others who share their views are arguing that 
involvement with and understanding of indigenous communities are as 
important to development, over the long term, as the raising of money 
and shipment of relief. In their view, traditional agencies are failing 
because they lack detailed information and focus too narrowly on 
fundraising: 
TWinners believe - and the aftermath of the Ethiopian crisis rein- 
forces this - that donors want to grow up and be treated on a par with 
the organization spending their money. They want more scrutiny of 
what's happening, and a more detailed understanding of how the aid 
process works - who are the middlemen and what are the grinding 
day-to-day problems.6 
5 -Q and A: What's all this about village twinning?" Villagers (Special Preview Edition, 
1986), p. 5. 
6 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Some go further, complaining that agencies which route the funds they 
raise to international affiliates deprive Canada of due credit, since the 
parent body may be identified as American or European. 
The spontaneous upwelling of new organizations is part of the cycle of re- 
generation in the voluntary community, stemming from a desire for 
involvement, and a perception of a gap or an unmet need. In times of 
financial stringency it may be that only disasters provide an opening for 
new ventures to develop, by making new resources available, even for 
organizations with no experience. 
But while new perceptions can enrich understanding of development 
processes, there is a cost. Successive emergencies have shown that relief 
work is a specialized field. Inexperienced organizations, however well- 
intentioned (and however long they have existed) can do great damage. 
Knowledge of the milieu and a commitment to assist beyond the immedi- 
ate emergency are critical. It is a matter of some concern that 20 of the 44 
Canadian agencies funding famine relief in one African country in 1984 
had never worked in that country before; of the remainder, 10 had relief 
experience elsewhere, four were already supporting development work 
in the same country, and the other 10 had neither been involved in relief 
work nor in the particular African country prior to the drought. 
Even though Canadian agencies rarely implement relief projects, inex- 
perience can exact a heavy price. In one example, a new agency, estab- 
lished in the wake of the Ethiopian crisis, sent 10 tonnes of chocolate, 
butter, margarine and other supplies to Ethiopia. A fundraiser said at the 
time the chocolate - valued at $110,000, but donated by a manufacturer - 
contained nuts, which would be a good source of protein even if the 
chocolate melted.7 Such stories, while infrequent, are not totally uncom- 
mon. Perhaps even more crucial, relief activities may not be properly 
designed or monitored to ensure that they contribute to a process of long- 
term development. 
Disasters are not only episodic events - springing from chance, extreme 
climate or ecological conditions - but also indicators of the vulnerability 
of a community or a country. Poverty is what makes people prone to 
disasters and limits their capacity to plan for and cope with emergency 
situations.8 Poverty helps to explain for example, the difference in the toll 
exacted by the toxic spill at Bhopal compared with that which occurred in 
the train derailment in Mississauga, Ontario the same year, or the cyclone 
in Bangladesh compared to the one in southern Ontario, both in 1985. 
One of the defining characteristics of developed societies is that they can 
7 The 7bronto Star, 1 April 1987. 
8 See, for example, Famine: AMan-made Disaster. A Report for the Independent Commission on 
International Humanitarian Issues (London: Pan Books, 1985). 
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afford to shield their citizens from the consequences of the unpredictable 
- through emergency reserves, disaster preparedness, and specially 
trained and equipped people. 
The lessons for Canadian voluntary agencies are twofold. First, relief 
operations need skilled and experienced people on the scene who are 
familiar with local circumstances. So while there may be merit in a few 
Canadian agencies acquiring the ability to plan and implement relief 
activities, the bulk of such assistance will continue to be channelled 
through international affiliates or through indigenous NGOs in develop- 
ing countries. A better idea for Canadian agencies might be to strengthen 
their capacities for early disaster warning and coordinated response, 
leaving the delivery of emergency relief largely to others. Indigenous 
Southern non-governmental structures may have some important ad- 
vantages as relief agencies. They are less likely than outsiders to have an 
episodic view of relief, from their vantage, the term 'disaster' is simply at 
one end of a spectrum of need, and dealing with it is part of building a 
community's capacity to meet its members' basic needs, including secu- 
rity in the face of crisis. Indigenous NGOs are less likely to rely on 
expatriate personnel, thus saving money and ensuring that the lessons of 
experience are internalized. Especially in areas of chronic or recurrent 
crisis, such as parts of Africa or South Asia, this locally based relief 
capacity will constitute an increasingly valuable resource to foreign NGOs 
seeking to respond in a timely and efficient fashion to human suffering. 
A second major point is that, Canadian agencies must realize that good 
development is itself the best form of prevention, and that even emergen- 
cies offer opportunities to promote it. An example of the last point can be 
drawn from Thailand, where in 1979 a Canadian agency already present 
in the country designed a project to take care of refugees who were 
streaming across the border from Kampuchea. Using its own and funds 
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it 
established a consortium of Thai agencies to manage a 'Holding Centre', 
or transit camp, at Kab Cherng in northeastern Thailand. As a progress 
report phrased it, the aim of this project was "not only the relieving of the 
suffering of the Kampuchean people but also the achievement of self- 
reliance and full participation in their own local affairs within the frame- 
work of an all Thai-Kampuchean working relationship. "9 A key element 
of this approach was to ensure that project inputs would also have spin- 
off benefits for the surrounding communities (for example, purchasing 
local foodstuffs for the camp as much as possible, to help farmers in this 
economically depressed region). An evaluation of the project carried out a 
year after it ended reported the following findings: 
9 CUSO Thailand, "Progress Report to UNHCR," February 1981 (mimeographed). 
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the reliance on Thai organizations resulted in a ... very constructive 
working relationship with the host government officials. . . this was 
attributed to the better understanding of the government's policy as 
well as the absence of language barriers, particularly at the field level. 
As for the implementing agencies, they all appreciated having the 
opportunity to do what they always felt they could do and do well. 
Most agreed that one of the main factors against their increased 
participation in refugee work was their limited financial resources. It, 
therefore, seems desirable to give more consideration, by foreign and 
international agencies, to build their refugee operation plans around 
local expertise.10 
The experience gained by the Thai agencies as well as the contacts 
established through the project with neighboring communities paid off in 
the decision to launch a development program in the area after Kab 
Cherng was closed: 
all participating NGOs agreed that ... the lessons learned from the 
Project were very useful, particularly in strengthening their staff's 
capability ... Furthermore these experiences and resulting cred- 
ibility were found to be contributing to the decision to launch a 
Village Development Programme for the 53 villages in the same 
province." 
Identifying Needs 
As we have seen, even in relief situations, identifying the needs of people 
is not always simple. The straightforward welfare approach to helping 
others is based on the assumption that everybody has the same basic 
needs for food, shelter and clothing, and that the essential issue is simply 
one of efficient delivery of aid. The concept of development, however, 
rests on no such simple assumptions. Since the collapse of 'stages of 
growth theories' which took for granted that all societies wished to follow 
the Western industrial model (a collapse perhaps most dramatically un- 
derscored by the Khomeini revolution in Iran), outsiders have become 
more circumspect about defining the future for others. Needs other than 
the most basic, it transpires, are heavily influenced by cultural factors. 
Who is to determine whether the community centre, church or mosque 
which the village wants is more or less necessary than the clinic which the 
donor agency is willing to fund? Who is to determine whether the 
provision of bore holes and pipe-borne water is more efficient than the 
time-consuming and risky process of consultation which will produce 
hand-dug wells in a self-help project? 
10 CUSO Thailand, "Report of the Project Evaluation," report prepared by Malee 
Sundhagul, et al, February 1982 (mimeographed). 
11 Ibid. 
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These questions face any voluntary development agency but they are 
particularly problematic for Canadian NGOs. As was pointed out in the 
previous chapter, only a minority of Canadian agencies have personnel 
working in Third World countries; the majority of these, moreover, work 
on specific projects; only some 15 agencies have an ongoing field presence 
with responsibility for identifying needs and communicating these di- 
rectly to the Canadian agency. As a result, Canadian agencies are not only 
less able to assess needs themselves, but also less able to undertake the 
discussion and consultation with community groups that would help to 
guide their decisions. 
Instead, they rely on local indigenous agencies and international opera- 
tional agencies to assess needs. Of the sample of 51 Canadian agency 
projects visited in the field for this study, 22 (44 percent) were proposed 
by an indigenous NGO, 10 (20 percent) came through an international 
affiliate, 10 (20 percent) were identified by the Canadian agency itself, 
and 9 were identified by others, such as a local parish priest, a local 
government body or official, another Canadian agency, or CIDA. Another 
study, a survey of NGO project officers that was carried out for CIDA's 
corporate evaluation of the NGO program, indicated an even lower level of 
agency reliance on field staff: 40 percent of projects identified in that 
study originated as a result of a request directly from an indigenous NGO; 
14 percent came from a local agency through a national or international 
coordinating body (such as the Community Development Trust Fund in 
Tanzania); 24 percent originated with an international parent or affiliate 
of the Canadian agency; 8 percent came from another Canadian agency. 
Only 8 percent of projects originated with the overseas staff of the agency 
which funded the project. (The source of a further 6 percent of projects 
was either unspecified or unknown. 72) 
The capacity to assess needs, however, is important not just in project 
identification and selection, but also in allowing implementors in the field 
to adapt as projects evolve. Ideally, agencies should have regular, ongoing 
communication with project implementors and beneficiaries so as to 
monitor progress. Agencies implementing projects in the field require 
information on project results and impact, while funding agencies need 
financial information to meet accounting and reporting guidelines. In the 
majority of projects visited for this study, (39 out of 51, or 76 percent), 
agencies were judged to receive adequate information to meet these 
12 Andrew G. Hamilton and Martin Mujica, "A Mail Survey of Project Officers in the 
Canadian NGO Community," report prepared for CIDA, January 1985, p. 30. One explana- 
tion for the differences between the results of the two studies lies in the exclusion of ICDS 
agencies from the CIDA study. Of the 11 projects in our study supported by ICDS agencies, 
five (10 percent of the total sample) were initiated by the agencies' own field staff, one 
(a country focus project) was initiated by CIDA, and the rest (all projects implemented by 
local NGOs, with CUSO support as well as that of other Canadian agencies) were all initiated 
by a local NGO. 
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needs. But in at least half of the projects there were doubts as to whether 
the Canadian agency would be able to learn from the project lessons to 
apply to future project selection and management. In other words, while 
agencies generally receive adequate management information, they often 
lack the kind of contextual information about local needs and develop- 
ment problems essential for planning. 
In part, this vacuum results from the lack of field capacity mentioned 
earlier. But for some agencies it also reflects the nature of their programs, 
which in many cases are so widely dispersed as to outstrip the capacity of 
Canada-based program staff to assimilate information. Fifty-eight percent 
of questionnaire respondents indicated that they have projects in 10 or 
more countries. While some agencies (e.g., Pueblito Canada, Plan Nagua, 
Jamaica Self-Help, or Missi-Haiti '79) limit their countries of involve- 
ment, there has been a general trend among Canadian NGOs (even small 
agencies) to expand the number of countries in which they work. For 
agencies with small program staff this may make monitoring almost 
impossible, as well as dissipating effort and impact; to counter this, some 
agencies (for example, the Canadian Organization for Develop- 
ment through Education (CODE), Match International) have moved to 
reduce the scope of their programs. CODE's strategy plan for 1985-88, 
for example, makes the following statement: 
In virtually all recent CODE evaluations, trip reports and staff forums, 
it has been concluded that if we wish to have'a more meaningful 
impact, then we cannot continue to function in the traditional way in 
over 80 countries. CODE must begin to make some judgments as to 
where its resources should be concentrated. 13 
Government aid agencies have also been criticized for their insufficient 
capacity to remain abreast of evolving needs overseas, and to respond 
quickly and effectively to such needs. The 1987 report of the Parliamen- 
tary Committee examining Canadian aid policies (the Winegard Commit- 
tee) argues forcefully for a greater decentralization of authority within 
CIDA, which it contends will lead to improved project selection, better 
monitoring, and more rapid approval and/or modification of projects. 14 
CIDA has already taken the first steps to increase its field presence 
overseas through the creation of 'Canadian Cooperation Offices' in some 
recipient countries. Further steps to decentralize are planned, although 
the full extent of the changes, and the speed with which they will be 
13 Canadian Organization for Development through Education (CODE), "A Three-Year 
CODE Strategy Plan," 1985-88, Ottawa, 1984. 
14 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and Inter- 
national Uade, For Whose Benefit? Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
International Rade on Canada's Development Assistance Policies and Programs (Ottawa: Queen's 
Printer for Canada, May 1987), pp. 124-45. 
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instituted, remain to be worked out. This decentralization puts more 
pressure on NGOs to improve their own links to the field, particularly if 
they intend to justify their programs on the basis of a unique and indepen- 
dent capacity to identify and respond to needs 'at the grassroots'. 
However, the solution to the problems of needs assessment and monitor- 
ing for Canadian NGOs, is not an increase in their agency field staff 
directly managing projects; in fact, such a move would in all likelihood 
run against the trend to devolving more of the responsibility for projects 
to local people. Rather, for the majority of agencies, the primary source of 
monitoring and needs assessment information will continue to be the 
indigenous NGOs responsible for project implementation; their linguistic 
and cultural affinity with local beneficiaries gives them a considerable 
advantage over foreign-based and often transient agencies. For those 
Canadian agencies linked to international affiliates, information will 
continue to be centralized in the parent agency - although for some 
agencies, such as CARE Canada, devolution of programming will in- 
crease their information about the projects they support. And for a few 
operational Canadian agencies, needs will be defined either by field staff, 
or through their links to government and multilateral agencies. 
For the majority of agencies, however, improving their links with their 
Southern counterparts means regularizing and systematizing the flow of 
information between themselves and the recipient local NGO. As will be 
emphasized in the next chapter, management of information is central to 
the work of NGOs and will increase in importance in the future. At 
present NGO monitoring of projects depends substantially on informa- 
tion gleaned from the (infrequent) trips of agency staff and board mem- 
bers (and in some cases, the personnel of other agencies), and the arm's 
length contact provided by written progress reports. Reciprocal visits by 
project implementors to Canada are rare, and the use of computer- 
assisted networking strategies is only beginning. To a large degree, im- 
proved information flows will require a far-reaching reorientation of the 
relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs, in the direction of 
more equal sharing of responsibilities. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, 
some progress has been made, but considerable ground remains to be 
covered. 
Increasing reliance on Southern NGOs in needs assessment, project 
identification and monitoring does not preclude a role for Canadian 
agency staff, but it does imply a certain re-thinking of that role. Canada- 
based program staff, for example, will probably visit specific projects less 
often, concentrating more on networking with project implementors. 
There will also continue to be a role for field staff, not as project super- 
visors or managers, but as channels of communication between Northern 
and Southern NGOs. Agencies such as CUSO and CANSAVE have found 
that an ongoing presence in areas where projects are being funded is an 
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indispensable aid to project selection and monitoring, even where pro- 
jects are wholly implemented by local NGOs. Increasingly, however, such 
personnel may be locally engaged staff rather than Canadians. And to a 
degree, 'like-minded' Canadian agencies, particularly smaller agencies, 
may share field staff in a given country in order to save money. 
Conclusion: Aid and Accountability 
We introduced this chapter with the statement that NGOs are altruistic, 
that is, they work for the benefit of others. This raises a question: to 
whom, then, are NGOs accountable for what they do? 
Most agencies would respond that they are in the first instance account- 
able to their individual donors - to the people who contribute funds. But 
donors constitute a large, unorganized group, and it is in practice virtually 
impossible for them to hold an agency accountable in other than the most 
general sense. 
A more real accountability is exercised by the government, both through 
Revenue Canada - for organizations with a charitable registration - and 
more precisely through CIDA, which is in turn accountable to Parliament 
for taxpayers' money spent by NGOs. Unlike the public, government 
bodies are able to enforce their demand for accountability, since they 
possess both detailed information on NGO activities (Revenue Canada tax 
returns, project reports, evaluation studies) and effective sanctions (the 
threat to withdraw an agency's funding or charitable status). But even 
though NGOs accept the legitimacy of CIDA's claim, most are quick to 
assert that their more 'theoretical' accountability to individual donors 
comes first. They have also fought to limit the enforcement of CIDA's 
claim - in particular, to prevent CIDA having unrestricted right of access to 
Third World partner agencies in the field, 
In the midst of these multiple and often competing lines of accountability, 
NGOs often lose sight of their accountability to the beneficiaries of their 
work, or their partners in the South. NGOs face an anomaly in respond- 
ing to needs defined by one group, beneficiaries or NGO planners/imple- 
mentors, while holding themselves responsible for their success or failure 
to an entirely different group, namely their donors or the government. It is 
necessary to differentiate two broad forms of accountability: accountabil- 
ity for funds NGOs receive and how they are used, and accountability for 
results achieved through the use of those funds. To date, NGOs have 
concentrated almost exclusively on the former. 
More and more, however, real accountability to beneficiaries and part- 
ners in the Third World is becoming a reality for Canadian NGOs. Agen- 
cies need to examine whether their work encourages or promotes this at 
present. Giving assistance in the form of grants or gifts discourages 
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accountability: welfare recipients are in no position to refuse or even 
negotiate the forms of assistance. NGOs can help to promote their ac- 
countability in the design of projects, for instance by providing health 
services on a user-payment basis rather than free of charge, or basing 
agricultural work on the provision of credit rather than grants; in this way, 
former welfare recipients become clients and 'customers', entitled to 
insist on full value from those providing services. 
Similarly, as Southern NGOs and community groups implement a grow- 
ing share of development work, they will develop the countervailing 
power to insist on accountability from their funders. 
This need not be seen as a threat to NGOs' more traditional lines of 
responsibility to donors, but it does mean that agencies need to take a 
broader perspective on the issue of accountability - one based as much on 
non-financial as on financial considerations. It also means that NGOs 
must resist a simple response to evidence of human suffering, and instead 
base their programming on careful consultation with beneficiaries. In 
other words they must avoid the assumption that good motives neces- 
sarily lead to right actions; altruism is not an end in itself. 
46 
4 Autonomy: Charting Independence 
voluntarism has been caught in the straitjacket of service. It has become 
fixated on the concept of provision to the neglect of advocacy that deals with 
the root causes which create the demand for service. 
- Vernon Jordan, Voluntarism in America 
Independence from the state is perhaps the most obvious common 
characteristic of voluntary organizations, expressed most unambiguously 
in their very designation as 'non-governmental'. In democratic societies 
this independence flows from their juridical status, their financial auton- 
omy, and their capacity to articulate their own goals and to pursue 
appropriate ways to achieve them. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the role of 
the voluntary sector preceded that of government in most fields of social 
service, including international cooperation. Indeed, until relatively re- 
cently there was little overlap between the activities of government and of 
non-governmental organizations. Drawing on their own motivation and 
resources, NGOs have been to a considerable extent insulated from official 
priorities and shifting development dogmas. 
NGOs tend to share a distinctive concept of development which is people- 
centered, poverty-focused and self-reliant.' Implicit in such a concept is 
criticism of the excessively aggregative and impersonal view of develop- 
ment embraced by many of the major bilateral and multilateral agencies. 
But is this critique predicated on a different perception of the goal of 
development, or simply on the most effective means of attaining it? Both 
official and voluntary agencies would agree that the purpose of develop- 
ment in the broadest sense is the full realization of human potential - not 
simply expressed in higher living standards, but also in forms of cultural 
expression, in the development of spiritual values, in people's ability to 
participate in determining their future, and so on. Perhaps the essential 
difference in NGOs' perception of development is an explicit ideal of 
men and women as bearers of values rather than as just producers and 
consumers; hence, development must integrate ideas of justice, self- 
determination and dignity. Abstract human values have historically been 
difficult for governments to handle, given their overriding concern for 
national sovereignty and their often short-term calculations of their own 
national interests. But for many voluntary organizations, both religious 
and secular, such values are a direct reflection of their own ethical 
foundations and the source of their motivation and commitment. Not 
surprisingly, this translates into sometimes strong differences between 
1 See, for example, CCIC, "Policy Paper: A Framework for Canada's Official Development 
Assistance," Ottawa, November 1979. 
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governmental and non-governmental views of both ends and means, 
sharpened by the very different opportunities and constraints which each 
face. 
Despite this traditional philosophic divergence, there are now many 
forces tending to narrow the differences between governmental and non- 
governmental approaches to international development; the increasing 
flow of official funding through NGOs has engendered much greater 
interaction between the two. As a result, on the one hand, governments 
and multilateral agencies are being influenced by NGOs to meet people's 
basic needs, to recognize the key role of women, to give higher priority to 
human resource development and to overlooked groups such as small 
farmers, minorities or entrepreneurs. On the other hand, NGOs have 
subjected themselves to the discipline of the project format, have become 
more institutionalized, and in many cases have begun to broaden the 
scope of their development activities beyond caring for isolated individu- 
als, families or communities. Increasingly, the vocabularies of govern- 
ment and NGOs have become indistinguishable. As the gap narrows it has 
become difficult to determine from the pronouncements of Canadian 
voluntary development agencies how 'different' they now view them- 
selves to be from government. At times they argue that increased govern- 
ment support is justified precisely because they are doing what govern- 
ment cannot do, or ought not to do; at other times they argue equally 
forcefully that they deserve more support because they represent a more 
cost-effective way for government aid to achieve its objectives. 
This chapter examines the basis of claims to distinctiveness from govern- 
ment, particularly in terms of unique access to information, and assesses 
the impact on NGO autonomy of increased government funding. 
Information and Communication 
Much of the credibility and legitimacy of Northern NGOs and their 
defence of their autonomy rests on their claim to have unique access to, 
and knowledge of, the real needs and aspirations of people in the coun- 
tries in which they work. It is this, they say, which qualifies them to act as 
advocates for the poor, to promote and/or oppose various government aid 
or foreign policies, and to insist on the relevance of their own work. This 
knowledge may derive from direct contact with people and experience in 
the Third World, long-standing relationships with Southern organiza- 
tions, or regular communication with partner agencies and field staff. 
(Indeed it could be said that to a considerable extent, the business of 
NGOs is communication: needs are communicated from partner agencies 
or staff in the field, packaged as projects and processed by an NGO, and 
then sent out to a donor public by means of fundraising appeals or grant 
applications.) Ideally, timely and accurate information guides an NGO's 
programming decisions, shapes its understanding of the context in which 
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it is operating, and feeds its educational activities; in short, its ability to 
communicate decisively affects its overall effectiveness and impact. 
In light of this, it is surprising how little attention is in fact paid to 
information and communication by Canadian NGOs. Only a few - 
mainly research or policy advocacy groups like the Latin American 
Working Group (LAWG) or the Centre d'Information et de Documenta- 
tion sur le Mozambique et 1'Afrique Australe (CIDMAA) - have systemat- 
ically developed networks to generate and disseminate information, and 
most of that is of a specialized nature. 
A survey conducted in 1984 found that most agencies relied on three 
sources for the information they needed to do their work: personal 
communications, the mainstream press, and government publications.2 
Personal contact, though a potent means of sharing information, is inter- 
mittent, vulnerable to staff changes, and highly dependent upon individ- 
ual ability to listen and to communicate; the mainstream press, in Can- 
ada, is notoriously deficient in its coverage of international events ;3 
government publications, while more or less reliable depending upon the 
issue and the government, are unlikely to nourish an independent 'non- 
governmental' analysis of what is happening in the world. 
Nor is information, once gathered, efficiently managed. For most agencies 
there is paradoxically, both too much and too little of it. Although three- 
quarters of the respondents to the 1984 survey already had, or were 
planning to acquire computers, less than 10 percent used these for infor- 
mation management (other than for mailing lists and office tasks) or to 
access on-line data bases. Our own questionnaire arrived at similar 
results. The 1984 survey concluded: 
Communication resources and skills have always been essential to 
the work of Canadian NGOs. Developing overseas projects, develop- 
ment education programming, fund-raising and administration all 
require good communication and information management for suc- 
2 IDERA/Inter Pares, Final Report on Phase I of a Study into the Feasibility of Establishing a 
Development Communications Centre, Ottawa: January 1984. 
3 ibid. See also Dennis Schroeder, A Survey of International News Coverage by the Canadian 
Media (Manuscript Report MR20) (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
March 1980); or, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College, "North 
American Perceptions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," Discussion Paper for the "Consulta- 
tion on the Horn of Africa," University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, 21-23 November 
1986. Roy Megarry, publisher of The Globe and Mail, recently remarked that "the information 
flow consists mainly of western journalists observing what is transpiring around the globe 
through their western eyes and their western perspectives and their western value systems, 
and reporting back not just to the West, but to the rest of the world ... Not to be aware of the 
benefits of a two-way information flow is the ultimate in stupidity. To be aware of the 
discrepancy and to do nothing about it is the ultimate in arrogance." Roy Megarry, "Com- 
munications in a Global Society," 1986. 
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cess ...despite the importance of communications in their work, 
relatively few NGOs have a well-developed communications strategy, 
or a comprehensive understanding of the role of communications in 
development.4 
It is a cliche that communications technology has shrunk the globe, and 
that it has become possible to talk to each other as never before in human 
history. By and large, NGOs have lagged behind in recognizing this and 
turning it to their advantage. They have made little use of mass media 
(with the exception of one or two large fundraising agencies such as 
OXFAM-Quebec and World Vision); their contacts with overseas partners 
tend to be periodic and one-way, and most have done little to develop 
independent sources of information that would shape a distinctive view of 
the world. 
Some steps are now being taken. In 1987, an NGO project placed an 
experienced journalist in Harare for two years to furnish interested agen- 
cies with timely, relevant information about the rapidly changing situa- 
tion in Southern Africa. The guidelines for projects funded by Partnership 
Africa Canada encourage more direct and explicit cooperation between 
funding and development education agencies, in order to disseminate 
more first-hand knowledge of steps being taken (by Africans as well as 
Canadians or others) to tackle the problems of that continent. Some U.S. 
private voluntary organizations have begun to experiment with low-level 
satellites and amateur radio to facilitate contact with project holders in 
remote locations overseas. In Canada, a number of voluntary agencies 
involved in development, environment, peace and social justice issues 
have begun to set up a computerized 'bulletin board' called A1terNET 
to share information.5 Such computer-assisted communication sys- 
tems could facilitate low-cost, flexible, and interactive messaging, con- 
ferencing and data retrieval, cutting across the barriers of geography or 
specialization. 
Efficient long-distance communications and information-sharing is es- 
sential in a country as large and thinly populated as Canada, but the skills, 
once learned, could also be transferred to partners in the South. The 
prospect this opens is that of direct contact and communication between 
North and South - not just the 'official' version of events transmitted by 
governments, nor the approved message mediated by NGOs or others 
'interpreting' what people should hear - but a global switchboard 
through which people can talk to each other. This still sounds utopian, 
but increasingly the technology exists to make it possible. Already, a 
computer link-up for elementary students is being explored by a Cana- 
4 IDERA/Inter Pares, Final Report on Phase 1. 
5 See "Global Village Notice Board: Using Computer Assisted Communications," Ribute, 
1:3 (1986). 
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than NGO in cooperation with the UNESCO Man in the Biosphere 
program: the beginnings of the global classroom! 
Technology is no more than a means, however, to facilitate communica- 
tion. For it to be really useful, NGOs must first decide-based on their own 
experience - what they have to say, how important it is for Canadians to 
hear their message, and how willing they are to serve as ,a' channel for 
people in the South to voice their interests and concerns directly to 
Canadians. 
Advocacy: Begging to Differ 
A direct implication of real autonomy is freedom; in the case of NGOs, 
freedom to express an independent or alternative view of the world. 
Sometimes this involves direct advocacy intervention in government 
policy making. 
Policy making in Canada, as in any pluralistic, democratic society, is a 
matter of weighing options, balancing interests, and making choices 
between conflicting viewpoints and values. Some of this is open, articu- 
lated through the political process and the rigorous competition of the 
various sectors, but much is hidden - in inter-departmental committees, 
in the caucus of the ruling party, and in the work of lobbyists engaged to 
press the views and interests of groups ranging from professional associa- 
tions to industry, small business, charities and farmers. As government's 
role in society and the economy has expanded, there has been a propor- 
tionate increase in lobbying. (However, the policy-making process in 
Canada has always been relatively more insulated from public pressure 
than is the case in the U.S. - the result of a more disciplined party 
structure, and the relatively fewer number of leverage points in a parlia- 
mentary as opposed to Congressional system). 
Within this play of opposing forces Canadian voluntary development 
agencies have been notably ambivalent about how to play a role in policy 
making and indeed the legitimacy of their seeking to influence policy at 
all. Whose interests do they represent, and when is their intervention in 
the policy-making process justified? A small number (15 percent of 
questionnaire respondents) view advocacy as an integral part of their 
mandate - in the words of Tim Draimin of the Jesuit Centre in Toronto, 
"taking up cudgels on behalf of the Third World." Many of these are 
research and solidarity groups with strong links to their areas of interest 
and clearly identified expertise. But over half the agencies surveyed 
(56 percent) reported that they attached little importance to policy 
advocacy. 
Such reluctance to engage in advocacy appears to have little to do with 
financial autonomy. Although it might be assumed that an NGO's ability, 
and willingness, to engage the government on policy issues would be in 
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inverse proportion to its dependence upon that government for funding, 
(not biting the feeder's hand has always seemed like good sense as well as 
good politics) in fact questionnaire responses show no correlation be- 
tween level of government funding and an agency's support for advocacy. 
Many specialized groups which concentrate on policy research and ad- 
vocacy (such as LAWG and GATT-Fly) receive little or no government 
money, but some of the most consistent and vocal advocates within the 
NGO community are among the most dependent on official funding. 
Indeed, the NGOs' chief vehicle for such work, CCIC, is itself heavily 
government- supported.6 
Why do NGOs disagree so strongly over speaking out on policy issues? 
The majority insist that their responsibility as humanitarian agencies is to 
respond to human need wherever and whenever it arises. Development is 
helping individuals, families, and communities, not a matter of overarch- 
ing structures or systems. 'Political' or controversial activities may impede 
effectiveness, in their view, in two ways: first, by taking a public stance, 
they may be cut off from those they seek to help, and who may most need 
that help; and second, a public stance may be unpopular in Canada and 
alienate actual or potential supporters. Reluctance to engage in advocacy 
is chiefly due to the perception that it is invariably confrontational, and 
may therefore alienate individual donors, not government. Buttressing 
this viewpoint, until recently, was an anachronistic interpretation of laws 
regarding 'political' activity by charities: while charities could prepare 
briefs or make representations to a Minister or his/or her staff, they were 
prohibited from actually undertaking any action in support of their goals 
(such as organizing a letter-writing campaign, or suggesting legislative 
changes). To some, it appeared to be the difference between merely 
seeking to influence, and actually being effective. New legislation in 
February 1986 established the terms whereby charities could carry out 
advocacy which is 'ancillary and incidental' to their charitable objectives, 
on condition that 'substantially all' of their resources are devoted to the 
charitable purposes for which they were created (defined as at least 
90 percent, over a five-year period). This less restrictive provision goes a 
6 This is entirely consistent with a long-standing tradition in Canada (as elsewhere, 
including the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) of government support for 
public policy development (for the women's movement, anti-poverty organizations, envi- 
ronmental groups, etc.) On the other hand, a 1985 study argues that in recent years CCIC's 
advocacy has avoided broader development issues and focused instead almost exclusively 
on NGO/CIDA relations, and furthermore, that this results from both the Council's (and 
NGOs') growing dependence on government and the consequent overriding need to main- 
tain harmonious relations. John S. Clark, "Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations and 
their Influence on Canadian Development Policy," (Working Paper No. A. 17) Department of 
Political Science, University of Toronto, October 1985, p. 59. 
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long way toward updating charitable law to bring it into line with 
practices current since governments adopted a major role in welfare and 
service delivery.' 
The counterargument that development is about values, choices and the 
allocation of resources, and hence inherently 'political,' confronts the 
reality of a public perception that NGOs are first and foremost human- 
itarian bodies and that changing public policy is not integral to their task 
of improving the quality of life for poor people. It is the clash of two 
paradigms: development as 'out there' problems facing others, vs devel- 
opment as interdependence. This schism is most obvious in those agen- 
cies which act primarily as fundraisers for a foreign-based parent organi- 
zation and which shy away from controversy. Paradoxically, some of 
those parent organizations themselves are becoming increasingly out- 
spoken in challenging official development thinking and practice. Cases 
in point are the CARE head office in New York, which has recently 
become involved for the first time in significant development education 
activity in the U.S., and UNICEF, which has challenged the IMF on the 
impact that World Bank and IMF-imposed adjustment policies have had, 
and are having, on the Third World poor. 
New Opportunities in Advocacy 
But advocacy is not invariably confrontational. Having a viewpoint on 
development issues, even if it disagrees with the government's position, 
need not imply sterile negativism. In fact, government has increasingly 
solicited the views of NGOs - in part because aid policies have come under 
scrutiny by Parliament and government departments, and in part because 
NGOs' claims to a special role (and special support) are being justified to a 
large extent by their expertise, detailed knowledge of Third World prob- 
lems, and particular perspective on development. It is striking how often 
hearings of the Commons Committee on External Affairs and Defence 
(now External Affairs and International "Bade) have devoted a dispropor- 
tionate share of the limited time they spend examining ODA to that very 
restricted share of CIDA resources channelled to the voluntary sector and 
- to the ill-concealed irritation of senior CIDA staff - have held up small- 
scale NGO projects as examples for CIDA to emulate. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, parliamentary enquiries have increasingly sought input or 
7 Note that this is not the only area where charity law had become anachronistic in the 
view of international development agencies. In 1978, several NGOs were challenged by 
Revenue Canada officials on the grounds that they were engaged in illegal activities in 
sending money to groups overseas who were not 'qualified donees' (a restricted category of 
permissible recipients, such as other registered charities or government bodies) while not 
retaining direct control of the funds and/or holding title to any property or materials shipped 
or purchased abroad. The issue was allowed to drop when it was pointed out that these 
"illegal" practices were virtually universal in the NGO community, and were furthermore 
supported and encouraged by another arm of the federal government, CIDA! 
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response from the NGO community. While in 1970 only two NGOs - 
CUSO and a coalition of church groups - appeared before the Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs' enquiry into Canada-Caribbean 
relations, a decade later 11 agencies presented written statements and a 
further seven appeared before the Parliamentary Task Force on North- 
South Relations. Most recently, the House of Commons Standing Com- 
mittee on External Affairs and International Ttade (the Winegard Com- 
mittee) attracted over 50 submissions from the NGO community and an 
equal number were called to appear in person before the Committee. This 
does not include numerous local solidarity and peace groups which also 
presented briefs. These successive enquiries have provided an oppor- 
tunity for NGOs to influence Canada's policy, but at the same time have 
placed a considerable burden on their staff, who are usually ill-equipped 
to research and draft credible statements on the wide range of issues 
under review. 
The effectiveness of advocacy for NGOs depends both on the quality and 
credibility of their positions, and on the 'clout' they are presumed to wield 
as representing a substantial body of public opinion. On both counts 
Canadian agencies have tended to be weak. Given the limited resources 
and ambivalent attitude toward advocacy of most agencies, it is not 
surprising that few are able to research or monitor policy issues, let alone 
develop alternatives. As a result briefs are frequently submitted which 
skirt the contentious and complex issues to focus on the familiar and 
straightforward: lobbying for increased support for the NGOs 
themselves. 
The Role of CCIC In Advocacy 
A weak knowledge base (compounded by limited contact with research 
bodies, educational institutions, or even the considerable number of 
students from Third World countries in Canada at any particular time), 
allied to the fact that many agencies lack a real constituency on whose 
behalf they could presume to speak, makes it logical for NGOs to look to 
CCIC to play a pre-eminent role in advocacy. This has a number of 
advantages: CCIC advocacy gains credibility because of the clear implica- 
tion that a given position represents the collective view of most, if not all, 
NGOs; CCIC is more capable of sustained research on specific topics than 
an individual agency (and serves a useful educational function within the 
NGO community as issues are ventilated within the committees and 
councils of CCIC); and, not least, it distances agencies from potentially 
controversial topics. In theory, CCIC can afford to be more outspoken 
than any single agency or small group. 
Or can it? In fact, while CCIC's membership has long given priority to its 
role in maintaining and monitoring 'government relations' there have 
been sharp differences as to when a public CCIC stance is either justified 
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or desirable. The increasing interaction between the government and the 
non-governmental sectors has heightened membership demands on 
CCIC for information on policy shifts, personnel changes, etc., within 
CIDA; indeed, this area of the Council's work received the highest ap- 
proval rating in a 1984 evaluation of CCIC.8 Broad support also existed for 
CCIC's 1979 Policy Paper, which expressed for the first time a collective 
NGO viewpoint on the major aid and foreign policy issues facing Canada. 
But once CCIC moves beyond general statements of principle to tackle 
specific issues the fragile consensus is likely to fracture. CCIC's role in 
helping NGOs to lobby in their own self-interest is universally accepted by 
its membership: advocating policy changes which would benefit others is 
not. 
In this the Council simply reflects the divergent views of its membership, 
with their differing conceptions of development. Individual members 
with significant clout, such as the churches or the Canadian Labour 
Congress, often prefer to express their views directly to government, 
while others with strongly held views or particular expertise grow frus- 
trated by the slowness of the consensus-building process in CCIC and the 
often diluted stances that emerge from it. In 1983, after a bruising debate 
between proponents and opponents of a vigorous public advocacy profile 
for CCIC, the Council formulated an Advocacy Policy to establish clear 
rules and procedures guiding the adoption of public stands. But such a 
policy by itself cannot create a common understanding of development, 
nor of the priority issues to be addressed, nor does it necessarily confer 
credibility. Too often, the Council's policy pronouncements have been 
unfocused, reactive, and poorly researched. Credibility suffers when an 
issue is important to only a few members, or when an issue is taken up but 
no consistent lobbying follows, or when an issue is poorly researched and 
presented. What is often not appreciated is that this lack of credibility 
affects not just CCIC but the whole Canadian NGO community. 
It is easier for the Council to address relatively limited issues with clear 
desired outcomes; in 1978, for example, the Council successfully lobbied 
against the proposed imposition of countervailing duties on Tanzanian 
sisal. Complex, long-term issues, on the other hand, require a sustained 
commitment. CCIC has presented briefs opposing patenting of genetic 
resources and changes in drug patent policy, arguing the negative impact 
these would have on poor countries; but in both cases, follow-up work 
was carried out by the provincial councils in Saskatchewan and Manitoba 
respectively, as CCIC's attention was drawn to other issues. 
One example of effective advocacy is the Election Priorities Project, a 
national campaign conceived and planned by the Development and Disar- 
mament working group of C CIC prior to the 1984 federal election. A well- 
8 Cooperative d'Animation et de Consultation, Evaluation of CCIC: Final Report, p. 38. 
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documented kit was widely distributed in each riding and to all candi- 
dates, containing information on major topics of interest to the develop- 
ment and peace constituencies and a questionnaire. Seventy of the candi- 
dates who responded were elected to the House of Commons, and 12 
were appointed to the Cabinet. It was no doubt worthwhile for these 
political figures (and the unsuccessful candidates) to have been asked 
their views on major issues of global development and justice, and in the 
process reminded that such matters are of concern to ordinary voters; but 
the real success of the project lay in the long-term contacts that were built 
across the country and the practical organizing experience gained by 
people in the development and peace communities. 
If NGOs have placed greater emphasis on their public relations lobbying 
and rather less on their advocacy work, this may reflect the prevailing 
division of labour in the Canadian NGO community: national, fundrais- 
ing agencies look after the former, with a steady eye on their need for 
continuing political support and a strong donor constituency, while 
small, relatively specialized research and solidarity groups, chronically 
under-funded, do the latter. Increasingly, however, knowledgeable ob- 
servers are pointing to an emerging role and responsibility for Northern 
NGOs to become actively engaged in the policy process around develop- 
ment options and strategies. As Marcel Masse, now Canadian executive 
director at the IMF, remarked to a conference on NGOs hosted by CUSO 
and the North-South Institute in October 1986: 
The role of NGOs has got to be seen in terms of a much wider picture, 
a much greater number of influences that go to create or prevent 
development ...the more we learn about the way the economy of 
the world works, the clearer it becomes that what Secretary Baker 
does about the budget deficit in the U.S. and what the Group of 5 
does about exchange rates and interest rates are more important 
determinants of what is going to happen to the production of 
sorghum and millet in a small village in Senegal than almost any 
other policy.9 
Agricultural training, credit for small farmers, improvements in tech- 
nology, and so forth, all remain important and must continue to be 
assisted through NGO programs - but a real concern with the prospects 
and well-being of the Senegalese farmer demands that Northern agencies 
begin to play a role in pushing for appropriate policies on the part of 
national governments and international institutions. Willingness to re- 
flect critically on the 'macro' issues as well as to work for improvement on 
the 'micro' issues is also a measure of NGOs' independence and their 
9 CUSO/North-South Institute, "Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations in In- 
ternational Development: Mobilisation, Partnership and Effectiveness," Ottawa, 1986, 
pp. 3-5. 
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maturity. NGOs, if truly motivated to work with and assist the poor, will 
have to demonstrate as much commitment to advocacy on their behalf as 
they have shown to lobbying on their own. 
Impact of Government Funding on Autonomy 
The most basic form of government support to the voluntary sector is 
through the tax relief which most NGOs, as registered charities, can 
provide to their donors. This is support which is 'blind,' in that it is 
available to all bona fide charities regardless of their particular charitable 
objective, their effectiveness, or the extent to which they fit governmental 
priorities. It is a not inconsiderable support to private fundraising and 
represents a substantial 'hidden' contribution by the state. 
More focused and explicit government support for NGOs' development 
work has been available since 1968 through CIDA's responsive program, 
administered by the NGO and ICDS divisions. In Chapter 3 it was pointed 
out that Canada ranks second among OECD members in the proportion of 
ODA channelled through NGOs. As the overall volume of financial trans- 
fers from CIDA to the voluntary sector has grown, many observers have 
expressed the view that the independence of NGOs is being eroded. 10 As 
Figure 4.1 shows, the majority of NGOs now receive more than half their 
funding from government sources. For development education groups, 
dependence on government funds is high but relatively stable; for agen- 
cies with overseas programs, the level of dependence is lower, but has 
increased markedly over the past decade. 
Overseas Programs 
Although the responsive program administered by CIDA's Special Pro- 
grams Branch has doubled as a share of ODA, from 3.9 percent to 
8 percent between 1976-77 and 1985-86, it has remained remarkably 
constant as a proportion of NGO income. Over the same period, however, 
the proportion of government funding increased from 40.9 percent of 
NGO revenues to 48.6 percent (see Table 4.1). The difference is almost 
entirely due to the development of new funding channels, particularly 
contracts and so-called country focus projects, through which CIDA's 
bilateral branches have over the past decade channelled substantial re- 
sources directly to NGOs. The concerns expressed in recent years about 
the impact of increased government funding on NGO autonomy refer 
most properly to these new sources, although the level of financial 
dependence has also increased for some agencies without bilateral fund- 
ing. Have these new funding sources in fact diminished NGO autonomy? 
10 See, for example, Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs 
and International Rade, Discussion Paper on Issues in Canada's Official Development Assistance 
Policies and Programs, Ottawa, July 1986, pp. 14-15. 
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Figure 4.1 
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Bilateral contracts, which normally are awarded through a competitive 
bidding process, differ from responsive funding in two critical ways: the 
implementing agency (NGO) does not itself make a financial contribu- 
tion, and program priorities are entirely set by the funding agency, CIDA. 
The first substantial bilateral contracts were awarded to NGOs in 1978, 
but it was not until 1982 that they became significant in terms of numbers 
of projects or volume of funding. By mid-1984 12 NGOs held 25 active 
service contracts with a total value of over $19 million; in 1986, the 
number of agencies involved had shrunk to eight, holding 19 contracts 
with a total value of $20.6 million. As Table 4.2 shows, the rate at which 
contracts are being awarded has also slowed, reportedly as a result of 
CIDA concern about the absorptive capacity of the NGOs involved, and 
complaints from private commercial firms that non-profit organizations 
are competing unfairly for CIDA business. (It should be noted that con- 
tracts being executed by NGOs represent less than 2 percent of total active 
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Table 4.1 
Canadian NGOs: Revenue by Source 








CIDA - Regular Program 35.9 35.0 35.4 
CIDA - Bilateral (country 
focus, contracts) 
1.2 7.8 
Other Federal Government 0.1 0.2 1.9 
Provincial Government 4.9 7.1 3.5 
Subtotal, Government 40.9 43.5 48.6 
Corporate Donations 3.0 3.0 1.7 
Foundation Donations 0.9 0.5 1.0 
Individual Donations 44.1 41.7 37.7 
Other° 11.1 11.1 11.1 
Subtotal, Private 59.1 56.3 51.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
I The types of revenue included under this category vary from agency to agency. For the most part, it 
includes contracts with international agencies, grants from other NGOs, and, in some cases, self- 
generated income (proceeds from fundraising events). 
Source. Questionnaire responses. In a few cases, reference years may vary. Totals may not add, due to 
rounding. 
CIDA service contracts" and, most importantly, that 80 percent of all 
contracts held by NGOs are being executed by one agency, WUSC.) Given 
the costs associated with preparing bids, few agencies are now willing or 
able to tender for CIDA contracts; consequently, this will continue to be a 
source of income for only a very few. In fact, the perception that NGOs are 
engaged in direct competition with the for-profit sector may reduce the 
availability of contracts to any agency as the government yields to private 
sector pressure to reserve contracts for commercial firms. This could also 
have the effect of excluding a significant source of relevant expertise from 
whole sectors of development work contracted out by CIDA. 
11 A further $75.2 million, or 7 percent of the total, has been awarded to educational 
institutions; these (and crown corporations like the Ontario International Corporation), are 
the more significant competition for the private sector. 
Table 4.2 
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Active CIDA Service Contracts to Canadian NGOs 
As of 
30 June 1984 
As of 
1 September 1986 
Number of Contracts 25 19 
Number of Agencies 12 8 
Value of Contracts ($ thousands) 19,021 20,623 
Number of Contracts Approved 16 10 
Within Previous 24 Months (64.0) 
(percent of total) 
(52.6) 
Value of Contracts Approved 13,143 7,046 
Within Previous 24 Months (69.1) (34.2) 
($ thousands) (percent of total) 
Source: 1986 data taken from CIDA, Active Service Contracts and Current Lines of Credit, Autumn 1986 Hull, 
1986; 1984 data supplied by Contracts Division, CIDA. Contracts under $10,000 were excluded. 
Figures do not include contracts with universities, colleges or professional associations. 
Country Focus Funding 
A more significant new channel of government funding of NGOs opened 
up as a result of CIDA's adoption of a 'country focus' policy in 1981. 
Championed by Marcel Masse, then the president of CIDA, the country 
focus approach was an explicit attempt to offset the limitations of the 
typically large-scale, capital-intensive bilateral projects directly adminis- 
tered by CIDA. As such, the new policy expressed convictions already 
embodied in the NGO approach to development. In Masses explanation, 
country focus 
consists in defining what the objectives of our intervention in a given 
country should be, and then determining which channel of interven- 
tion available to the Agency is the most efficient. Then we choose it, 
we fund it, and we hope it [development] happens.12 
12 At a meeting with NGO representatives in Ottawa in February 1982, Masse noted: 
"We've got a number of countries in CIDA where we have given locomotives, however, we 
have learned slowly that this is not necessarily a good kind of project, because if the 
locomotives are used just 28 percent or 30 percent of the time, you've got a good project in 
terms of transfer of funds, or transfer of goods and services, but you do not have a good 
project in terms of the 'development' effect in the country itself. . .". He went on to say that 
this "simple" lesson had only been recognized by the World Bank in 1980, when it 
concluded for the first time in its World Development Report for that year that the rate of return 
on investment in human resource development (such as health, training, and so on) is often 
higher than that of investment in physical goods and resources. See Maureen Hollingworth, 
Consultation on Country Focus: Report on the Proceedings of the NGO-CIDA Meeting, 17 February 
1982 (Ottawa: CCIC, March 1982), Appendix A, p. 3-4. 
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The policy shift inside CIDA sowed confusion at the lower levels of the 
bureaucracy, but also unleashed a new creativity among those frustrated 
by the lack of results achieved by more conventional government-to- 
government aid projects. 
For CIDA planners this opened the door to new types of programming at 
the grassroots which hitherto CIDA could not have managed, and new 
flexibility in using NGOs, universities, or other institutions and firms as 
delivery channels. For NGOs it meant the potential of dramatically in- 
creased resources for their programs and projects, where these fitted into 
CIDA's country priorities. Country focus projects were not only larger 
than most responsive program projects, but also offered matching fund- 
ing ratios of up to 9 to 1, as opposed to the maximum 3 to 1 available 
through responsive channels. 
The discussion over country focus which took place through 1982 be- 
tween CIDA and the NGOs provided an opportunity to re-state the terms 
of their 15-year old relationship. Was the purpose of the new policy to 
enhance NGOs' capacity to respond to development needs as perceived by 
them, or to 'use' the NGOs as an efficient delivery mechanism in order to 
meet CIDA's program goals? In the face of NGO anxiety that this shift 
would lead to greater control harnessing them to CIDA's own objectives, 
the CIDA president asserted 
your usefulness to us is principally that you are outsiders, that you 
function differently, that you bring up ideas, projects and ways of 
operating that are not our ways. In other words, if you did not have 
that autonomy, it would be in CIDA's interest to create it and to keep 
you away from us.13 
But while some NGOs perceived country focus as an opportunity and 
some saw it as essentially irrelevant to their work, many others viewed it 
as a threat to the traditionally 'responsive' nature of government sup- 
port. 14 They expressed three principal concerns: that new and directive 
bilateral funding would gradually replace the matching-grant program; 
that because bilateral funding was not responsive, NGOs would be under 
pressure - which some would find hard to resist - to align their activities 
more closely to CIDA in their selection of countries and sectors; and, 
finally, that the scale and administrative demands usually associated with 
13 Ibid., p. 6. 
14 See, for example, CCIC, Report of the Task Force on Government Funding, Ottawa, 1982. 
One author argues that "the incipient involvement of NGOs in country-focus activities 
implies an extension and transformation of their role. The country-focus approach suggest a 
change in the essential characteristics of NGOs, as they take on the functions of quasi- 
governmental agencies for policy implementation." Martin Rudner, "The Evolving Frame- 
work of Canadian Development Assistance Policy," Brian Tomlin and Maureen Molot, eds., 
Canada among Nations, 1984: A Time of Pansition (Toronto: Lorimer, 1985), p. 139. 
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bilateral projects could lead some NGOs to overextend themselves and 
eventually to become wholly dependent on continuing CIDA funding.lb 
what extent have these concerns proved to be well-founded? 
Overall Level of Government Funding: The growth of country focus 
funding has been nothing less than dramatic. Reliable figures on these 
disbursements have been difficult to collect, particularly since manage- 
ment responsibility for a project established before 1987 could rest either 
with Special Projects Branch or one of the four bilateral branches. 15 As of 
October 1986, 157 country focus projects were operational, having a total 
value of some $207 million. While this includes many projects managed 
by universities, colleges and professional associations, 1985-86 disburse- 
ments to NGOs included in this study were still in the order of $40 mil- 
lion, or equal to one-quarter of their funding from the responsive (match- 
ing grant) program (one-third if food aid, PPP and provincial government 
contributions are excluded). 
There is little indication, however, that growth in country focus funding 
has been at the expense of the responsive program. In the four years 
preceding the introduction of country focus funding (1976-77 to 
1980-81), the responsive program (excluding food aid, PPP and provincial 
government contributions), grew at an average annual rate of just under 
5 percent in real terms; in the four years following the introduction of 
country focus, the comparable figure was over 11 percent. 16 A number of 
variables could explain the higher rate of growth in recent years (for 
example, pressure on bilateral desks to disburse unspent funds in a given 
year, resulting in their transfer to the responsive program). Yet it is clear 
that rather than pushing out responsive funding, country focus funds 
resulted from a general receptivity to NGO initiatives within CIDA, which 
was felt in both responsive and bilateral programs. 
This receptivity may not endure. The present trend appears to be toward a 
gradual decrease in country focus disbursements; Table 4.3 indicates a 
decline in the rate at which country focus projects are approved. This 
reflects pressures from CIDA's bilateral branches on available funds for 
projects which they have identified themselves, as well as from the 
15 In 1986, CIDA altered its guidelines, so that in future all country focus projects would be 
managed by the bilateral branches. 
16 In 1985/86, growth rates for the responsive program slowed somewhat. In large mea- 
sure, however, this was due to the Progressive Conservative government's freeze on discre- 
tionary funding in the last three months of the fiscal year, not an independent decision by 
CIDA. 
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commercial sector. 17 At the same time, two further trends are apparent. 
First, there is a concentration in the number of agencies receiving country 
focus projects: perhaps only 25 of the more than 200 included in the 
terms of reference for this study have received such support. Within this 
restricted number there is an even greater concentration: as of 1987 
50 percent of the country focus projects approved by the NGO division, 
by value, were being implemented by just two agencies, CARE and 
UNICEF; while in ICDS 75 percent of the projects by value (excluding 
universities, colleges and professional associations) were with WUSC, 
CUSO and CECI. Second, as Table 4.3 shows, there is a parallel trend 
toward larger projects. In short, country focus funding will likely go to 
fewer agencies and larger projects in future. 
NGO Priorities: While the logic of the country focus approach sug- 
gested that CIDA's goals and priorities would be the basis for deciding on 
projects, and that CIDA's role in planning would therefore be paramount, 
in practice the door was left open to NGOs to bring forward projects 
which they or their Southern partners had developed. Experience to date 
reveals that country focus projects have originated in one of four ways: an 
existing NGO project has been renewed, extended or 'scaled-up'; an 
agency has introduced a project itself (usually a larger one than would 
normally be funded from SPB's own budget); CIDA has made known its 
interests or priorities in a given area, and awaited responses from NGOs; 
and, finally, a CIDA bilateral official has designed a project and then 
sought an NGO willing and able to execute it. It is the last category, 
especially, and to a lesser extent the third, that has raised anxiety that 
voluntary sector programming would be dictated by official priorities. In 
fact, of 35 country focus projects administered through the NGO division 
between 1982 and 1986, for example, 29 (83 percent) were initiated by 
NGOs, not CIDA. (The extent to which projects have been initiated by 
CIDA may be higher for projects managed by the bilateral branches.) This 
would suggest that rather than distorting an agency's objectives, as many 
initially feared, 18 bilateral funding has allowed some agencies to increase 
the scale of their projects beyond the level possible using only donor funds 
or matching grants. 
17 John Watson, then operations director of WUSC, argued at a January 1987 consultation 
between CIDA and NGO representatives that "the country focus mechanism is dead as far as 
new NGO-initiated projects are concerned .... The only country focus initiatives likely to 
come to fruition in the current climate are projects that are wholly initiated by CIDA, which 
cannot, for some special reason be implemented by a private firm, or renewals of existing 
country focus NGO projects." John Watson, "Diversity of Funding Channels: Presentation to 
the NGO/CIDA Consultation," WUSC, Ottawa, no date, pp. 3-4. 
18 In questionnaire responses, the main reason given by NGOs who had not sought 
country focus funding was the concern that it might distort their own goals or priorities. 
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Table 4.3 
Country Focus Projects Approved and Planned 
Projects Approved 
1986-87 
Projects in the 
Planning Stage 
1984-85 1985-86 (to October 1986) (as of October 1986) 
Number of Projects 93 63 34 27 
(percent of all 
bilateral projects) 
(47.0) (14.9) (13.8) (16.5) 
Value of Projects 
($millions) 
50.0 62.0 40.0 47.0 
(percent of all 
bilateral projects) 
(7.2) (5.8) (4.6) (4.0) 
Average Value of 
Projects ($millions) 
0.5 1.0 1.2 1.7 
Source: Data supplied by Special Programs Branch, CIDA, 26 November 1986. Country focus projects 
include those with universities, colleges, and professional associations. 
The possibility of gaining access to bilateral funds could still lead an 
agency to pursue, expand, or modify a project beyond a desirable size or 
level. But as a partial safeguard, as well as tangible evidence of NGO 
'ownership,' the implementing NGO, if it is a project funding agency with 
resources of its own, is usually required to contribute a proportion of the 
project budget.19 Of the 35 projects mentioned above, all but two entailed 
a financial contribution from the implementing NGO; the average contri- 
bution was around 10 percent, but 11 of the projects were 25 percent or 
more funded by the NGO. Since many of the project budgets were over 
$1 million, even a relatively small contribution represented in some cases 
a major commitment of an agency's own funds. The average level of 
financial contribution is probably lower for agencies funded by ICDS, 
which are generally less able to raise funds from the public. But the 
general lesson is clear; as the 1986 Desmarais report on CIDA notes, NGOs 
have in large measure treated country focus as "another program recep- 
tive to their financing demands, in other words as another special 
program. 1120 Nor is there evidence that country focus funding has caused 
NGOs to alter their country or sector priorities radically: not surprisingly, 
CIDA has chosen in almost all cases to support agencies with a proven 
track record in a given area. 
19 This was a strong recommendation of the CCIC Task Force on Government Funding. See 
pages 17-18 of the report. 
10 Task Force on Canada's Official Development Assistance Program, Study of the Policy and 
Organization of Canada's Official Development Aid: Report to the Minister for External Relations 
(Hull: CIDA, August 1986), p. 9 (emphasis in original). 
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NGO Dependency: As we have shown, significantly greater bilateral 
funding has not either constricted the regular matching grant program, 
nor skewed NGO priorities. The question remains whether the country 
focus initiative has led some agencies to neglect their own fundraising and 
planning so as to take advantage of CIDA funding. This is perhaps the 
most difficult issue to assess, but also the one where initial NGO fears 
appear to be the most warranted. 
There is little doubt that country focus funding has increased the adminis- 
trative burden on recipient NGOs that for the most part are accustomed to 
working with smaller projects and simpler approval processes. Country 
focus projects must go through the same procedures as any bilaterally- 
funded project, and these can often be onerous and time-consuming. To 
quote the Desmarais report again, 
some community development projects were studied for almost two 
years before the promised funding was actually granted. Govern- 
ments in developing countries are accustomed to these kinds of 
delays, but the same cannot be said for rural communities or people's 
groups in the Third World. They end up not only tired of waiting but 
also begin to doubt the very credibility of their Canadian NGO 
partners?' 
It is worth repeating that for NGOs, loss of autonomy may be the result of 
other than financial considerations. To a much greater extent than with 
the responsive program (and increasingly, since CIDA personnel at bilat- 
eral country desks now manage the majority of such projects directly) 
country focus projects require familiarity with CIDA priorities and pro- 
cedures. This consultation with CIDA and compliance with its require- 
ments may come to displace an agency's relationships with the regular 
partners or the Third World groups with which it normally works. 
In strict financial terms, the fact that very few agencies have sought 
country focus funding means that its impact on the voluntary develop- 
ment community as a whole is more limited than the volume of disburse- 
ments might suggest. Most of the project-funding agencies implementing 
country focus projects already have substantial privately raised funds or, 
like CARE, UNICEF, or the Aga Khan Foundation Canada, are linked to 
international organizations with access to other funds and an implement- 
ing capacity. The danger of losing autonomy is greater for agencies that 
have relied on country focus instead of addressing weaknesses in their 
own fundraising. As the flow of bilateral country focus funds to NGOs 
dries up, agencies that had hoped to use this source as a basis for planning 
their own programs or building their operational capacity will face a 
difficult adjustment. WUSC, and some others for example, have begun to 
look to multilateral organizations such as UNHCR to partially replace the 
21 Ibid., p. 10-11. 
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bilateral funding that fuelled their expansion in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. But for most agencies this is not a viable alternative because they 
lack the necessary direct implementation capacity in the Third World. 
For agencies that have come to depend on country focus and other 
bilateral funding for a large percentage of their budgets, the inevitable 
result of financial dependence is vulnerability - in this case, to changes in 
CIDA's funding policies and priorities. To a degree, however, the same 
lesson may apply to the broader NGO community. In recent years, there 
has been a proliferation of special funding arrangements through which 
CIDA has encouraged NGOs to undertake certain kinds of projects or to 
work in countries of priority to CIDA: special funds for Africa, South Asia, 
or the Philippines, or for immunization programs or women's projects. 
Indeed, as country focus and bilateral contract disbursements stabilize or 
decline in coming years, the pattern of CIDA funding of NGOs may come 
to be centred on such hybrid initiatives, neither completely responsive 
nor totally directive. 
Such funding channels allow NGOs more autonomy in deciding program 
priorities than they have with direct bilateral contracts or country focus 
arrangements, but they spring from the same broad CIDA concern: to 
improve its ability to meet its own objectives. Of course Canadian NGOs 
face no compulsion to participate other than the 'subtle' inducement of 
available funding, but once involved they must accept conditions regard- 
ing the sector or region of programming, and may have to work with local 
agencies designated by CIDA. As a result, instead of analyzing develop- 
ment needs overseas for themselves, and orienting their priorities and 
programs accordingly, NGOs are tempted to change course to take advan- 
tage of more readily available funds. They can be expected to grow 
increasingly reliant on CIDA in this way, especially as CIDA's field capacity 
grows, unless they improve their ability to assess needs through their own 
field staff and/or local partners. In that case, although overall government 
funding of a particular organization may increase, it will be at the cost of 
its internal coherence and operational autonomy. 
On the other hand, the proliferation of funding channels offers NGOs a 
measure of protection in that they can diversify their funding sources and 
'hedge their bets' against future CIDA cutbacks. But they are still vulnera- 
ble to broad CIDA policy shifts. While the past decade has seen a growing 
government appreciation of the NGO sector, both in Canada and else- 
where, there is no guarantee that it will endure indefinitely. The need to 
balance popularity in government circles with effective mobilization of 
their own resources is a lesson that NGOs ignore at their peril. 
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Development Education: Funding and Autonomy 
Traditionally, NGOs concentrating exclusively on development education 
have had limited financial resources; their work as a result has been 
characterized by low salary levels and rudimentary facilities. Although a 
few groups (e.g., LAWG, GATT-Fly, the Inter-Church Committee on 
Human Rights in Latin America) have made a deliberate decision not to 
accept government funds, many rely heavily on official support. In 1984, 
of 24 agencies for which data was available, 75 percent depended for 
more than half of their total budget on government sources. CIDA fund- 
ing, through the Public Participation Program, also finances a large share 
of the development education programming of agencies with overseas 
projects (which presumably have a greater fundraising capacity). Unlike 
these groups, agencies concentrating exclusively on development educa- 
tion in Canada cannot diversify their funding base by appealing to a 
variety of CIDA funding'windows': federal development education fund- 
ing for NGOs is limited to the PPP budget, and, more recently, Partner- 
ship Africa Canada, while already limited provincial support has been 
declining. 
This heavy reliance on the PPP inevitably produces vulnerability to 
changes in the PPP budget and priorities, intensified by the year-to-year 
uncertainty of future funding 22 While the program's budget has grown 
steadily in absolute terms since its inception, the level of funding per client 
has changed little in real terms, as the number of clients has expanded 
dramatically (see Table 4.4). As well, PPP must respond to requests from 
non-NGO sources, such as professional associations, universities and 
colleges, which in 1985-86 absorbed over 15 percent of PPP disburse- 
ments. Despite its growth since 1971-72, PPP's budget remains small in 
relation to other CIDA programs. In this era of slow growth in CIDA's 
overall budget, doubts persist that PPP, with a tiny staff and a widely 
dispersed constituency, has the clout within CIDA to increase, or even 
maintain, its share of aid funds. There have been intimations that PPP may 
not survive at all as a separate entity, but maybe amalgamated with CIDA's 
Public Affairs section, the agency's promotional arm. 
It has long been axiomatic in the NGO community that it is next to 
impossible to raise private funds for development education. A 1982 CCIC 
report, for example, stated flatly that "it has proven unrealistic to expect 
that education can generate the necessary funds for its own perpetua- 
tion."23 Stated often enough this moves from being an axiom to a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. Some agencies have nevertheless met the funding 
22 An additonal problem for PPP is the fact that with a small budget and a large client list, 
its flexibility in funding new initiatives, as opposed to ongoing programs, is limited. 
23 MC, Report of the Task Force on Government Spending, p. 14. 
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Table 4.4 
CIDA-PPP Disbursements, 1971-72 - 1985-86 
1971-72 1980-81 1985-86 
Total Amount Disbursed 600.1 3,438.1 9,080.6 
($ thousands) 
Number of Clients Funded 32 87 140 
Average Disbursement per Client 
Current Dollars ($ thousands) 18.8 39.5 64.9 
Constant (1981) Dollars 43.2 40.8 49.6 
($ thousands) 
Source: PPP client lists, 1980-81 and 1985-86. Conversions to constant dollars using CPI (all items). 
challenge quite successfully. In Toronto, for example, the Development 
Education Centre (DEC) raises some 70 percent of its funds from non- 
governmental sources, largely from the revenues of its book and film 
distribution service, and has recently launched a direct mail campaign, as 
has Carrefour de Solidarite Internationale in Sherbrooke; other learner 
centres such as those in Calgary, (Arusha) and in London have found that, 
by expanding into multicultural education and immigrant resettlement 
work, they can tap new sources of federal and provincial financing. 
Obviously, not all agencies can adopt such strategies, particularly those in 
smaller communities, but some elements might apply. The Marquis 
Project in Brandon has increased its revenue by selling books, t-shirts, 
and posters from its office, while the Common Heritage Programme and 
some other school-based activities generate revenue from professional 
workshop fees, and sales of materials produced for classroom use. 
Development education remains in a financially weakened state for two 
main reasons: namely, the difficulty of demonstrating quantifiable impact, 
and the lack of substantial support for development education activities 
from fundraising NGOs. With few exceptions agencies seldom support 
community-based education initiatives, partly because they do not get 
enough profile, partly because their own education work is intimately 
linked to fundraising and agency promotion, but also due to a simple 
reluctance to relinquish 'control' over an activity with some potential for 
risk, embarrassment, or worse, loss of image that would impact on 
fundraising. 
For small groups with limited staff, the constant struggle for funds and the 
debilitating dependency upon one major donor, the federal government, 
undermine efforts to plan and foster attitudes of vulnerability and defen- 
siveness. For Canada and the development community, investing in an 
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informed public opinion is important and requires a longer-term base of 
support with understood and accepted standards of performance and 
criteria of accountability. 
Operational Autonomy: Relations with Third World 
Governments 
'traditionally, Canadian and other foreign NGOs have enjoyed relatively 
easy access to many poor countries, and something approaching carte 
blanche for their operations. Where this has not been the case, they have 
simply stayed away. In some regions, particularly Francophone Africa, 
and in countries with centrally planned economies, the very concept of a 
non-governmental role in development was at one time strange 
and suspect: scarce resources and the need to reinforce fragile state insti- 
tutions in the post-independence era left little room for pluralism; to 
officialdom, non-governmental sounded uncomfortably like antigovern- 
mental! Acceptance of foreign NGOs, however, has since become more 
widespread. For poor countries they bring welcome resources (during the 
1972 -74 Sahel drought, for example, Mali, which had virtually no foreign 
NGOs, compared its situation with that of Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso, 
and reversed its earlier hostility). In recent years there has been rising 
pressure from donor countries and some multilateral institutions to give 
greater leeway to non-governmental initiatives. 
The increasing financial presence of Northern NGOs, coupled with the 
emergence and growing strength of indigenous organizations, has inev- 
itably drawn the attention of Southern governments. Their attitudes 
toward NGOs vary widely, depending upon the country and the regime in 
power, on a spectrum which ranges from minimal supervision through 
loose coordination, to restrictive regulation. But attitudes can shift 
quickly in response to domestic or international political changes. In 
Jamaica, for example, which had a laissez-faire approach, growing suspi- 
cion and hostility between government and NGOs culminated in a police 
quest for incriminating documents in the local office of a Canadian 
agency (none were found). In Peru, government-NGO relations were 
friendly after the election of the Garcia government in 1.984 but deterio- 
rated two years later when a Congressional enquiry was launched into the 
activities of selected Peruvian NGOs and their foreign backers. In Zim- 
babwe, too, troubles in Matabeleland in 1984 caused strains between 
foreign NGOs and the government. 
For their part, most development agencies have resolutely kept at arm's 
length from local governments, fearing possible political interference, red 
tape, or manipulation to partisan advantage. Regimes indifferent to the 
welfare of their populations, especially those violating human rights, are 
especially threatening. Avoiding close contact with government allowed 
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NGOs to continue to work in Uganda throughout the period of Idi Amin's 
brutality, when official aid was stopped. Similarly, in Chile under 
Pinochet, in the Philippines under Marcos, in South Africa and Vietnam, 
NGOs remain active on the premise that people suffering oppression 
should not face the double penalty of losing all external support just when 
they have greatest need of it. 
The problem for NGOs lies in determining when cooperation with a local 
government may either unduly restrict their autonomy, or be construed as 
support for that government's policies, or inadvertently assist repressive 
actions. In several countries, (Guatemala, El Salvador, Jamaica) Canadian 
agencies have objected to CIDA's use of counterpart funds (which in 
principle are under the control of the recipient government) to support 
indigenous NGOs, on the grounds that this could expose the local agen- 
cies to direct interference and even physical danger (see Chapter 7). But in 
other situations, an agency that distances itself from the government may 
be isolated; without government support its projects may become unsus- 
tainable and its compatibility with local development priorities put in 
doubt. 
Indeed the survey of Canadian projects in the field conducted for this 
study revealed few examples of successful replication of activities, the 
main reason being the reluctance of sponsoring organizations to coordi- 
nate their work with the local government and with other development 
agencies. In part this reflects the lack of pressure on voluntary organiza- 
tions to gear up their activities to affect large numbers of beneficiaries; in 
part their suspicion of working with powerful institutions, including 
government. In the long run, however, the objective of development 
agencies must be to enable the poor to confront powerful institutions like 
government and to make effective demands on them, rather than to 
isolate beneficiaries from the 'system' and in doing so create further 
dependencies. 
Trends are now forcing a greater degree of cooperation between govern- 
ments and NGOs: the increased resources of NGOs make them too 
prominent to be left alone, and bilateral and multilateral support for their 
projects normally requires the approval of local governments. Good 
relations are hampered, however, when Southern governments feel that 
NGOs are competing with them for donor resources, or if NGOs attempt 
to operate separate (or even competitive) service delivery mechanisms 
which are better endowed than those of local governments (which unlike 
NGOs, usually must spread their resources more thinly to accommodate 
as many people as possible). 
There is also a need for more self-discipline and internal coordination 
among NGOs. In post-disaster situations, for example, outside agencies 
have often flooded into a country, imposing a considerable burden on 
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local structures 24 The lack of effective coordinating mechanisms often 
leads to a seemingly endless succession of missions, visits and 'fact- 
finding' tours by outside agencies which make excessive demands on 
harrassed officials. Local coordinating NGOs have been set up in many 
countries, including Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Zimbabwe, 
forestalling the imposition of more top-down control by government, but 
it requires a real willingness to make these function effectively, par- 
ticularly on the part of foreign NGOs who may prefer to rely on direct 
access to government officials or the backing of their own embassy when 
they have disagreements with local authorities. 
Conclusion 
NGOs fiercely defend their independence, yet in the past 10 years they 
have sought and received dramatically increased funding from govern- 
ment. They proudly point to their close ties to poor communities as the 
basis for their autonomy, but their information about them is often weak, 
intermittent, and indirect. They insist on their freedom to set their own 
priorities, yet are quickly drawn into new regions or types of program- 
ming by the prospect of additional funds. How can one explain these 
apparent paradoxes? 
It is perhaps well to remember that NGOs also have institutional interests 
to protect, conflicting internal views to reconcile, and a difficult task of 
striving for organizational coherence while remaining responsive to a 
multitude of needs and pressures. Their freedom to function implies that 
NGOs can do what governments cannot, ought not, or will not do - 
supporting human rights for example, or working in politically 'difficult' 
areas like Eritrea, or asking questions about the impact of large-scale 
projects on the environment, and so on. But the will to do so derives not 
from some formalistic assertion of autonomy, nor even from indepen- 
dence from government money, but from a vision of development rooted 
in values and choices. It is this willingness to explore alternatives and to 
experiment with new initiatives which makes NGO autonomy valuable 
and worth protecting. In this sense Canadian NGOs are less at risk from 
the support they receive from CIDA than from a loss of internal vitality 
and self-questioning that can only come from agencies' direct work in the 
field. Autonomy is not so much a virtue to be guarded as a challenge to be 
met, and a principle to be exercised. 
24 In its report on the African emergency relief operation, the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) states that the number of NGOs in the Sudan ex- 
ploded from fewer than 20 before 1984 to some 160 at the height of the emergency. See 
International Institute for Environment and Development, Report on the African Emergency 
Relief Operation, 1984-1986 with Particular Reference to the Contribution of Non-Governmental 
Organisations, and at the Request of the UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, London, 
November 1986, p. 82. 
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S Participation: Involving Canadians 
If you look closely, you will see that almost anything that really matters to 
us, anything that embodies our deepest commitment to the way human life 
should be lived and cared for, depends on some form - most often, many 
forms - of volunteerism - Margaret Mead 
The right to participate is integrally linked to the right to learn. Individuals 
learn by participating in interactions with society; and society learns from 
the participation ofgroups and individuals in its activities. One measure of 
the potential for innovative learning in a society is its degree of effective 
participation. And from a global view, the potential for innovative learning 
in the world system as a whole hinges on the extent of participation at 
international as well as national and local levels 
- No Limits to Learning: A Report to the Club of Rome 
By definition, voluntary activity involves people. The legitimacy of volun- 
tary organizations has always rested to a large degree on their links to the 
Canadian population, and they have flourished in proportion to their 
ability to harness the energy, skills, and commitment of individual Cana- 
dians. By implication, the degree of public participation is an important 
indicator of the strength and resilience of the NGO community. 
Participation can take a variety of forms, depending upon both the 
personal preferences of those involved and on the nature of the organiza- 
tion. Many Canadians work for NGOs, either in Canada or overseas on a 
paid or volunteer basis; many more are involved indirectly, through their 
charitable donations. Finally, through the public education activities of 
various agencies, Canadians can learn about - and participate in - the 
process of international development. 
Volunteers: The Human Thuch 
In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that a conservative estimate of the 
number of Canadians directly participating in the work of NGOs might be 
as high as 40,000, based on 1984 figures. Of this figure, the vast majority - 
perhaps 90 percent of the total - are volunteers.' Indeed, it is often 
claimed that the involvement of volunteers is one of the factors that sets 
I These figures, drawn from questionnaire data, are in broad agreement with other 
available sources. A 1985 study of Alberta NGOs found that of 1,835 agency personnel (full- 
and part-time), 1,653 (90 percent) were volunteers. See Katherine Rechico, Alberta NGO 
Economic Impact Study (Edmonton: Alberta Agency for International Development, Sep- 
tember 1986), pp. 6-7. 
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NGOs (and other voluntary agencies) apart from government or profit- 
making bodies. Nigel Martin, former executive director of CCIC, put it the 
following way: 
the NGO is an institution, a structured body, a legal entity. And yet, it 
is a physical embodiment of an ideal ... The structure is set up to 
ensure participation around a mission by volunteers. The volunteers, 
amateurs, hire the professionals. Professionals give their advice, but 
the ultimate decisions are made by amateurs.2 
Volunteers are involved in various ways, from serving on boards of 
directors to working on projects overseas. It is perhaps helpful to separate 
volunteers into two main groups - those working for an agency in 
Canada and 'cooperants' working overseas. The two groups are dis- 
tinguished not only by where they work, but also by their conditions of 
employment. While the former are usually part-time and/or casual, the 
latter are almost invariably full-time, with overseas postings lasting from 
six months to several years. While the former are volunteers in the classic 
sense, working without remuneration (other than the travel and meal 
allowances provided by some agencies), most cooperants receive a small 
subsidy to cover living costs. This may be paid by the sending agency, a 
host agency or government, or some combination of the two; in other 
cases, individual cooperants raise funds from church or other sources to 
cover their expenses. 
There is no necessary contradiction between professional staff and a 
voluntary structure. NGOs continue to believe that volunteers are impor- 
tant, not simply as a way to lower their costs but, more importantly, for 
the ongoing links they provide to the community. Yet there are growing 
questions as to the ability - and in some cases the willingness - of NGOs 
to integrate volunteers effectively into their organizations. 
In-Canada Volunteers 
The rapid growth of many NGOs over the past two decades has been 
accompanied by a growing 'professionalization.' Not only do agencies 
now have more money to hire trained, full-time professionals, but in- 
creased funding (particularly government funding) brings with it greater 
pressures for efficiency and accountability, and a consequent shift toward 
rule-based, systematized operations rather than ad hoc decision making. 
This in turn puts a premium on continuity. In contrast to the 1960s and 
1970s, when there was a rapid turnover of staff positions and a constant 
infusion of new employees, most NGOs are now characterized by a 
relatively stable employment pattern. Executive directors who responded 
to our questionnaire had held their current position for over five years on 
2 Quoted in The Hunger Project, A Shift in the Wind, (October 1986), p. 8. 
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average, and had 11 years experience in non-governmental development 
work (nine with the present agency). CIDA's corporate evaluation of the 
NGO program notes a similar stability in project officers of agencies with 
overseas programs ,3 while a study of training needs among development 
education groups found that 48 percent of respondents had more than 
five years' experience in this field, and 83 percent at least two years.4 As a 
result, agency employees are now more able to draw on past experiences 
to aid their work. Unfortunately, volunteers, often part-time or tempo- 
rary, may not be able to offer the continuity and experience now de- 
manded by NGOs. At the same time, changes in staffing structures have 
shifted the balance away from 'generalists' toward more specialized posi- 
tions, further reducing the scope for volunteer input. As Table 5.1 shows, 
support and management positions made up some 72 percent 
of all in-Canada NGO staff in 1975, but by 1984 had fallen to only 
63 percent; the decline was offset by an increase in more specialized 'pro- 
fessional' positions, particularly in project administration and develop- 
ment education. 
As a result, there has been a gradual decline in the relative importance of 
volunteers in NGOs' in-Canada activities. Some agencies, particularly 
locally based learner centres or national agencies with a regional volun- 
teer structure (e.g., CANSAVE, UNICEF) still rely on volunteer workers 
for a broad range of tasks, but this is no longer the case for many others. 
The days of entirely volunteer-staffed agencies are numbered: of 129 
questionnaire respondents, only 11 (9 percent of the total) had no paid 
staff. The same trend is occurring in voluntary agencies in other fields 
as well: while the desire to volunteer remains high,5 most studies agree 
that volunteer service is less prevalent than in earlier decades, because 
agencies provide fewer opportunities.6 
The past decade has also witnessed the increasing marginalization of 
volunteers within NGO decision-making structures. Questionnaire re- 
3 CIDA, Corporate Evaluation Study of CIDA's Non-Governmental Organizations Program 
(Integrated Report), Hull, October 1986, pp. 43-45. 
4 Maria Giovannini, "Report on the Training of Development Education Workers in 
Canada: Final Report," prepared for PPP, CIDA, March 1985, p. 18. 
5 In a 1984 opinion poll, 25 percent of respondents claimed to have done volunteer work 
during the preceding year, but 49 percent indicated that they would have done such work if 
they had been aware of the need for assistance. See Canadian Gallup Poll Limited, Financial 
Support for Non-Profit Organizations, 1984, p. 112. A Statistics Canada study also notes a 
sizeable number of'potential volunteers,' which it estimates at 3 percent of the working-age 
population. The study also found that in 70 percent of cases, 'inactive' volunteers (who had 
done volunteer work in the reference year but not the reference week) attributed this to lack 
of demand rather than personal reasons. Statistics Canada, 'An Overview of Volunteer 
Workers in Canada," The Labour Force, pp. 84-85. 
6 Samuel A. Martin, An Essential Grace: Funding Canada's Health Care, Education, Welfare, 
Religion and Culture (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 205. 
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Table 5.1 
Average Number of Staff per Agency, by Category 
Number of Staff 
Category 1975 (n = 88) 1984 (n = 116) 
Management 1.7 (28.3%) 2.5 (22.7%) 
Support Staff 2.6 (43.3°/x) 4.4 (40.0%) 
Project Administration 0.3 (5.0%) 1.2 (10.9%) 
Development Education 0.5 (8.3%) 1.4 (12.7%) 
Fundraising 0.3 (5.0%) 0.6 (5.5%) 
Other 0.6 (10.0%) 0.9 (8.2%) 
TOTAL 6.0 (100.0%) 11.0 (100.0%) 
Source: Based on questionnaire data. In a few cases, reference year may vary. 
sponses indicate that whereas some volunteers - particularly members of 
boards of directors - are extensively involved in various facets of agency 
business, (long-range planning, financial management, project selection, 
project administration, monitoring or evaluation, and fundraising), the 
vast majority of rank and file volunteers are most often involved in 
fundraising and development education. This is consistent with findings 
that show a clear discrepancy between types of volunteer work preferred 
and actual work performed in Canadian voluntary agencies in general. A 
1984 Gallup poll found that while most volunteers would prefer to serve 
in decision-making postions on boards or committees, or take a direct 
part in programs and services, they are most commonly assigned 
fundraising and administrative/clerical tasks.7 Yet as automation takes 
hold in NGO administration, and fundraising techniques such as direct 
mail solicitation require less labour and more specialized skills, even these 
areas of work may become less accessible to volunteer workers. 
Overseas Cooperants 
A narrowing of volunteer opportunities abroad has also occurred, as 
Third World countries gradually develop the human resources (teachers, 
health workers, etc.) formerly supplied by volunteer placement agencies 
such as CUSO or CECI. At the same time some agencies which formerly 
placed many Canadians overseas, have concluded that volunteer place- 
ments, at least in the traditional sense, may not be an effective or efficient 
means of assisting development efforts. A 1986 CUSO brief to a House of 
Commons committee examining Canadian aid policies stated that even 
7 Canadian Gallup Poll Limited, Financial Support for Non-Profit Organizations, 1984, 
pp. 108-110. 
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when cooperants live and work directly with local residents, "few are as 
effective as a qualified local person would be.118 As a result, CUSO has 
moved toward hiring indigenous staff for their development projects, and 
now emphasizes project support as well as technical assistance. Despite an 
increase in cooperant placements by some other agencies, e.g., CECI, the 
overall level of Canadian cooperant placements has remained steady 
since the mid-1970s. 
More significantly, the type of volunteer placed overseas has changed. In 
contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s, when the majority of volunteers 
were recent university graduates serving as teachers, volunteers now 
usually possess specialized skills and/or training (doctors, public health 
nurses, engineers, agronomists). The 'average' volunteer or cooperant is 
now both more highly skilled and older than was the case in the 
mid-1960s. In many cases they are mid-career professionals. For exam- 
ple, the average CECI or OCSD cooperant in 1985, was 35 years old with 
between 6.5 and 8 years of work experience. Other volunteer placement 
agencies (WUSC, CUSO, SUCO) note a similar change in the age and 
professional qualifications of cooperants. 
Demand by Canadians to do volunteer work overseas, however, has 
continued to rise: in 1985-86, CECI received 1,369 applications, but 
selected only 92 applicants, less than 7 percent of the total.9 A desire for 
adventure and a commitment to helping others-is no longer enough to be 
selected to work overseas. This change can be seen in successive 'genera- 
tions' of CUSO recruitment advertisements: a 1975 ad stated that "We 
don't offer much money, fringe benefits or promotional opportunities, we 
offer involvement"; by 1985, a similar ad called on readers to "share your 
skills overseas ... gain a lifetime of experience," and promised a "gener- 
ous benefits package." Youth exchange programs such as Canada World 
Youth and Canadian Crossroads International have filled some of the gap, 
but even the current level of over 500 participants annually in these 
programs cannot keep up with the demand from young Canadians. 
The 'professionalization' of overseas volunteer positions is on the whole a 
positive step: it testifies to the improved human resource base of Third 
World countries. But it may also raise problems for some NGOs in the 
future. In the 1960s and 1970s, much of the dynamism of the voluntary 
development community was provided by recently returned volunteers - 
who now fill a large percentage of senior positions both in NGOs and in 
CIDA. The trend toward more experienced, and therefore older, cooper- 
ants in the field deprives NGOs of the constant infusion of new energy 
8 CUSO, Submission to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Rade on 
Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs, December 1986, p. 12. 
9 Le Devoir, 19 May 1987. CIDA's evaluation of the NGO program also notes an increasing 
interest in volunteer work overseas; see CIDA, Corporate Evaluation Study, p. 45. 
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which returning volunteers brought to them in the past. On the other 
hand, although much value was ascribed to the educational impact of 
overseas experience (captured in CUSO's early motto "To serve and 
learn"), little systematic effort was made (with the exception of Canadian 
Crossroads) to support educational work by returned cooperants. It may 
be that more - albeit indirect - impact is being made now, as cooperants 
resume interrupted careers and introduce an international perspective 
into their varied workplaces. 
New Strategies 
In the end, this educational role may be the greatest argument in favour of 
continued and intensified efforts to involve Canadian volunteers, both 
overseas and within Canada. Clearly, the skills and experience of individ- 
ual volunteers will still be valued, and financially strapped agencies will 
continue to rely on volunteer labour for many tasks. Although there may 
be difficulty and even extra cost in effectively integrating volunteers into 
agency structures, agencies may need to take a broader view of the 
benefits. Returned cooperants can help to provide the direct links to the 
Third World which many Canadian agencies, particularly those dedicated 
exclusively to development education, often lack. Volunteers also remain 
the most committed constituency for NGO work, providing not only a 
receptive audience for NGOs' educational messages, but also, if properly 
managed, an efficient way of spreading that message to the larger com- 
munity. Fundraising agencies may be attracted by a slightly less altruistic 
motive: several studies have found that levels of charitable giving increase 
sharply with the amount of volunteer work performed.10 
This is not to argue for a return to the days of exclusively amateur 
leadership, nor for a reversal of the trend in volunteer recruitment toward 
technical skills. But the involvement of volunteers is not necessarily in 
conflict with such trends. What are needed, rather, are more imaginative 
approaches to the involvement of Canadians. 
On the domestic side, this means adopting a new attitude toward volun- 
teers, one which sees them as a resource to be managed rather than 
simply mined. Too often in the past, as Helmut Kuhn of CANSAVE has 
noted, volunteers have been treated as "just another kind of donor"" - 
and in many cases given even less attention than donors, since volunteers 
are presumably already 'sold' on the merits of an agency. Volunteer 
coordinators may be needed, or, where resources do not permit the hiring 
of additional staff, training in volunteer coordination may be needed for 
existing paid staff. 'training and professional development opportunities 
10 See Martin, An Essential Grace, p. 207. 
11 Helmut Kuhn, "Volunteers in Canada," CUSO Journal (1986), p. 9. 
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should be offered as much as possible to volunteers as well as paid staff. 
Given the costs involved, the financial burden could be shared among 
smaller agencies through some form of collaboration. In Western Canada, 
the Prairie Windbreak conference has in recent years provided an effective 
regional training forum. Another option would be to fund 'roving' train- 
ers to service smaller agencies. Most of all, there is a need to open up 
agency debates over policy and programs to non-paid staff, fostering a 
spirit of partnership between paid and volunteer staff. National agencies 
could move in this direction by creating or strengthening their regional 
structures in a way that would permit access points for volunteer 
participation. 
As well, however, new avenues are needed to enable interested Canadians 
to experience overseas development work, perhaps through short post- 
ings which combine education and direct work experience - modelled on 
the Canada World Youth or Crossroads programs, but catering to older 
age groups, including agency staff and volunteers. Another possible 
model is offered by Jamaica Self Help, a small NGO based in Peter- 
borough, Ontario, that supports the work of an indigenous agency in 
Kingston, Jamaica. Each year, the agency takes a small group of interested 
Canadians to Jamaica to work for a few weeks with its Jamaican partner, 
and arranges return visits by Jamaicans to Canada. Another program, 
funded by Crossroads and Inter Pares, linked young farmers belonging to 
the National Farmers' Union to counterparts in the Caribbean. 
The impact of such programs on Canadian attitudes is clear: for example, 
an evaluation of Crossroads, dated February 1983, noted that the program 
had produced changes in the "awareness, acceptance of others and 
personal lifestyles" of participants, and also had a multiplier effect as 
returnees spoke to other groups and individuals, and volunteered their 
time to Crossroads and other organizations. la Exchange programs can 
also help to bridge the gap between development education agencies and 
agencies supporting overseas projects. Yet any such program must also 
clearly benefit the host organization or country, or at the very least not 
place undue burdens on Third World partners. One idea would be an 
exchange of staff members between Canadian and Third World (or other 
donor country) NGOs; to date, however, only a few tentative steps have 
been taken, such as AQOCI's internships with the United Nations Non- 
Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) offices in Geneva and New York. 
It is ironic that while NGOs are more convinced than ever of the need to 
involve beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of overseas 
projects, many have become less open to involving Canadians in their 
own work. Yet most agencies believe that development implies changes at 
12 Universalia Management Systems Ltd., "An Evaluation of Canadian Crossroads Inter- 
national: Une Evaluation de Carrefour Canadien International," Montreal, 1983, p. 150. 
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home as well as 'out there'. The constant upswelling of new agencies and 
schemes to provide avenues to involve Canadians - such as the growth of 
village twinning movements - attests to both the desire for involvement 
and the inadequate outlets for it provided by established NGOs. 
The Alms 'Trade: Participation by Giving 
Many Canadians participate in NGO activities primarily as donors - 
whether to church-related appeals, through a union or professional 
association, or by responding to fundraising messages. Each year hun- 
dreds of thousands of Canadians give to NGOs: according to the analysis 
in Chapter 2, total funds raised in 1984-85 from non-governmental 
sources were in the order of $280 million, or more than 10 dollars for each 
Canadian citizen. 
Who Gives to NGOs? 
Since the 1960s, the number of registered charities in Canada has in- 
creased dramatically, and currently totals more than 40,000. Yet the value 
of charitable donations has not kept pace with this growth, with the result 
that an ever larger voluntary sector is competing for a charity 'pie' which 
is at best growing slowly.13 
How have development agencies fared in this competition for funds? By 
all indications, quite well. Between 1975 and 1984, for example, revenue 
from non-governmental sources for a sample of 51 development agencies 
grew by some 17 percent annually in current dollar terms, or almost 
8 percent annually in real terms (see Table 5.2). While this is slower than 
the growth of government funding of NGOs, the increase is still consider- 
able. Although development agencies appear less popular choices for 
13 Donations to charities by individual Canadians have increased in recent years: taxation 
statistics indicate that the total amount of charitable donations claimed for tax deduction 
rose from $885 million in 1979 to $1.7 billion in 1984. Over the longer term, however, the 
trend is less reassuring. A study by J.F. Deeg found that between 1961 and 1979, the 
percentage of all taxpayers claiming donations in excess of the standard $100 deduction fell 
from 25.9 percent to 9.2 percent. As a result, even though the average value of donations by 
this group increased both in real dollars and as a percentage of total income, per capita 
donations for Canadians as a whole have fallen as a percentage of disposable income. See 
J. F. Deeg, How and What Canadians Contribute to Charity (Toronto: Canadian Centre for 
Philanthropy, 1982), p. 5. 
79 
Table 5.2 
Growth of Revenue of a Sample of NGOs, by Source of Funds 
($ thousands) 
Average Annual 
Rate of Growth 
1975 1984 (%) 
Current Dollars 
Government Sources 16,003 96,357 22.1 
Private Sources 24,123 98,865 17.0 
TOTAL 40,127 195,221 19.2 
Constant (1981) Dollarsa 
Government Sources 27,356 19,127 17.5 
Private Sources 41,236 18,838 7.8 
TOTAL 68,593 125,625 9.8 
Converted using Consumer Price Index (all items), as published in Department of Finance Canada, 
Economic Review, April 1985, p. 119. 
Source: Based on questionnaire data. Only 51 agencies provided complete information for 1975 and 
1984. 
donations than domestic charities, 14 they have been very successful in 
raising funds from individual donors. 
Unfortunately, the generosity of individual Canadians has not been 
matched by the Canadian corporate sector. This is not to say that corporate 
support of development work is non-existent; out of 98 agencies provid- 
ing information on sources of revenue in 1984, 45 (46 percent) indicated 
they received some funding from corporate or foundation sources; and in 
14 The 1984 Gallup poll mentioned earlier showed that development NGCs are not the 
most popular targets of donor generosity. While 77 percent of those surveyed reported 
having donated money to charity in the past year, only 4 percent of these mentioned having 
donated to "organizations aiding third world countries," as compared to 50 percent giving 
to "organizations seeking cures for diseases," 46 percent to "social service organizations," 
and 17 percent to "churches, synagogues, and other religious groups." Some of the organi- 
zations in the latter two categories also do development work (the churches, the Red Cross), 
so the 4 percent figure is probably underestimated. Canadian Gallup Poll Limited, Financial 
Support for Non-Profit Organizations, 1984. As well, this poll was taken before the 1984/85 
wave of public interest in African famine relief, which obviously increased the popularity of 
development charities, at least in the short term. A February 1986 poll showed that 
56 percent of respondents claimed to have made a donation to African relief programs 
during the previous year. See Canadians and Africa: What Was Said. A Report for the Honourable 
David MacDonald, Canadian Emergency Coordinator/African Famine of a nation-wide survey by 
Decima Research Ltd., conducted in February 1986 (Hull: Canadian Emergency Coordinator/ 
African Famine, 1986), p. 28. 
80 
some isolated cases corporate support is substantial. In total, however, 
corporate donations represented only 1.7 percent of their total revenue, 
down from 3 percent in 1975. 
For the most part, this reflects the overall low rates of corporate giving in 
Canada. Allen Arlett, of the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, notes that 
"between 70 and 80 percent of charitable giving has always come from 
individuals .... Corporate donations only accounted for 15 to 20 percent 
and that is declining.1115 In 1983 only 6 percent of all Canadian businesses 
that made a profit gave to charities, compared to the 88 percent of 
Canadian families who made charitable donations in 1981.i6 Those who 
do make donations have increased the size of their contributions since the 
late 1970s, but, at a reported average 0.4 percent of pre-tax profits, 
corporate philanthropy lags behind levels recorded in the 1960s, and is far 
less than the 1.5 to 1.8 percent of profits donated by corporations in the 
United States. As one editorial noted, in the battle over the distribution of 
Canadian corporate profits, "the slice cut for charity was almost trans- 
parently thin.1117 
It is also generally agreed that development agencies face a tougher battle 
attracting corporate funds than do many domestic charities. A survey 
of 293 Canadian corporations that donated to charity found that only 
82 firms (28 percent) made gifts to 'foreign aid' charities; of these, at least 
11 made gifts in-kind only, not direct cash contributions. 18 The authors of 
the report argue that the low level of support reflects "a cardinal principle 
of corporate giving - giving where your employees are." 19 As the number 
of fundraising requests to corporations increases, there is a clear danger 
that development agencies may not promise enough pay-offs to attract 
corporate support. As one corporate spokesperson stated, 
Business is becoming more sophisticated ... Before, they just 
wanted to be good corporate citizens. Now they're looking for some 
indication of a benefit from the money they give.20 
As one indication of this change, some observers note "a growing ten- 
dency to combine charitable activity with marketing or promotional 
objectives '1121 sponsoring fundraising campaigns which help to increase 
their own public profile. In fact, the 1984 survey may actually overstate 
15 The Toronto Star (25 April 1986). 
16 Martin, An Essential Grace, p. 144. 
17 The Globe and Mail, 17 December 1986. 
18 Institute of Donations and Public Affairs Research, Corporate Giving in Canada, 1984, 
Montreal, 1985, p. 5. 
19 Ibid., p. 5. 
20 The Toronto Star, 25 April 1986. 
21 The Globe and Mail, 17 December 1986. 
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the level of corporate giving to NGOs: many respondents indicate that 
their donations were an exceptional, isolated response to the African 
'crisis', and thus reflect the overall surge in donations to NGOs springing 
from the recent African famine. 
Nor do Canadian NGOs generally attract large amounts of money from 
charitable foundations. Foundations are less active in Canada than in the 
United States, where large philanthropic foundations (the Ford Founda- 
tion, the Carnegie Endowment and others) have thrived. While there are 
some 1,000 Canadian charitable foundations, they are mostly small, and 
often limit their activities to a particular community in Canada. Only a 
small percentage of them, moreover, are active in the field of international 
development. As a result, it is not surprising that questionnaire data show 
only 1 percent of total NGO revenue in 1984 coming from foundation 
sources. 
Who, then, supports the work of NGOs? The answer, quite clearly, is 
ordinary Canadians - and not necessarily those in higher income 
brackets. Both the incidence of charitable giving and the average value of 
donations increase with income, in much the same way that corporate 
giving increases with level of profits. But despite the fact that the capacity 
to give should rise faster than income (since higher income-earners spend 
less of their income on basic necessities than lower income groups), the 
relative generosity of individual and corporate donors (donations as a 
percentage of income or profits) actually decreases as income rises (see 
Figure 5.1). The resulting 'generosity gap' between rich and poor donors 
may actually be widening over time, at least for individual donors: 
between 1970 and 1979, percentage of income donated increased for 
lower income groups, but remained stagnant at intermediate income 
levels, and actually declined for those earning in excess of $50,000.22 
While some fundraising strategies are specifically geared toward higher- 
income Canadians (e.g. special events such as benefit dinners, or con- 
certs), or increasing the value of individual contributions (such as by 
pre-authorized monthly deductions from bank accounts), middle- and 
upper-income Canadians may not be bearing their share of voluntary 
sector expenditures. 
The other group not donating to NGOs is youth. The 1984 Gallup poll 
indicated that only 58 percent of those in the 18-24 year-old range had 
donated to charity, compared to over 80 percent for all other age groups. A 
lower level of giving is to be expected, since a high proportion of this 
group is still in school or unemployed. Yet it is clear that potential 
donations by youth are not being tapped by traditional fundraising strat- 
egies. The 1986 Decima poll notes that 45 percent of respondents in the 
16-24 year-old range who made donations to African famine relief did so 
22 Deeg, How and What Canadians Contribute to Charity, p. 16. 
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Figure 5.1 















through 'Live Aid' and other entertainment-related appeals, (as opposed 
to only 21 percent of all age groups.) Obviously, if NGOs are to capture the 
attention and dollars of young Canadians, they must design innovative 
approaches which reflect the interests of this group. But while some 
agencies, such as Club 2/3 and the YM/YWCA stress youth as an audi- 
ence, most consistently neglect this important constituency. The current 
favorite fundraising technique, direct mail, is perhaps the least likely of all 
approaches to reach young Canadians, in stark contrast to earlier 














Source: Based on figures in Samuel A. Martin, An Essential Grace: Funding Canada's Health Care, 
Education, Welfare, Religion and Culture (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), pp. 148, 232. 
Family data, based on a 1981 Statistics Canada survey, show donations in excess of $100 for three 
income classes ($7,000-10,000; $15,000-25,000; and over $60,000). Corporation data, based 
on Revenue Canada returns, show all charitable donations by Canadian corporations, broken 
down into five income categories (up to $50,000; $50,000-100,000; $100,000-1,000,000; 
$1,000,000-30,000,000; and over 30,000,000). 
Fundraising as Education 
The commodity we are offering the public, in exchange for its donations, is 
to feel better about its own affluence when others have so little. We sell the 
public relief from guilt, they pay us with money for relief from famine. 
In the long run, fundraising is not just about money. It may be the main 
conduit for public education. It may be the first step for Canadians in 
learning that they can do something about massive global problems, acting 
as part of a larger community. 
View B 
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These two quotations, both from fundraising consultants to major Cana- 
dian NGOs, reflect the diversity of opinion over the purposes of fundrais- 
ing. At times, fundraising appears to be little more than the marketing 
end of the development 'business' - an emotional appeal for public 
generosity. Yet most NGOs also argue that fundraising is, or at least can be, 
more than a cynical attempt to attract individual donations: educated, 
responsible world citizens are a far greater resource for world develop- 
ment than dollars alone can ever be. Unfortunately, the marrying of the 
objectives of education and fundraising is fraught with difficulties. 
In a sense, of course, all fundraising messages have an impact upon public 
opinion: Jorgen Lissner, in a study of fundraising and educational activi- 
ties of European NGOs, notes that "as soon as a voluntary agency enters 
the field of public communication - as it does in any fundraising appeal - 
it adopts an educational role vis-a-vis its constituency. 1123 What is at issue, 
is the quality of education being offered. The dynamics of fundraising, at 
least as practiced to date, can work against effective education, forcing a 
simplification and selectiveness upon issues of international develop- 
ment. Particularly in emergency appeals, agencies portray themselves as 
the solution to a given problem, at least in some small corner of the globe. 
In turn, the problems themselves are cast as something which aid can 
cure - through food, water, medicine, education or whatever - ignoring 
the larger political and economic forces which constrain development 
options. The necessarily long-term process of development is reduced, to 
use the words of Bernard Kouchner, founder of the French agency 
Medecins sans Frontieres, to "un choc elementaire, une reaction lineaire: 
on envoie Fambulance et on oublie."24 
Even in non-emergency fundraising appeals many agencies shy away 
from touching on controversial issues. In part, of course, this reflects 
NGOs' different understandings of the development process, and the 
causes of underdevelopment. Yet it also reflects a fear that 'political' 
stances on issues - for example, the linkages between militarism and 
underdevelopment - will only serve to alienate sections of the agency's 
donor constituency, leaving it less able to pursue its tasks. And at a much 
broader level, it stems from a conviction that "people give money to 
people, not to concepts"25 - that giving is motivated essentially by com- 
passion, not by feelings of solidarity and empathy. Even though there has 
never been conclusive proof that fundraising and development education 
are mutually exclusive, most NGOs are reluctant to stray far from the tried 
and true techniques of charity fundraising. 
23 Lissner, The Politics of Altruism, pp. 147-48. 
24 Bernard Kouchner, Charite Business (Paris: Le Pre aux Cleres, 1986), pp. 166-167. 
25 Quoted in Ben Whitaker, A Bridge of People: A Personal View of Oxfam's First Forty Years 
(London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 41. 
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What is more, recent trends in NGO fundraising may actually work 
against effective public education. In the first place, the search for new 
and more efficient fundraising tools has caused many agencies to discard 
activities based on the personal involvement of the donor. In the early 
1970s, much agency fundraising depended on special events (rich/poor 
dinners, benefits, the Miles for Millions walks) which by their nature 
provided a context for education about development issues. By way of 
contrast, fundraising in the 1980s relies most heavily on direct mail 
appeals and, for some large agencies, mass media advertising. As a result, 
NGOs may well be losing the opportunity to inform donors and respond 
to their questions. Direct mail, for instance, restricts the amount of infor- 
mation that can be given and provides it in a uniform, one-way flow, 
rather than stimulating the flexible give-and-take which most educators 
agree is the basis of sound pedagogy. 
Ironically, in the long run, this trend to 'efficiency' may make for less 
effective fundraising. In the 1984 Gallup poll quoted earlier, 84 percent 
of respondents approved of personal appeals for funds, compared to only 
60 percent for direct mail and 24 percent for telephone solicitation.26 As 
Chapter 6 will point out, direct mail is also among the most expensive of 
all fundraising techniques, and increased postal rates and the abolition of 
second class mail will only increase its costs. While established agencies 
will still generate sufficient returns to cover such costs, smaller agencies 
may ultimately be forced out of the direct mail market. 
Competition among NGOs for donations can also diminish the educa- 
tional content of appeals. As competition becomes more intense, agencies 
opt for 'sexy' appeals, with the emphasis on eye-catching graphics and 
messages rather than public education. To take just one example, a recent 
NGO direct mail appeal, perhaps hoping to capitalize on public concern 
for the African famine, spoke of a 'book famine' purportedly threatening 
Africa. Nor is this an isolated example: images of Africa have dominated 
NGO advertising since the fall of 1984, even for non-relief appeals. Not 
only does this give a distorted picture of the work of NGOs, but it further 
reinforces Canadians' perceptions of Africans as helpless and dependent. 
On the other hand, this competition for funds could have a positive result, 
forcing some agencies toward a fundraising strategy based upon greater 
educational content. As any marketing executive knows, one of the most 
powerful marketing strategies is 'product differentiation', particularly for 
new entrants to a market facing tough competition from products with 
high name recognition. The analogy cannot be pushed too far, but it 
contains a lesson for the NGO community. Smaller NGOs find it difficult 
to compete with established fundraisers such as Foster Parents Plan or 
CARE Canada, which have the advantage of well-developed (and closely 
26 Canadian Gallup Poll Limited, Financial Support for Non-Profit Organizations, 1984, p. 71. 
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guarded) mailing lists, and a well-known name; for some, the solution 
may be a move toward constituency education as a long-term fundraising 
strategy, attempting to increase people's understanding of international 
development, rather than simply tapping their compassion. 
Some agencies, such as Inter Pares, Development and Peace, OXFAM- 
Canada or Tools for Peace, have already tried to integrate educational 
materials into their donor newsletters, profiling not only what the agency 
is doing but how this fits into the development process in a given region or 
community. The results are inconclusive as yet although some donors are 
clearly put off by references to militarization in the Caribbean or human 
rights abuses in Latin America. Such a strategy, if successful, will call into 
question the notion that fundraising and education are irreconcilable. But 
old notions die hard, and in the absence of pressure from their donor 
constituencies, NGOs may be unwilling to make the necessary changes. 
In the end, however, demands by local indigenous NGO partners and 
Third World governments for a more accurate depiction of developing 
countries may force a change in Canadian agencies' advertising. At the 
same time, the need to sustain donor support in the face of the increasing 
complexity of the development process may demand that fundraising 
messages be based on respect rather than manipulation, and education 
rather than sensationalism. Nor, in an era of global communications, can 
agencies continue to pursue one image of development in their overseas 
programs, and present another, quite different image, to their supporters 
at home. To quote Bernard Kouchner once again: 
Is it necessary for their survival, that organizations working in the 
Third World resort to blatant manipulation of feelings? Yes, to raise 
money in the short term. But not if they want this support to last. On 
the contrary, it leaves the public with a false notion of both solidarity 
and development.27 
A recent advertisement by a Quebec-based agency drew a quick riposte 
from Africans living in Quebec. In the Montreal daily La Presse, they 
complained of the distorting effects of emotional fundraising appeals: 
les pays touches ont toujours su apprecier la solidarity interna- 
tionale, mais ils se refusent a 1'exploitation commerciale de la misere, 
qui est humiliante et contribue a renforcer les pryjugys racistes.Z8 
The African Crisis: Profile of a Fundraising Drive 
The African crisis, more than any single event before or since, illustrates 
the tremendous fundraising potential of the NGO community. In Novem- 
17 Kouchner, Charite Business, p. 167 (author's translation). 
28 La Presse, 25 May 1987. 
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ber 1984, following on the heels of the now-famous BBC broadcast of 
23 October, the Canadian government announced the creation of a 
$65 million Special Fund for Africa, $15 million of which was set aside to 
match donations from individual Canadians. But donations to NGOs 
soon outstripped this amount, and the government eventually added 
another $15 million in matching funds for relief (announced in February 
1985) and $18 million in matching funds for NGO recovery projects 
(announced in April of that year). By the end of 1985, as the crisis began to 
fade from the nation's TV screens, the government had channelled some 
$53 million to NGOs via Africa Emergency Aid (AEA), an inter-agency 
coordinating body established to distribute the funds. Perhaps even more 
strikingly, NGOs themselves had raised over $60 million for African relief 
and recovery, above and beyond their normal fundraising appeals. 
As David MacDonald, Canadian Emergency Coordinator for the African 
Famine, noted, 
The Canadian community of voluntary organizations - large and 
small, and from all parts of the country - played an absolutely 
vital role in organizing and mobilizing emergency support for Africa 
.... These groups have built and maintained a pipeline of assistance 
which begins with the contributions of ordinary Canadians and 
ends, thousand of miles away, with the provision of help to the 
African people.29 
Yet an examination of this same event also highlights some of the weak- 
nesses of NGOs. 
In the first place, it is clear that the NGOs alone could not have mobilized 
public support on the scale witnessed in 1984-85. While some agencies 
had been attempting to sensitize the public and policy makers to the 
deteriorating conditions in Africa for several months - and in some 
isolated cases had launched special donor appeals - it was the media, and 
particularly television coverage, which captured mass interest. John Wat- 
son, then operations director of WUSC, noted in a 1985 paper that "the 
extent to which the media managed to catalyze public opinion and, 
therefore, to facilitate an outpouring of donations, was radically under- 
estimated" by all parties.30 This is not to suggest that NGOs do not share 
some of the credit for eliciting such generosity from Canadians; but their 
role, for the most part, was in channelling and encouraging public 
29 Canada, Canadian Emergency Coordinator/African Famine, No More Famine: A Decade 
for Africa, Report by the Honourable David MacDonald, Canadian Emergency Coordinator/ 
African Famine for the period ending 31 March 1986, p. 14. 
30 A. John Watson, "The Elephants and the Mouse: An NGO Perspective on the Influence 
of Media Coverage on Aid Projects," September 1985, p. 14 (mimeographed). 
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support, rather than in mobilizing it. Even in their role as conduits for 
individual donations, the capacity of agencies to respond was at times 
outstripped by the tide of public concern. 
Many of the most innovative fundraising approaches were designed and 
operated outside the traditional NGO community - the Northern Lights 
entertainers' appeal for example, or the United Steelworkers' voluntary 
payroll deductions, or the spontaneous response of Inuit communities in 
northern Canada. All these campaigns succeeded in reaching audiences 
which had eluded mainstream NGOs - youth, labour, isolated communi- 
ties. Yet they were amenable to the right kind of approach - a specific 
message tailored to the audience, rather than the homogenized appeals of 
mass-marketing. 
Second, the African famine illustrated how quickly even the minimal 
educational content of NGO fundraising activities can be overpowered by 
the desire to maximize income. There are exceptions, of course, but NGOs 
have, on the whole, moved away from a strategy based on arousing pity, 
toward one which attempts to inform Canadians of the potential for 
development, and the ways in which they can help this process. Over the 
past decade, there has been a gradual shift away from images of poverty 
and helplessness, toward more positive, hopeful images of the Third 
World and its people. During the African famine, the pressure to raise 
funds led to a resurgence of 'starving baby' imagery. In autumn 1985 one 
national NGO, whose advertisements had increasingly emphasized the 
need for potable water, education and basic health care, rather than 
emergency relief, ran a two-thirds page ad in a national magazine. In the 
ad, a child clutches its mother's emaciated breast; across the picture is 
written a single word - "Mama ...." While the text below speaks of 
'long-term solutions' and 'helping people stand on their own two feet', 
the image is one of despair and dependence. An advertisement for 
another agency featured a cartoon of a white chef staring in desperation at 
an endless line of black children with bowls waiting to be filled: again, the 
text emphasized the need for 'self-development', but the graphic image 
conveyed a very different message. 
Such fundraising messages were particularly damaging in the context of 
the African famine, since they compounded the already oversimplified 
picture of Africa provided by media coverage which bordered on sensa- 
tionalism. A review of U.S. and Canadian newspaper and magazine 
coverage of Ethiopia between January 1984 and June 1986 found that of 
572 articles mentioning Ethiopia, only 44 (8 percent) gave any in-depth 
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analysis of Ethiopian history, or of the current political and/or military 
situation of the region.31 To quote one observer, the 
humanitarian emphasis reinforced the stereotyped image of Third 
World victims dependent on the charity of the North ... public 
response to Ethiopia, induced only after the films of mass starvation, 
was based on virtually complete ignorance of the complexities of the 
region or indeed of Africa as a whole.32 
Finally, the experience with fundraising around the African famine illus- 
trated the Canadian agencies' inability to sustain massive donor interest 
and support once the sense of emergency began to fade. As Figure 5.2 
shows, donor support for African famine relief sharply increased in late 
1984 and early 1985, but by the summer of 1985 had rapidly begun to 
decline. Many agencies now suggest that total fundraising income for 
1985-86 dropped considerably in comparison to 1984-85. In Saskatche- 
wan, for example, fundraising by SCIC member agencies dropped by 
3 percent in current dollars in 1985-86, the first decrease in the 12 years 
SCIC has collected such data. 
This drop in donor generosity is probably not surprising. In part it 
represents the normal pattern of response to an emergency situation. By 
the end of 1985, as positive reports of harvests in Africa become more 
common, and as media coverage of Ethiopia faded, the public became less 
and less convinced of the urgency for further giving.33 But it also demon- 
strates the NGOs' failure to convince the public that the task of long-term 
development is just as vital as that of short-term relief, and equally 
deserving of support. While NGOs themselves are well aware of the long- 
term nature of development needs, the logic of 'mass-marketing' 
fundraising leads them to emphasize short-term responses rather than 
building long-term support for development. If they cannot change their 
strategy the entire development community may suffer, as 'donor fatigue' 
depresses the level of public support for aid programs in general. 
31 Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, "North American Perceptions of Conflict in the 
Horn of Africa," p. 3. 
32 Ken Epps, "Canadian Development Education Response to the African Crisis," Discus- 
sion Paper for the JUNIC/NGO Development Education Project on Africa, no date, pp. 3-5 
(draft). 
33 This trend was not limited to Canada, but also occurred in other donor countries. See, 
for example, Linda Feldmann, "Crisis persists as foreign aid falls: UN wages war on donor 
apathy," The Christian Science Monitor, 24-30 November 1986, p. 9. Declining donor interest is 
worsened by reports of misuse of aid funds by voluntary agencies and government officials; 
see, for example, Rony Brauman, "Famine Aid in Ethiopia: We Have Been Duped," Reader's 
Digest (November 1986), pp. 68-75. 
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Figure 5.2 
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Note: Q = Quarter. 
Source: Based on telephone surveys carried out by Africa Emergency Aid. All data are unofficial and 
approximate. Totals refer to funds collected specifically for famine relief, above and beyond 
normal fundraising revenue, since October 1984. The total for 1984-Q4 is slightly exaggerated, 
since it includes funds collected in the first few days of January 1985, and, in a few cases, funds 
raised specifically for African famine relief before October 1984. 
Building Participation: Education for Development 
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the roots of development education in 
Canada lie in the adult education theories of Freire, Illich and others, and 
in the creative spark provided by the first wave of returned CUSO volun- 
teers in the mid-to-late 1960s. These combined to create not just a 
network of community-based education activities, but also a ped- 
agological orientation which emphasizes the necessity of rooting educa- 
tion in people's own experiences, and the linkage between education and 
action. Since that time, development education has expanded to encom- 
pass a multiplicity of learner centre activities, national publicity cam- 
paigns, school programs, and so on. Within these, there remains a core of 
beliefs that stresses the process of education as well as the product, and 
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which sees education not as the transmission of information, but rather as 
providing a context within which individuals can come to understand 
their own situation, and act on the basis of that understanding. 
In that sense then, development education is participation, action based 
on understanding: in interviews, development education workers 
pointed out again and again that mobilizing Canadians to support change 
is central to their notion of development education. For example, one 
learner centre describes its objective as "to raise public awareness and 
foster action on international development and social justice issues"; a 
church-based national development education program speaks of a 
"focused education program aimed at specific actions"; and a national 
NGO with both overseas and development education activities stresses 
the need for "understanding leading to action." The specific type of action 
varies, depending both on the agency and the individual involved. But 
whether the action is signing a petition, supporting overseas work, or 
dealing with poverty in Canada, participation is at the heart of the 
objectives of development education. 
The Canadian NGO community is widely regarded as being in the fore- 
front of 'dev. ed.' work. Foreign visitors (particularly from the United 
States, where development education has a much shorter history) fre- 
quently remark on Canada's maturity in this sphere: not only the range 
and quality of development education work done in Canada (due at least 
in part to ongoing government support), but also the solid network of 
development education groups established, both in larger centres and in 
smaller communities and rural areas.34 In a comparative report on devel- 
opment education in Europe and Canada, prepared in 1982 for the Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pradervand mentions sev- 
eral ways in which Canadian agencies have played a pioneering role, 
ranging from the concept of'learner centres', to the work of the Common 
Heritage Programme in curriculum development, to exchanges between 
Canadian and Caribbean farmers.35 
Despite this enviable reputation, Canadian NGOs face recurrent doubts 
about the effectiveness of their development education. Financial depen- 
dence on government, coupled with frequent disparaging references to 
"talking only to the converted," delays and uncertainties in funding, and 
lack of clarity concerning CIDA's own priorities for its Public Participation 
34 Angus Archer, a transplanted Canadian now heading the UN Non-Governmental 
Liaison Service in New York, has remarked on U.S. agencies' admiration for the "effective 
force of Canadian dev. ed. initiatives." See Angus Archer, "Development Education: Some 
International Perspectives," Canadian and International Education 12:3 (Special Issue 1983), 
p. 62. 
35 Pierre Pradervand, Development Education: The 10th Century Survival and Fu fillment Skill 
(Bem: Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, January 1982). 
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Program, combine to create a siege mentality which can inhibit creativity 
and self-criticism. Low salaries discourage professional development, 
while lack of systematic monitoring of public opinion reduces proof of 
impact to reliance on subjective and anecdotal evidence. Some ways of 
estimating impact do exist: for example, one partial indicator is the extent 
to which development education groups are able to reach their intended 
audience, as measured by demand for the services they provide. DEC in 
Toronto claims to reach some 600,000 people, from coast to coast, 
through its book and film distribution services. On a smaller scale, the 
Global Community Centre (GCC) in Kitchener, Waterloo, reports some 
20,000 users, or almost 10 percent of the total population it serves; even 
assuming a large number of multiple users, the Centre still manages to 
reach a sizeable portion of its potential audience, with very limited 
resources.36 Even greater numbers are reached through indirect 'ripple' 
effects. Ten Days for World Development, a national education program 
run jointly by five 'mainstream' churches, reaches an estimated 40,000 
people directly each year via local activities, but may reach more than 
100,000 indirectly, through media coverage and the informal spread of 
information. 
Nor are NGO programs targeted exclusively at the converted; many 
agencies have made serious attempts to cultivate new, harder-to-reach 
audiences. Many learner centres in predominately rural areas (especially 
on the Prairies) have devised special programs for the farm population: 
The Marquis Project, in Brandon, for example, produces weekly articles 
for rural newspapers, while the South Saskatchewan Committee for 
World Development (SSCWD) in Regina has a rural animator on staff to 
serve communities outside Regina. Other programs geared to rural peo- 
ple include the Rural Inter-Church Development Education Program 
(RICDEP) in Saskatchewan, the Centre de Solidarite Internationale 
d'Alma in Quebec, and the Northern Development Education Project, 
based in Dawson Creek, B.C., which serves isolated communities in 
Northern B.C. and Alberta, and parts of the Yukon. In larger centres, 
agencies have been slower to move away from the traditional NGO bases 
of churches and community groups, but some are working to develop a 
wider constituency. The Arusha Centre in Calgary, for example, targeted a 
recent educational program on the Middle East to members of the pe- 
troleum industry, while the St. John's (Newfoundland) Oxfam Commit- 
36 In the case of GCC, with a 1984 budget of some $144,000, a rough estimate of cost per 
user would thus be just over seven dollars. PPP has encouraged dev. ed. groups to collect 
such information as one indicator of their impact and efficiency. Yet the scale economies 
involved in educational activities mean that learner centres and other dev. ed. groups cannot 
hope to compete with, for example, the mainstream information media. NGOs should 
continue to collect such information, but also look to other "proxies" for impact, which 
reflect the nature of their work. One such indicator may be links to the community, as 
reflected in the composition of boards of directors, or the frequency of local media coverage. 
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tee has tried to involve health care professionals in special programs. In 
Saskatchewan, the CUSO-OXFAM Labour Project (COLP) has a long 
history of working with the labour movement.37 
As with the overseas work done by NGOs, however, most indicators of 
success deal only with individual agencies or programs, telling us little 
about the cumulative national impact of the total development education 
community. The record of development education groups is not 
qualitatively different from that of agencies supporting overseas projects: 
both have proven their ability to design and carry out a variety of small- 
scale projects, both continue to face nagging doubts about their broader 
impact. But while individual overseas projects are generally judged on 
their own merits, development education, paradoxically (and probably 
unfairly), is expected to produce wholesale changes in the attitudes and 
behaviour of Canadians. In fact, however, dev. ed groups face a tougher 
battle in proving their effectiveness, even on a limited scale. Changes in 
attitudes and opinions are hard to measure, especially if there is no set of 
standards or baseline data against which to assess progress. This difficulty 
is at the heart of scepticism about development education impact. While 
many point to opinion polls as evidence that development education is 
successful in creating a favourable attitude to international develop- 
ment,38 NGOs are only one influence on public opinion, and (judging 
from the response to the African famine) not,the most important. 
Uncertainty about impact is of course widespread among Canadian 
organizations working for social change, from environmental groups, to 
the women's movement, to the peace and disarmament network. Devel- 
opment education, despite its frequent characterization as a 'voice in the 
wilderness', is not completely sui generis, either in its goals or its periodic 
self-doubts. Yet the effectiveness of these other groups in changing public 
attitudes (if not always policy) has often seemed greater than that of the 
37 See Christine Smillie, "Doing Development Education with Labour," Canadian and 
International Education, 12:3 (1983), pp. 149-152. 
38 In a 1985 poll on Canadian foreign policy, 40 percent of Canadians selected poverty and 
hunger as the most important issue facing the world, compared to 28 percent for the arms 
race, and 20 percent for economic problems. See Decima Research Ltd., The Canadian Public 
and Foreign Policy Issues, Toronto, August 1985, p. 5. Dev. ed. workers contrast such results 
with public opinion in the United States, where one crucial difference has been the lack of a 
substantial dev. ed. community. A recent U.S. poll, for example, found that only 54 percent 
of Americans were in favour of providing foreign aid at any level; by way of comparison, the 
1985 Decima poll showed that 83 percent of Canadians feel Canada is spending the right 
amount or too little on foreign aid, and only 17 percent would decrease current levels of aid 
giving. See Christine E. Contee, WhatAmericans Think: Views on Development and U. S. - Third 
World Relations. A Public Opinion Project of Inter-Action and the Overseas Development 
Council, New York and Washington, 1987, p. 23; Decima Research Ltd., The Canadian Public 
and Foreign Policy Issues, p. 59. 
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development community - partly because they provide more oppor- 
tunities for direct public involvement but also because of some critical 
weaknesses of the development education community. 
First among these is the lack of inter-agency coordination - more glaring 
perhaps in the development education sphere than in any other aspect of 
NGO work. Certainly, there are examples of agencies sharing information 
and (less frequently) working together: since 1973, the 'mainline' 
churches have jointly run the national Ten Days for World Development 
program, and CCIC, provincial councils and ad hoc groupings facilitate 
contact among groups at the regional and local level. But cooperation 
between local and national agencies is limited. In part this results from 
the differing priorities and resulting functional specialization of the two 
types of organizations involved in development work: development edu- 
cation groups are uniquely concerned with educational work, but for the 
larger agencies with overseas programs, the fundraising imperative often 
leads them to combine development education with agency promotion. 
However, there may also be an ideological division between the two 
groups of agencies. Often those working solely in development education 
highlight a different conception of social change than those concerned 
mainly with overseas programming. 
Second, as Chapter 4 pointed out, the development education sector as a 
whole suffers from a precarious financial position, resulting in a lack of 
'fit' between goals that are inherently long-term in nature, and chronic 
funding uncertainties. Financial insecurity, and, especially, vulnerability 
to changes in government policy, remain serious problems. Programs to 
involve schools, media or community groups require long-term plan- 
ning, staff continuity, and a well-developed skills and resource base, none 
of which can be built if agencies are uncertain of their funding beyond the 
current year. Figures collected by Sterken, for example, show that for a 
sample of 13 learner centres, the average expenditure on resource acquisi- 
tion was only 5.1 percent of total budget (compared to 65 percent for 
salaries); in only one case did resource acquisition receive more than 
10 percent of total budget.39 Similarly, many development education 
groups are only now beginning to computerize their operations, in part 
because until recently PPP would not fund equipment purchases. 
Responses to our questionnaire, for example, indicated that only 16 
agencies (12.5 percent) use computers to access outside data bases. 
Third, and related to the above point, the information and analytical base 
of development education groups is often weak. The rift between devel- 
opment education and overseas development, both between and within 
agencies, deprives development education workers of ongoing first-hand 
39 Jack Sterken, "National Review of Learner Centres for the CIDA Public Participation 
Program" (Draft, 1986). 
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exposure to the Third World, and thus the opportunity to confront their 
analysis with the reality of people's daily struggle and changing needs. A 
lack of training opportunities compounds the problem. A 1985 study 
concluded that most training consists of 'learning by doing' or in-house 
workshops; perhaps most importantly, travel and education grants are 
available for paid staff in only 14 percent of agencies, and for volunteers in 
only 3 percent.40 Clearly, some additional measures (e.g., study tours, 
staff exchanges) are needed if development education groups are to 
overcome the current information gap. 
Some remedies are available to overcome some of the weaknesses dis- 
cussed above. For example, local development education agencies could 
strengthen their finances by negotiating a fee-for-service arrangement 
with national NGOs, which already use the services of learner centres and 
other local groups for speaking tours and other national campaigns. 
Similarly, a national opinion poll on development issues, such as that 
carried out in 1986 by U.S. NGOs, could provide useful information for 
planning and evaluating development education programs. Agencies 
working at the local level have long emphasized the importance of linking 
the development education message to local concerns, but NGOs' knowl- 
edge of their audience on a national scale is quite limited. 
But a more complete resolution of the problems facing the development 
education community will demand that NGOs and their supporters (gov- 
ernmental and private) come to terms with the changing nature of 
development education itself. Over the past decade, the subject matter of 
development education has broadened, moving beyond so-called 'Third 
World' issues to embrace a wide range of topics affecting Canada's own 
future as well as that of Southern nations: trade, human rights, racism 
and immigration, environmental protection and the impact of militarism. 
Development education has become, in the words of the Swiss educator 
Pierre Pradevand, the "twentieth century survival skill," what human- 
kind needs to know and apply in order to survive into the next century. It 
is not just a body of knowledge or set of skills, but a way of thinking about 
the issues confronting us: the exercise of critical judgement and the 
making of intelligent choices based on clear values. 
This goes a long way beyond CIDA's more limited mandate to promote 
public awareness and support for Canada's aid programs. Yet clearly the 
expanded mandate of development education also requires a stable base 
of financial support. Active public involvement is essential to responsible 
citizenship in a democratic society, and it is legitimate that government 
should support such involvement - particularly given the limited capacity 
of most development education agencies to raise their own funds. In the 
40 Giovannini, Report on the Paining of Development Education Workers in Canada, p. 23. 
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end, this means not simply a continuation of governmental support 
through PPP, but also multi-year program funding, so that development 
education agencies can overcome the uncertainties fostered by year-to- 
year grants. 
At the same time, the 'new' conception of development education re- 
quires a change of attitude on the part of development education NGOs. If 
the development education message is no longer isolated from the con- 
cerns of other social groups, neither can development education workers 
act in isolation from such groups, or from the institutions which shape 
our attitudes. In an ironic twist to the statement oft-repeated by NGOs 
that "we are in business to work ourselves out of business," the success of 
development education will be measured by the extent to which its 
preoccupations are integrated into the everyday concerns of our major 
institutions - perhaps ultimately at the expense of specialized develop- 
ment education groups. As in NGOs' overseas programs, the ultimate test 
of development education agencies' success is the building of broad, 
sustainable impact; this in turn may demand that NGOs recognize the 
limits on their ability to 'do' development education, and instead empha- 
size a facilitative or catalytic role. 
Already, there have been considerable moves in this direction. In inter- 
views, several learner centres noted that one of the most tangible illustra- 
tions of their impact is the growth of other groups (e.g. Central American 
or South African solidarity groups) which now carry out some of the 
work formerly performed by the learner centre. A recent report to PPP 
echoes this conclusion regarding the 'catalytic' role of learner centres. The 
report, a review of the 29 PPP-funded learner centres, argues that, at least 
in the larger cities, learner centres have been able to shift away from direct 
community animation, toward a 'community coordination' role, provid- 
ing support services to groups and individuals working on various devel- 
opment education issues, or providing a development focus to non- 
international groups. As a result, the report concludes, several centres 
have "created a network of community ties that has significantly 
increased the multiplier factor and impact of centre activities. 1141 
Attempts to expand development education's impact also lead to new and 
difficult choices for NGOs. Nowhere is this clearer than in the continuing 
debate over work within the schools. For many years, the formal educa- 
tion system was dismissed by NGOs: restrictive curricula, lack of access, 
and the difficulty of transplanting development education from its 
community-based, adult education roots all conspired to insulate NGOs 
from the schools. In the past decade, however, this has changed. Groups 
ranging from the Canadian Red Cross Society to Queen's University 
International Centre and Cooperation Nord-Sud in Montreal have devel- 
41 Sterken, "National Review of Learner Centres," 1986. 
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oped teaching materials, promoted curriculum changes to embrace global 
education, and conducted workshops for teachers. CIDA has encouraged 
this trend with increased funding: approximately 36 percent of PPP's 
budget is now devoted to NGO work in schools. 
Many development education workers continue to doubt that develop- 
ment education can be practiced in the schools without a loss of clarity 
and context. Pat Mooney, for example, has argued forcefully for the need 
to "drop the schools. They are a monstrosity we cannot substantially 
influence. They are basically conservative - their job is to socialize kids 
into accepting the world as it is."42 Others worry that the availability of 
PPP funding for school programs risks reducing funding for other types of 
development education work. In the end, however, development educa- 
tion groups cannot ignore the schools. The relevance of the school system 
to development education is not simply that schools play a key role in 
shaping the attitudes of young people, nor that they provide a captive 
audience for information about the Third World, but rather that they 
potentially multiply many times over the impact that development educa- 
tion can have. Clearly, there must be a balance between school programs 
and community-based education, both within and among agencies, and 
CIDA's funding policies must continue to recognize this. But school 
programs will remain a crucial part of the development education agenda 
- and those NGOs choosing to work there must develop skills in areas 
such as curriculum development, coordinate their efforts to avoid du- 
plication, and, as much as possible, ensure that other actors (school 
boards and trustees, teachers' federations) integrate development educa- 
tion concerns into their own work. 
Many of the same issues are raised in terms of NGOs' relations with other 
institutions, such as the news media. On the one hand, the Canadian 
media's generally poor coverage of international events, its tendency to 
present news in 'bits' without adequate context, and the one-way infor- 
mation flow involved, all limit the relevance of the media to development 
education as practiced to date. As a result, NGOs' relations with the media 
have been at arm's length and ad hoc: although some development educa- 
tion groups have influenced small, community-based newspapers, their 
impact on national print or broadcast media has been minimal. Yet there 
may be scope for increased collaboration, with the media serving both as 
a channel for development education groups' messages, and, at least in 
some cases, as a voice for global education in its own right. To achieve the 
former, NGOs need to foster better contact with journalists, and build up 
their own credibility so that the media will turn to them for information 
and comment. The latter is necessarily more difficult, but even here some 
42 Pat Mooney, "Seeing Global Issues Through Local Eyes," Canadian and International 
Education, 12:3 (1983), p. 82. 
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initial steps are being taken; to take one example, PAC has provided 
funding for a full-time Canadian journalist to be stationed in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, to provide in-depth coverage of African development issues. 
At best, of course, this will be a small part of the overall development 
education effort and it is unrealistic to assume that the small development 
education community can on its own alter the media's coverage of devel- 
opment issues. But, as with the schools, building links to the media may 
be an area where NGOs, by refusing to 'go it alone', can significantly 
increase their impact. 
Conclusion 
A large number of Canadians are involved in the work of NGOs; in fact 
NGOs continue to represent one of the few practical channels for Cana- 
dians to become directly involved in international development. But 
trends over the past two decades have made it more difficult for NGOs to 
offer interesting and challenging forms of involvement to ordinary Cana- 
dians. The steady improvement of Southern countries' own human 
resources is gradually reducing the need for the type of direct service 
overseas formally provided by CUSO and other volunteer-sending agen- 
cies. At the same time, the struggle to do better - or in some cases simply 
to do more - has led NGOs to emphasize professional staff and rule-based 
procedures (in the process often 'squeezing out' volunteer staff within 
Canada), and to adopt fundraising strategies based on mass-marketing 
techniques rather than direct personal contact. 
The challenge is not to return to old methods of involving Canadians, but 
to look for new, innovative approaches which foster, rather than frustrate, 
the gradual transfer of responsibility to the people and organizations of 
the South and which advance, rather than impede, overall program 
impact and efficiency. In the future this may mean not so much involving 
Canadians within NGOs, but rather involving Canadians through NGOs - 
by ensuring that fundraising appeals have a strong educational compo- 
nent, by redoubling efforts to educate Canadians in favour of a more just 
relationship between North and South, and, increasingly, by building 
more direct links between Canadians and the people of the South. 
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6 Efficiency: What Price impact? 
Those who work in our non-governmental organizations have proven many 
times that they know how to make a dollar stretch an amazing distance 
- Margaret Catley-Carlson 
Voluntary development agencies have always been concerned with con- 
trolling their expenses - partly because they have traditionally been 
forced to work with limited funds, and partly because they view money 
raised from the public as a kind of sacred trust, to be administered as 
scrupulously as possible. Changes in recent years have increased the 
pressure on NGOs to operate efficiently. In particular, expanded govern- 
mental support has been based in large measure on an assumption that 
certain NGO characteristics (low salary scales, modest administrative 
costs, flexible, small-scale programs) give them cost advantages over 
bilateral and multilateral aid channels. Vittorio Masoni of the World 
Bank, for example, argues that donors increasingly turn to NGOs out of 
'pragmatic considerations', seeing them as "more efficient conduits for 
development inputs than the often-discredited official agencies."' In 
return, official aid agencies are beginning to demand in-depth studies to 
test NGOs' presumed efficiency.z 
At its simplest, efficiency refers to the rate at which inputs (for example, 
dollars) are converted into outputs (development impact). As such, effi- 
ciency depends not on minimizing costs, but on maximizing impact with a 
given level of resources. Too often, however, NGOs have seen efficiency as 
simply a matter of keeping costs low. The few attempts to carry out more 
in-depth studies of the costs and benefits of NGO programs have met with 
only mixed success - at least in part because the standards and techniques 
used to assess large, bilateral aid projects are not always feasible or 
relevant for NGO work. 
In light of this, this chapter serves a dual purpose. The first section reviews 
some of the traditional measures of NGO efficiency, and the shortcomings 
of such measures. In the subsequent sections, data from research for this 
study are used to highlight four alternate indicators of NGOs' efficiency: 
the ability of NGOs to mobilize non-governmental resources; the sus- 
tainability of NGO activities over time; the degree of replication of inno- 
vative NGO programs; and the extent of cooperation among NGOs. In 
each of these areas, the emphasis is on the need for NGOs (and those who 
I Vittorio Masoni, "Non-governmental organizations and development," Finance and 
Development 22:3 (September 1985), p. 38. 
2 See USAID, Development Effectiveness of Private Voluntary Organizations, February 1986. 
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observe their work) to take a broader view of issues of cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency: in the long run, NGOs' efficiency will be ensured not 
by strictly controlling costs, but rather by investing in activities which 
promise a broader, more sustained impact. 
"traditional Measures of Efficiency 
Administrative Costs 
There are a number of possible cost advantages of NGOs vis-a-vis official 
donors: their exception from aid-tying regulations, which allows them to 
search out lowest-cost suppliers; their ability to negotiate preferential 
shipping rates owing to their charitable status; or their generally lower 
salary scales. Most often, however, attention is focused on NGOs' admin- 
istative overheads. 
Despite the rare and usually well-publicized abuses3, on the whole NGOs' 
in-Canada operating costs appear to be within acceptable limits. A survey 
of 1984-85 financial statements for 44 Canadian NGOs revealed that on 
average these agencies spent about 13 percent of their expenditures4 on 
administration and fundraising - although a true assessment is difficult, 
due to different definitions of administrative expenses, and divergent 
accounting practices. The simpler approval procedures of NGOs should 
also keep their costs lower than those of large bureaucracies. 'Small is 
beautiful' reasoning, however, cannot be pushed too far: in some areas 
(e.g., project design and evaluation) there may exist considerable econo- 
mies of scale, so that larger agencies and projects (whether governmental 
or non-governmental) will have a cost advantage over smaller ones.5 
This type of analysis, however, only deals with one-half of the efficiency 
equation: low costs on their own are not a guarantee of cost-effectiveness. 
Low administrative costs depend as much on an agency's style of opera- 
tion as upon its ability to use resources efficiently; simple transfers of 
funds to overseas partners obviously require less administration than the 
design of development projects, which in turn are less administration 
intensive than the provision of technical assistance through cooper- 
ant placements. While a certain limit on administration expenses is essen- 
tial to guard against abuse, the relationship between costs and cost- 
3 The most recent example was the exposure in 1985 of International Christian Aid, a U.S. 
based agency whose funds for African relief allegedly never reached the continent. See The 
Toronto Star, 7 April 1985. 
4 Calculations were deliberately based on expenditures rather than on revenue (as is often 
the case). During 1984/85, donations often outstripped agencies' ability to disburse, so that 
there was a large gap between revenue and expenditure. 
5 Gene Ellis, "Making PVOs Count More: A Proposal," in Private Voluntary Organizations as 
Agents of Development, Robert E Gorman, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984). 
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effectiveness is not a simple one, and up to a certain point may even be 
negative. Robert Chambers6 notes that projects which most effectively 
reach the poor are relatively administration-intensive in comparison with 
other development efforts. Stringent constraints on administrative costs 
may reduce long-term cost-effectiveness, if they result in cut-backs in 
project monitoring, staff development, research or policy development. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The few studies which look in detail at the costs and benefits of NGO 
programs are far from conclusive in their findings; they do indicate, 
however, that NGOs' claims to cost-effectiveness are open to some ques- 
tion. A 1979 study of 17 U.S. NGO projects in Kenya and Niger concluded 
that even with 'generous' assumptions regarding discount rates, time 
horizons and future costs, eight of the 17 projects had an implied benefit- 
to-cost ratio of less than one - that is, benefits generated were less than 
costs - despite the fact that all 17 projects had been selected as examples of 
successful projects.7 A 1986 evaluation of five Canadian NGOs which ship 
medical equipment to Third World countries found that high transporta- 
tion and administration costs, combined with the unsuitability of much 
equipment and inadequate attention to maintenance, resulted in poor 
cost/benefit ratios, despite the fact that the equipment had been donated. 
In fact, for certain types of sophisticated equipment, there was a net 
negative impact on recipients, regardless of cost considerations.8 
Evidence from the field suggests that in other types of programs, however, 
Canadian agencies may have greater success. In Peru, for example, two 
separate water supply programs (one urban and one rural) were operat- 
ing at a claimed 40 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the cost of 
comparable Peruvian government programs. In Bangladesh, a road 
maintenance program emphasized preventive maintenance and relied on 
the labour of destitute women; its costs were estimated at somewhere 
between 15 and 30 percent of the cost of the 'normal' government practice 
of allowing roads to deteriorate and then rebuilding them every five years 
or so. 
6 Robert Chambers, "Project Selection for Poverty-Focused Rural Development: Simple is 
Optimal," World Development 6:2 (February 1978), p. 210. 
7 Development Alternatives Inc., The Development Impact of Private Voluntary Organizations: 
Kenya and Niger. Final Report, Washington, D.C., 1979. 
8 Frederick Ian Gilchrist, "Health Help: Non-Governmental Organizations and the Cana- 
dian International Development Agency Cooperating in Medical Supply Operations for 
Health Development," June 1986, pp. 20-24 (draft). 
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Toward New Standards of Efficiency 
Unfortunately, accurate cost/benefit analysis is complicated by the nature 
of NGO programs. In the first place, while measurement of inputs (costs) 
is relatively straightforward, measuring outputs (benefits) is more com- 
plicated, particularly when benefits are largely intangible or long-term in 
nature. This, combined with poor record-keeping by some agencies and 
the lack of reliable baseline studies, severely limits the sample of projects 
which can be assessed. A 1985 study of 32 projects co-financed by the 
European Communities, for example, found that in only one was there 
clear evidence available on which to judge project efficiency.9 
Our own field surveys bore this out: while accurate information on costs 
and benefits was often available for these projects with a single, quantifia- 
ble output (e.g., water supply systems, health clinics), this is only a small 
percentage of total NGO activities. In addition, while cost/benefit ratios of 
individual projects may be helpful, it would be more informative to 
compare NGO performance to that of official donors or local government. 
Unfortunately, the nature of NGO work is often qualitatively different 
from that of these actors, so that comparable projects are difficult, if not 
impossible, to find. 
More importantly, the small size of most NGO activities means that static 
measures of cost-effectiveness may provide few clues as to a project's 
ultimate success or failure. 'ltaditional cost/benefit analyses pay little 
attention to the dynamic long-term effects of a development intervention. 
Yet it is precisely through such effects - replication of activities by other 
groups, for example - that small projects may have their greatest impact. 
This was the conclusion of a 1981 evaluation of 20 projects supported by 
British NGOs: 
Taking the 20 projects overall, efficiency, or the conversion of inputs 
into outputs, seemed to be moderately high, but often this did not 
itself seem to be a critical determinant of project success ... If the 
project impact endured and/or the wider community benefitted from 
even modest replication, the efficiency of the original project was of 
little significance to the project return.10 
9 Genevieve de Crombrugghe, Mick Howes and Mark Nieukierk, 'An Evaluation of CEC 
Small Development Projects: Draft Report," Brussels, Collectif d'Echanges pour la Tech- 
nologie Appropriee (COTA), November 1985, p. 11 (mimeographed). 
10 K. O. H. Osborne and G. A. Armstrong, An Evaluation of the Joint Funding Scheme 
(London: Overseas Development Administration, January 1982), pp. 20-21. 
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A similar conclusion was reached by a team evaluating projects financed 
by the European Communities, which concluded that "conventional 
tools of economic analysis are not well adapted to the needs of small 
projects."" 
What then, are relevant standards of efficiency for NGOs? As noted above, 
our research pointed to four important considerations: the ability of 
NGOs to mobilize private resources; the long-term impact of their proj- 
ects, as measured by the degree of sustainability and the extent of replica- 
tion; and the effectiveness of cooperation among agencies. 
Efficiency in Mobilizing Private Resources 
Other things remaining equal, NGOs' ability to draw on non-govern- 
mental resources should allow them to achieve greater results per dollar 
of ODA funds than official aid agencies. Indeed, this is one of the explicit 
purposes of government funding of development agencies. CIDA's policy 
manual states that one purpose of the NGO program is 
on a cost-sharing basis, to stimulate and support Canadian groups as 
the focal point for non-governmental aid and, in doing so, to have a 
multiplier effect on Canada's total aid effort and a greater impact on 
the developing countries. 12 
There are two ways in which NGOs can have such an impact: by mobiliz- 
ing Canadian resources, in support of development programs; and by 
encouraging beneficiaries to contribute to specific activities. 
The Cost of Fundraising 
As was pointed out in Chapter 5, NGOs successfully raise millions of 
dollars annually from individual Canadians; each dollar of official aid 
funds channelled through NGOs, statistics show, is accompanied by at 
least an equivalent contribution from private sources. While the ratio of 
private contributions to government grants has fallen since 1975, this is 
largely because of the rapid increase in government funding of NGO 
work, not a decline in public donations, which have more than kept pace 
with inflation. The volunteer work of thousands of Canadians further 
increases this multiplier effect of government grants to NGOs. On the 
other hand, fundraising is not a costless activity, and in some cases 
absorbs a large share of an NGO's time and energy. A review of financial 
statements for 26 Canadian NGOs found that on average their fundraising 
// de Crombrugghe et al, "An Evaluation of CEC Small Development Projects," p. 11. 
12 Quoted in CIDA, Evaluation Division, Policy Branch, Evaluation Assessment of the NGO 
Program: Volume no. 1, Program Profile, May 1983, p. 4. 
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costs in 1984-85 represented 15 percent of the amount raised from the 
public (i.e., excluding government contributions). In some cases, 
fundraising costs were as high as 40 percent of the total amount raised. 
If anything, such figures understate the true cost of fundraising; NGO 
reporting in this area is woefully inadequate, with many agencies failing 
to include staff salaries as part of fundraising costs, or including some of 
their fundraising costs under'information' or'education' budgets. For the 
most part, however, high fundraising costs do not represent waste or 
unscrupulousness on the part of fundraising agencies, but rather the 
difficulty of penetrating the highly competitive charity'business'. In direct 
mail appeals, for example, 'prospect' appeals (i.e., those sent to a large 
mailing list which has not previously donated) may produce a 2 or 
3 percent response rate, based on a 500,000 letter mail-out. As the 
number of direct mail appeals increases (as it has recently in Canada), the 
response rate will decrease, as will the return on fundraising costs. One 
study notes that in the U.S., where perhaps 6 of 10 families receive some 
form of direct mailing, such appeals may only raise 25 cents for every 
dollar invested; in France, where only 3 of 10 families have been 
approached, a dollar spent on prospect mailings may raise two or more 
from the public. For subsequent mailings to 'reliable' donors only, returns 
increase dramatically.13 
When agencies were asked how their fundraising techniques had 
changed over the past decade, the most frequent response was that they 
had begun, or increased the use of, direct mail campaigns. Only a small 
number indicated that they made use of new techniques (such as the use 
of credit cards, pre-authorized donations) designed to make donating 
easier for the donor and less costly for the agency. Those who have done 
so are almost always the large, established agencies. This, combined with 
the fact that established fundraising agencies have carved out a reliable 
market share based on name recognition and development of mailing 
lists, means that smaller agencies and new entrants will almost undoubt- 
edly face higher fundraising costs. 
Finally, it should be noted that the relationship between resource mobi- 
lization and development effectiveness is not always clear-cut. In the case 
of the medical equipment supplies mentioned above, for example, the 
'free' medical equipment was found to bring with it considerable costs: in 
one fairly typical case, the estimated value of donated materials repre- 
sented only 26 percent of total costs, the rest of the budget being used to 
cover shipping, handling, and administrative costs. 14 On a more general 
note, it should be remembered that there is no automatic correlation 
between fundraising efficiency and effective delivery of development 
13 Kouchner, Charite Business, p. 182. 
14 Gilchrist, "Health Help," p. 20. 
105 
programs; in many cases, in fact, the relationship may be just the op- 
posite. A high efficiency in fundraising may lead agencies to favour 
outmoded overseas program strategies simply because they involve low 
in-Canada costs, or promise a sure fundraising return. Perhaps the clear- 
est example of the latter is child and family sponsorship: sponsorship 
remains a potent marketing tool, but many agencies are now moving 
away from such programs, because of high costs and uncertain benefits. 
Gordon Ramsay of CANSAVE remarks that "focusing on the child makes 
it easier to fundraise, but the only people who can save the children are 
the communities themselves.1115 In addition, as Chapter 5 noted, fund- 
raising concerns may at times work against successful development edu- 
cation work, sending precisely the type of simplified - and in some cases 
degrading - messages development education groups strive to counteract. 
Involving Beneficiaries 
The second type of mobilization has to do with voluntary contributions of 
time, money and materials by beneficiary populations. While bilateral 
and multilateral aid projects often count on such contributions as well, it 
is often assumed that NGOs have a special talent in this area, owing to 
long-term involvement with beneficiaries at a relatively direct level. Field 
observation generally confirmed this assumption; almost all projects 
visited counted on some contribution from the local population, and in 
some cases this represented a relatively large proportion of the total 
project budget. Usually, beneficiary contributions took the form of un- 
skilled labour and/or locally available materials; less commonly, benefi- 
ciaries made financial contributions, either in the form of direct dona- 
tions, or on a user-payment basis. In Jamaica, for example, seven of nine 
projects visited involved some form of local contribution: in four cases 
this was primarily labour and in-kind contributions; in one case there 
was a user-payment scheme; and in two cases locally raised funds were 
added to the Canadian contribution. 
In our study NGOs did not always make the most effective use of local 
indigenous resources. In some cases for example, skilled labour was 
brought from outside the beneficiary population, despite the fact that 
with a small amount of training local people could have taken over the 
work. An agency's ability to draw upon local resources appears to depend 
not only on the establishment of strong links to the community, but also 
on its willingness to view local contributions as an important element of a 
strategy to promote local participation in (and ultimately control over) a 
development activity. Properly managed, local resources not only cut 
project costs directly, they also increase efficiency in a number of indirect 
ways. For example, contributions of labour speed up project implementa- 
15 Quoted in Maclean's (3 February 1986), p. 25. 
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tion and reduce variable costs such as administrative and supervisory 
salaries. More crucially, local input can increase the sense of local 
'ownership', helping to ensure that project results will be sustained over 
the longer term. 
SustainabRity 
Aid projects are often criticized for not producing lasting benefits; instead, 
it is argued, benefits fade as soon as external support ends. This criticism 
points out one of the crucial weaknesses of static cost/benefit analysis: 
even if a project can be demonstrated to produce immediate improve- 
ments in the quality of life for the beneficiary population, assessment of its 
overall efficiency depends on whether the benefits persist. Since aid funds 
are limited, this means that the project must be sustained with local 
resources. Some projects, of course, are short-term in nature, such as 
constructing a road or a health clinic, or mounting an immunization 
campaign: even for these, however, sustainability of the benefits flowing 
directly or indirectly from the project is important. 
This point has been recognized by various studies of NGO activities. A 
1985 evaluation of European Community financed projects concluded 
that long-term viability was "the most important criterion" of project 
success. 16 A cost-effectiveness manual prepared by USAID for the evalua- 
tion of NGO activities places considerable emphasis on measuring costs in 
comparison with community resources, as one way of assessing whether 
a project is able to "make a permanent change in the life of the com- 
munity."I' 
The difficulty of designing sustainable (i.e., lasting) development activi- 
ties plagues not only NGOs, but also official donors. In a review of offi- 
cial project aid by bilateral and multilateral donors, the 1986 Cassen 
report concluded that most projects do succeed in achieving their stated 
objectives: 
The common conclusion is that some 65 - 75 per cent of projects are 
found to be satisfactory or highly satisfactory, and most of the re- 
mainder problematic but not irreparably so, with a small percentage 
(in single figures) completely written off. 18 
16 de Crombrugghe et al, "An Evaluation of CEC Small Development Projects," p. 17. 
u Robert Nathan Associates, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Manual (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 
1985), pp. 27-34. 
78 Robert Cassen & Associates, Does Aid Work? Report to an Intergovernmental Task Force 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 109. See also the World Bank, 1985 Annual Review of 
Project Performance Results, Washington, D.C., 1986; or World Bank, IDA in Retrospect: The First 
71vo Decades of the International Development Association (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), pp. 61-76. 
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But the same study notes considerable weaknesses in terms of long-term 
sustainability of official aid projects. In some types of projects (e.g., 
institutional support), as many as two-thirds proved not to be sustaina- 
ble19, even though many of them were successful in achieving their 
stated, short-term objectives. 
Studies of NGO projects also show somewhat disappointing results. In 
1980 the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) sponsored 
a comparative evaluation of 28 projects co-financed with NGOs and 
26 CEC micro-projects. The evaluation concluded that in both cases 
"long-term functioning ability" was weak; only 6 of 28 micro projects 
(21 percent) and 5 of 26 NGO projects (19 percent) created a regular 
source of income to cover operating expenses.20 On a similar note, the 
previously mentioned study of U.S. NGO projects in Kenya and Niger 
found that of 11 projects with ongoing costs, "none of the projects in this 
category is presently 'paying for itself', i.e., raising enough funds from 
participants to cover all operations. 1121 And a recent study of small NGO 
projects in Africa found that perhaps 50 percent of projects had a capacity 
to be self-financing, but only a smaller number were actually self-suffi- 
cient in terms of financial and human resources.22 
Our own field research for the most part covered projects still in opera- 
tion, and as a result could only deal with potential rather than proven 
sustainability. In general, the findings appear more encouraging than the 
studies mentioned above, but the record is far from unblemished. As in 
the Cassen study, projects showed a clear ability to achieve their stated 
objectives: of the 51 projects surveyed, 32 were deemed to be substantially 
achieving their objectives, 10 were partially successful in this regard, and 
only six could be said to be failing to achieve their objectives; in three 
cases, insufficient information was available to make a judgement. But an 
inability to ensure sustainable results was equally clear: for 27 projects 
(53 percent), there was evidence that the project could probably be 
sustained, wholly or substantially, following the withdrawal of external 
support; but fully 22 projects (43 percent) were deemed to have little 
chance of surviving without longer-term infusions of foreign human or 
financial resources. In two cases (4 percent), insufficient evidence was 
available to judge project sustainabilty. We judged potential for sus- 
tainability by the extent to which ongoing costs could be met by benefi- 
19 Cassen, Does Aid work, p. 111. 
20 Commission of the European Communities (CEC ), Comparative Evaluation of Projects Co- 
Financed with NGOs and Micro-Projects: Indicative Synthesis, Brussels, 26 June 1981. 
21 Development Alternatives Inc., The Development Impact, p. 34. 
22 Marie-Christine Gueneau, Afrique: les petits projets de diveloppement sont-ils efficaces? 
(Paris: L'Harmattan, 1986), pp. 154-56. 
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ciaries, or were likely to be taken over by other local sources (e.g., the 
local government), and the availability of local management skills neces- 
sary to maintain project activities without external assistance. 23 
The reasons for the low potential for sustainability of some projects are 
significant. In nine cases (18 percent - a relatively low percentage), 
projects did not appear to ensure adequate management capabilities. In 
these cases, the chief problem was a failure to prepare adequately for the 
phasing out of expatriate staff: in one project in Jamaica, financial man- 
agement remained firmly in expatriate hands, despite the fact that expatri- 
ate personnel were to be phased out completely over the coming six 
months. A more common shortcoming was the failure to ensure a means 
of covering operating costs. In 19 projects (37 percent), we concluded that 
operating costs could not be covered by local sources, whether from the 
community or local government. In Mali, for example, a literacy program 
was dependent on continued external assistance, since neither the local 
government nor the beneficiary cooperatives could, for the immediate 
future, absorb the program's recurrent costs. The same was true of 
a number of service-delivery projects, such as a health centre and an 
ophthalmologic unit in Haiti. 
These results are similar to those of other studies. The CIDA evaluation, for 
example, found that "for the projects which were not self-sufficient, the 
primary ongoing need was financial";24 the European Communities 
study concluded that (in comparison with 'small' micro-projects directly 
funded by Northern governments) NGO projects were better able to 
ensure effective management by local peasant organizations, but less able 
to ensure financial viability without external assistance.25 
What explains the failure of some projects to achieve financial self- 
reliance? While generalization is difficult, a few broad observations can be 
made. First, NGOs have been more successful in limiting ongoing operat- 
ing costs of their projects than in designing income-generating activities 
to meet such costs. In other words, the successful examples are due more 
to a risk-minimizing strategy (keep ongoing costs as low as possible) than 
to a strategy which meets the problem head-on. (There are, of course, 
examples of innovative methods of ensuring project costs are covered. 
MCC in Haiti, for example, pays animators' full salaries for two years 
only; after that time, only half salaries are paid automatically, with 
23 Actual sustainability would in all likelihood be somewhat lower than these figures 
indicate. In its corporate evaluation of the NGO Program in 1984/85, CIDA surveyed 101 
projects, which had been completed between two and five years earlier. It found that 31 
percent of projects were self-sufficient at the time of the survey, 50 percent were continuing 
but not yet self-sufficient, and 20 percent were no longer functioning. CIDA, Corporate 
Evaluation Study, p. 90. 
24 Ibid., p. 90. 
25 CEC, Comparative Evaluation of Projects. 
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additional remuneration based on animators' success in generating in- 
creased project revenue.) In part, this reflects the traditional weakness of 
Canadian NGOs in designing and supporting income-generating activi- 
ties, but whatever its origins, the emphasis on cost-cutting rather than 
cost-recovery limits ability to promote sustainable development. It may 
also restrict the types of projects agencies are able to support, since many 
activities imply relatively high recurrent costs. 
In some cases, the project failure results from unanticipated external 
forces - changes in crop prices, cutbacks in government spending, or 
prolonged drought. Similarly, as most studies conclude, sustainable de- 
velopment projects are most difficult to design in low-income countries 
(e.g., parts of Africa) where infrastructure is often lacking, and govern- 
ment budgets are limited.26 Yet in most cases, at least part of the problem 
is NGOs' weakness in project design, monitoring and evaluation. Several 
analysts have made this point with regard to U.S. NGOs21, and it is even 
more applicable to Canadian NGOs, which are generally weaker on the 
technical aspects of project design than their American counterparts. In 
several projects, Canadian planners did not give adequate attention to 
long-term financial requirements; in Peru for instance, an artificial in- 
semination program was successful in improving quality of cattle stock 
and increasing milk production, but did not tackle the more difficult 
problem of improving market access for the milk produced. As a result, 
increase in the incomes of poor cattle farmers was limited, and the project 
was not able to institute an effective user-payment system which would 
have given it greater financial independence. Resolution of this problem 
and others like it requires greater emphasis on project design (including 
pre-feasibility studies to identify possible sources of ongoing support), as 
well as careful monitoring of the project so that possible problems 
(e.g., governmental unwillingness to assume financial responsibility) are 
identified as early as possible. 
Replication 
One of the reputed strengths of NGOs is their ability to pioneer innovative 
activities and approaches, which can then be replicated by official donors 
or local communities. Many analysts have argued that such replication 
of project benefits is the most important measure of NGO cost- 
effectiveness.28 To a degree, of course, replication will increase the 
cost-effectiveness of any development project, governmental or non- 
governmental, but the small size of NGO projects, and the limited re- 
26 Cassen, Does Aid Work, pp. 109-110; World Bank, IDA in Retrospect, p. 63. 
27 See, for example, Ellis, or Tendler, Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development 
Agencies. 
28 Development Alternatives Inc., The Development Impact, p. 22. 
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sources of most agencies, means that they often can only hope to have 
a lasting impact if their successes are repeated by others. As one author 
puts it 
The potential for replication of small-scale projects is of fundamental 
importance because it is the only way they can surpass the micro- 
economic level - the necessary condition if they are to be more than 
limited, isolated experiences, and reach a real dynamic in which new 
projects are created through a sort of chain reaction.29 
Such replication can take a variety of forms: replication by official donors 
or local government, on a similar or expanded scale; a ripple effect as 
activities spread to neighbouring communities or groups, where activities 
are reproduced more or less autonomously; or replication by the sponsor- 
ing agency in a different setting.30 
A study of individual projects may not adequately reflect the true extent of 
replication; instead, it is probably necessary to carry out studies of par- 
ticular sectors or fields of activity within a given country or region, and 
trace the spread of innovations over time. The available evidence, how- 
ever, suggests that NGOs have had at best limited success in ensuring 
replication of their work.31 In our own study, we could note few clear 
examples of replication; even more significantly, very few of the projects 
we studied were themselves replications of earlier successes of the agency 
in question or of another NGO. Similarly, the CIDA evaluation found only 
11 examples of replication (five by the agency involved, and six by other 
agencies) in a sample of 101 projects. Given the difficulty of accurately 
tracking replication of project components, such figures probably under- 
estimate the true extent of replication;32 nonetheless, it appears that 
29 Gueneau, Afrique: les petits projets, p. 156 (author's translation). 
30 As Gene Ellis points out, the extent to which replication improves cost-effectiveness 
depends upon a number of factors. First, of course, it is assumed that replication of a project 
entails no cost (or at least minimal cost) to the original project designers - in Ellis' words, 
that projects are replicable "by contagion." As well, the extent of cost savings depends upon 
the efficiency of other sources of investment (e.g., resources used by the agency (e.g., skilled 
project designers). If such conditions are fulfilled, Ellis concludes, "the overall benefit-cost 
ratios of projects replicable by contagion might well be higher than projects without such 
replication possibilities." Ellis, "Making PVOs Count More," p. 206. 
31 Ibid., pp. 204-206; and see Development Alternatives Inc., The Development Impact, 
pp. xiv. 
32 The CIDA evaluation figures do not include the 'spread' of project benefits to individuals 
or communities beyond the original target group, without the intervention of local or 
foreign development agencies. This, the evaluation suggests, is the most important 'ripple 
effect' of NGO programs. Unfortunately, evaluators used varying standards for judging this 
spread, some of which (e.g., indirect benefits through improved land or labour productivity, 
or improvements in social welfare) are better seen as indirect project benefits rather than 
replication per se. Still, if the 'spread' factor were included, the overall level of replication 
would improve. CIDA, Corporate Evaluation Study, p. 69. Gueneau's study of small NGO 
projects in Africa found that approximately 25 percent of projects had some form of 
multiplier effect, and half had qualities which made future replication possible. Gueneau, 
Afrique: les petits projets, pp. 159-60. 
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replication has only rarely occurred, and then mostly by accident rather 
than design. 
Effective replication depends upon three key variables. First, to what 
degree do NGOs support innovative development efforts? Obviously, 
innovation for its own sake does not necessarily make for good develop- 
ment, but unless NGOs are pioneering new activities, the possibility of 
successful replication will be greatly reduced. Innovative, however, is not 
synonymous with 'state of the art'; rather it refers to the introduction of a 
new tool, technique or approach within a given area, or to a given 
population. To a great degree, innovation is contextual; what is innovative 
in one setting may not be in another.33 Our field research distinguished 
two broad categories of innovation. Product innovation, in the case of 
development projects, refers to the introduction of new technologies, 
techniques or activities (e.g., a new tool or crop). Process innovation, on 
the other hand, refers to new working relationships, approaches to proj- 
ect design, or forms of cooperation to achieve desired results. 
While some analysts have argued that NGOs may not be as innovative as 
they often claim 1134 evidence from the field suggests a substantial degree 
of innovation. Of the 51 projects visited, 15 (29 percent) had introduced 
some form of innovation. Of these, nine projects (18 percent) represented 
product innovations, such as the introduction of soy-based foods in 
Jamaica, the establishment of cocoa cooperatives in Haiti, or development 
of a low-cost treadle pump in Bangladesh. In a further eight projects 
(16 percent), some form of process innovations was introduced, such as 
the attempt by a group in Peru to use handicraft production as a tool to 
raise women slum-dwellers' consciousness of their own situation, or the 
pioneering work of Sistren in Jamaica in the use of theatre as a tool of 
popular education. While the percentages of innovative projects (or pro- 
ject components) may appear relatively low, the logic of replication itself 
suggests that even in an ideal situation, only a portion of NGO projects 
should be innovative. Moreover, if a less stringent definition of innovation 
were adopted, several other projects (which introduced standard tech- 
niques or approaches to new beneficiary groups) might also be included. 
Nonetheless, a number of projects clearly relied on outmoded ap- 
proaches. Examples of these include a project in Burkina Faso which 
concentrated on digging open-pit wells (which easily become con- 
taminated) despite the existence of simple and affordable hand-pump 
technology within the country; and a small-scale credit program in Peru 
33 Mary Anderson, Generic Questions for PVO Evaluations, January 1983, pp. 9-12 
(mimeographed). 
34 Jerry van Sant, "The Role of International and Host Country NGOs as Intermediaries in 
Rural Development," Paper presented to a conference on "Managing Development at the 
Periphery: Issues in Program Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Third World," University of 
Ottawa 25-27 September 1986, pp. 3-4, (mimeographed). 
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which, despite success in its primary objective, had failed to use the 
provision of credit as a focus for training and other extension work. The 
reasons for lack of innovation in some projects are not always clear, but it 
appears that in most cases, it was not so much inadequate technical 
expertise as an inability to relate effectively to the local community. This 
was particularly true of process innovations, which involve a complex 
interaction between implementors and beneficiaries rather than the 
simple transfer of a skill or technique from the outside in. 
The second variable affecting success in replication is the technical feasi- 
bility of reproducing past successes. Not all projects can be copied, how- 
ever hard a NGO might try. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
some activities may be entirely 'site-specific'. For example, one project in 
Jamaica dealt with the production of breakfast cereal through a college- 
based food processing plant. While there was some interest in wider 
application of this experiment, its success rested on a number of factors 
not likely to be found elsewhere: the existence of a relatively large urban 
market accustomed to the consumption of commercial breakfast cereals; 
the Jamaican government's ban on cereal imports; the existence of a not- 
for-profit food processing facility with considerable excess capacity; and 
the relative ease of distribution, owing to Jamaica's good road system, and 
the cooperation of a commercial distributor. Certainly, the Jamaican 
market could not support another such enterprise, nor is it likely that a 
similar set of favorable conditions would occur elsewhere. Second, many 
activities are by their nature small-scale; as a result, it is doubtful whether 
official donors or local governments could 'scale-up' these experiments 
for wider replication. In particular, small projects requiring intensive 
investments of human resources (e.g., community animation) may be 
too expensive to replicate on a larger scale. Moreover, interest in some 
forms of projects - particularly those which focus on community level 
organization - may not be forthcoming from official sources. 
The final variable is the quality and availability of information about 
successful projects, and it is this factor which appears to be the most 
serious impediment to effective replication of NGO activities. To date, 
NGOs as a group have been relatively weak in the area of evaluation, and 
even weaker in documenting the results of successful interventions. 
Typically, Canadian agencies have short or non-existent institutional 
memories: information rests largely with individuals (and thus disap- 
pears with staff turnover), and many agencies lack adequate staff to 
assimilate the results of past experiments. While the trend toward compu- 
terization may help solve such problems, results to date are not promis- 
ing; only 28 percent of questionnaire respondents used computers for 
project control, as opposed to 68 percent for address lists and fundraising. 
The ability of Canadian agencies to draw on past experiences in designing 
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future projects is further weakened by their limited field presence, and by 
the fact that many agencies are not involved in the process of project 
design and implementation. 
Even more serious than poor information flow within agencies, is the lack 
of communication among NGOs, and between NGOs and other organiza- 
tions such as local governments and official donors. The 1980 European 
Communities' evaluation concluded that 
the integration of projects into the whole development effort was 
very variable, and often rather poor. There was little real co-ordina- 
tion between the efforts of NGOs themselves, and not much more 
between NGOs and governments or official agencies. 1135 
Unless information-sharing can be improved, potential for replication 
will always be limited. 
It should also be remembered that replication does not only occur on a 
project-by-project basis. Some reports36 suggest that one of the most 
important 'ripple effects' of NGO work may be its influence on local 
government policy. Similarly, officials at CIDA argue that one of the most 
important impacts of Canadian NGOs has been their effect upon Cana- 
dian government policy - for example, in terms of CIDA's funding of 
development work in areas previously considered 'off limits', such as 
Eritrea and Tigray, South Africa or parts of Central America. Such effects 
are largely unquantifiable, but they do warn of the dangers of a too 
narrow perspective on such issues as cost-effectiveness. 
Efficiency in Development Education 
if efficiency in NGOs' overseas projects depends on their ability to mobi- 
lize beneficiary and donor resources, to create self-sustaining develop- 
ment activities, and to promote broader replication of their successes, 
what are the relevant criteria of efficiency for development education 
work? 
If cost-effectiveness is to be measured solely in terms of NGOs' ability to 
make development education'pay for itself', then they have in most cases 
failed. As was pointed out in Chapter 4, most development education 
agencies continue to be critically dependent on the federal government, 
through PPP, for financial support; isolated examples of successful 
fundraising for development education are in many respects not gener- 
alizable to the broader community. Another reflection of this same prob- 
lem is the continual conflict within PPP (and the development agencies 
themselves) about whether funding should go to established, ongoing 
35 CEC, Comparative Evaluation of Projects. 
36 Ibid, p. 70. 
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projects or new initiatives. Certainly, as has been pointed out, steps could 
be taken to improve the public and private funding base of development 
education agencies - for example, fee-for-service arrangements with 
national NGOs who make use of the resources of local development 
education agencies such as the learner centres. As with overseas agencies, 
however, an exclusive concern with the financial side of efficiency may 
simply lead to cost-cutting (e.g., maintaining low salaries, limiting 
acquisitions) which is in the long run counter-productive. 
In the end, efficiency for development education, as for overseas pro- 
grams, depends on creating sustainable impact, not just balancing the 
books. To achieve this goal does not demand financial self-sufficiency: the 
key is not to ensure that agencies or programs are sustainable without 
external support, but rather that the benefits flowing from them are 
lasting. Evaluating the precise impact of educational programs is likely to 
be problematic, particularly given the often meager evaluation resources 
of development education agencies, and the nonquantifiable nature of 
outputs (see Chapter 5). 
NGOs can, however, take steps to ensure their programs have a lasting 
impact. In particular, replication of successful activities, and other indirect 
ripple effects, may be the greatest guarantee of long-term sustainability, 
and hence efficiency. As the previous chapter noted, the limited resources 
available for development education may mean that the only true guaran- 
tee of impact is the integration of the development education 'message' 
into the programs of other agencies, groups and institutions. Seen from 
this perspective, the greatest impediment to efficiency is an attitude of 
isolationism, which emphasizes individual agency initiatives, rather than 
the indirect effects - fostering the growth of autonomous, community- 
based initiatives, or encouraging changes in educational curricula or 
other government policy - which may be more important in the long run. 
This will demand a considerable change of outlook, not only from most 
development educators, but also from those responsible for evaluating 
their work. 
Maximizing Efficiency: Inter-Agency Cooperation 
One of the recurring questions asked by Canadians is: why are there so 
many NGOs? The stock response of the voluntary development com- 
munity has been to speak of 'strength in diversity', and the advantages of 
'pluralism'. Yet neither of these replies attacks the real point of the 
question: does the proliferation of NGOs imply a poor use of resources; 
could increased cooperation among agencies lead to greater efficiency? 
As one NGO worker noted, "Peut-etre faudrait-il repenser la creation de 
nombreuses ONG, et ... consolider les ONG au lieu de les voir pousser 
comme des champignons." 
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The advantages of cooperation are not limited to avoiding duplication of 
effort and expenditures. Cooperation among agencies can be an impor- 
tant investment in future effectiveness, offering opportunities for learning 
through exchanges of information and experiences, increased specializa- 
tion through joint programming, or greater impact of small agencies from 
pooling resources. But cooperation is not a self-evident good, and 
the advantages of any cooperative venture must be weighed against its 
financial and non-financial costs. 
First, despite the talk of 'common purpose', the NGO community, like 
Canadian society at large, encompasses a wide variety of activities, views 
and ideologies, which may frustrate attempts at concerted action. In 
theory, the diversity of the community provides considerable scope for 
joint programming: in reality, however, the differences among agencies 
often engender mistrust and resistance to cooperative ventures. It was the 
split between development education groups and overseas agencies 
which precipitated the demise of the Alberta Council for International 
Cooperation for example, and, in a somewhat similar fashion, CCIC's 
work is made more difficult by the need to respond to a diverse 
membership, often at odds. 
Second, real or perceived institutional self-interest is often a stumbling 
block for inter-agency cooperation. This is most common in fundraising, 
but it also occurs in other areas. Michael Harris, former overseas aid 
director of OXFAM-UK, argues that one of the most serious impediments 
to better coordination of international relief efforts in Ethiopia has been 
the "inbuilt secrecy" within many organizations .3 7 In fact, a kind of 
territorial imperative often seems to affect inter-agency relations, with 
individual NGOs more interested in solidifying their own reputation in a 
given area, than in exploring ways of improving effectiveness through 
cooperation with other agencies, both governmental and non-govern- 
mental. 
A third point, closely related to the second, is that agencies may be 
unwilling to sacrifice even a small amount of their autonomy. In a review 
of cooperation among European agencies working in Africa, Jean Perras 
notes that "the main obstacle was that the member agencies did not want 
to lose their autonomy. 1138 It is this same fear which has paralyzed most 
attempts by Canadian NGOs to develop joint strategies for public policy 
advocacy, whether through CCIC or more specialized agencies such as 
PAC. To a large degree, this reflects fundraising concerns: many agencies 
worry that an inter-agency body could take positions which might harm 
37 Michael Harris, "Ethiopia: Before and After," International Council of Voluntary Agen- 
cies, Geneva, no date (mimeographed), p. 77. 
38 Jean Perras, Hunger in Africa: Preliminary Report (Brussels: Cooperation Internationale 
pour le Developpement et la Solidarite, November 1985), p. 3. 
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their funding base, public or private. It is also due, however, to the origins 
and philosophy of most NGOs, which usually arose from independent, 
grass-roots action, and are mistrustful of bureaucratic structures of any 
stripe. 
Finally, and often most importantly, there are practical obstacles to coop- 
eration. To put it simply, cooperation with other agencies is never costless, 
in terms of dollars or staff time. Time and again in the field, NGO staff 
report that they simply cannot afford the time to travel to other parts of the 
country to confer with their colleagues; similarly, while coordination 
among development education groups within particular Canadian com- 
munities is often quite strong, the costs of air travel make coordination of 
activities on a regional or national scale more difficult. A consultation of 
members of learner centres in October 1986 was the first national meeting 
of this group in the 15-year history of learner centres in Canada, and even 
then only occurred because CIDA picked up the tab. 
As a result of these various impediments, the NGO community has not 
always realized the potential for inter-agency cooperation. As was 
pointed out in Chapter 2, there are, of course, various formal NGO 
collaborative bodies, and an even larger number of informal groupings, 
both within Canada and in the field. Among the mainstream churches, 
for example, there are at least eight coalitions and working groups, 
dealing with development education, refugees, Central America, South 
Africa, and a variety of other subjects. In many spheres of activity, 
individual NGOs have carved out relatively secure 'niches', with a degree 
of respect for each other's territory. 
Yet there are other areas where cooperation among agencies is less 
prevalent, such as government relations, development education, or in- 
field monitoring of projects. When questionnaire respondents were asked 
to list the greatest weaknesses of Canadian NGOs, by far the most com- 
mon response was lack of cooperation among agencies. This is perhaps 
most obvious in the field of fundraising, where the autonomous or, more 
correctly, competitive fundraising appeals of individual agencies are car- 
ried out with little consideration of the waste involved. As one NGO 
representative remarked, "la concertation est dangereuse quand it y a sur la 
table un gateau A partager." 
Perhaps more worrisome than the limited number of cooperative ven- 
tures has been their defensive motivation. When agencies do work to- 
gether, it is largely in response to outside pressures. In particular, the 
deciding factor has often been government policy: NGO groupings are 
often a reaction to either the 'carrot' of government funding, or the 'stick' 
of government challenges to NGOs. NGOs need to see cooperation in an 
active, rather than just a reactive, light. 
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What are the future chances for inter-agency cooperation? In order to 
answer this question, it is perhaps helpful to distinguish between two 
forms of cooperation: coordination and collaboration. Coordination 
refers to a process of information-sharing, discussion and consensus- 
building, usually on broad issues affecting the total community. It implies 
a certain agreement on broad goals and objectives, but usually encom- 
passes a wide variety of more specific objectives and approaches. Coordi- 
nation usually involves the entire NGO community, whether nationally 
(for example, an NGO response to the government's green paper on 
foreign policy, carried out through CCIC), provincially (SCIC's lobbying 
of the provincial government regarding cutbacks in provincial funding of 
NGOs), or locally (a calendar of coming events produced by all dev. ed. 
groups in a given community, or regular meetings of Canadian and local 
NGOs working in a specific country). Collaboration, on the other hand, 
refers to a much more active process of joint action, whether in terms of 
peer review of projects (as in AEA or PAC), or joint programming in 
overseas or development education projects. Collaboration requires not 
simply a broad harmony of interests, but rather a convergence of interests, 
so that concerted action is needed in order to further the aims of any one 
agency. Collaboration usually occurs on a smaller scale, via small group- 
ings of 'like-minded' agencies or individuals. 
Because of its greater intensity, the direct costs of collaboration (e.g., staff 
time, administrative workload) are significantly higher than for coordina- 
tion. Yet paradoxically, the indirect costs in terms of institutional self- 
interest and reduced freedom of action may be less. Certainly, collabora- 
tion requires the sacrificing of a greater amount of autonomy to the 
cooperative venture, but with a relatively small, cohesive 'affinity group', 
it may be easier for agencies to agree on common policy. This has 
certainly been the case for many of the inter-church working groups 
(such as ICFID, Ten Days for World Development, or ICCHRLA), where a 
common value base has helped lay the groundwork for joint overseas 
programs, development education work, and advocacy. In coordination, 
on the other hand, the very diversity of the agencies involved may make it 
more difficult to overcome institutional self-interest and arrive at a shared 
position; witness, for example, CCIC's difficulty in arriving at a common 
position on public policy advocacy, discussed in Chapter 4. 
Much of future cooperation among agencies (whether of a coordinating 
or collaborative nature) will continue to occur on an ad hoc basis, outside 
of any formal structures. There will continue to be a need for more formal 
groupings of agencies, and for more broadly based coordination. If this 
is to be effective, it will have to actively involve the widest possible cross- 
section of agencies - by making coordinating bodies such as CCIC more 
responsive to regional interests, for example, or by promoting more 
regular information-sharing among agencies in the field. Yet the logic of 
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the preceding paragraphs suggests that increasingly, agencies will turn to 
less broadly based, but more active, forms of cooperation. While it is still 
too early to pronounce on their ultimate success or failure, organizations 
such as SAP, PAC or Solidarite Canada Sahel are already providing 
glimpses of what may be possible. 
Conclusion 
In a 1986 speech to a conference in Ottawa, Jerry van Sant, a U.S. 
consultant specializing in the evaluation of NGO projects, argued that in 
the past NGOs and the observers of their activities have paid more 
attention to "operational performance" than to the "larger significance" 
of NGO activities.39 In a sense, this typifies the NGO approach to the issue 
of cost-effectiveness. NGOs have traditionally emphasized their low costs 
and ability to raise funds and in this sense they are efficient: adminis- 
trative costs are relatively low and many agencies have proven their 
tremendous capacity to attract donations from Canadians. 
But the desire to remain 'lean' - most often expressed in terms of pressure 
to keep operating costs low - may in the long run be counter-productive. 
As the above discussion has outlined, the most important determinants of 
the efficiency of NGO activities are long-term in nature, and often not 
limited to a given project: sustainability of project benefits; replication of 
successful experiments by other actors; and, at least in some areas, more 
effective information-sharing and collaboration among NGOs. 
In each of these areas, success depends less upon cutting costs than upon 
deploying resources strategically, in order to maximize impact. Rather 
than pursuing efficiency through cost-cutting measures alone, agencies 
will increasingly need to invest resources in measures which increase 
their long-term impact, even at the risk of an increase in short-term costs. 
In many cases, paradoxically, agencies will have to spend more if they 
wish to increase their efficiency: for most, accustomed to working with 
limited resources, this may demand a considerable change in attitude. 
39 van Sant, "The Role of International and Host Country NGOs," p. 3. 
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7 Cooperation: 
Working Tbward Partnership 
The building of a bridge begins - not from one side, but from each side 
- Raymond Moriyama 
Voluntary development agencies routinely claim that one of the principal 
differences between their operations and those of others - official donors, 
local governments, or private sector firms - lies in the way in which they 
relate to the people with whom they work. Thus, for example, NGOs 
speak of their 'grass-roots' style, of a 'participatory' approach to develop- 
ment, of development 'from the bottom up', of 'fostering local capacities 
for self-reliance', or of'empowering' communities and 'facilitating' devel- 
opment. The common thread running through all these self-descriptions 
is a respect for the people with whom they work. This in turn implies a 
particular view of the development process itself: first, development lies 
not so much in the delivery of outside inputs as in the uncovering and 
strengthening of local capabilities: second, development is by definition a' 
process: and third, development deals primarily with people and the 
institutions through which people relate to one another, not physical or 
financial resources. 
This approach is perhaps best summed up by the term 'development 
cooperation'. While not widely used in English (where the phrase 'devel- 
opment assistance' has predominated), the concept of development coop- 
eration has long been used in French, to describe a development ap- 
proach based not just on a simple transfer of resources, but on ideals of 
equality, solidarity, partnership and participation. As such, it expresses 
much which is distinctive not only about the work of development NGOs 
but voluntary activity as a whole. As Samuel Martin notes in a recent 
survey of charitable giving in Canada, 
altruistic behaviour ultimately attains a state of mutuality which 
recognizes that alter and ego are inseparable elements, each being 
essential to the other's welfare, a partnership founded on respect, 
dignity, equality, harmony.' 
Help or Self-Help? 
Development NGOs usually emphasize the importance of indigenous 
participation, in promoting equitable, sustainable development. Self-help 
and self-reliance are terms so widely used that one author notes a project 
I Martin, An Essential Grace, p. 123. 
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in Latin America where the implementors, wanting to stress the unique 
features of their approach, referred to it as "unaided self-help. 112 The 
notion of self-help, or participation, implies that beneficiaries should be 
involved in development projects - not only in implementing them, but 
also in identifying needs, planning project approaches, and evaluating 
results. 
Over the years a considerable body of research has accumulated to 
support this view, suggesting that participation of local people is one of 
the most important factors in successful grass-roots development. Thus, 
for example, CIDA's corporate evaluation of the NGO program concluded: 
when development success, not just objective achievement, is 
sought, access to technical and administrative resources is still im- 
portant ... but two additional factors need be present, namely, 
community participation in the project and soundness of the proj- 
ect's design. The latter two should enable the project to sustain its 
benefits over time by making sure there is, among other things, some 
long-term planning at the beginning (soundness of design) and some 
popular interest and willingness to keep the project going at the later 
stages (community involvement).3 
A study of small development projects financed by the Commission of the 
European Communities similarly concluded that "projects may some- 
times succeed without the intended beneficiaries being actively involved 
in needs identification but almost inevitably fail where they are excluded 
from the initial planning phase.114 
However the other general observation arising from such studies is that 
the success of NGOs and other actors in promoting participatory ap- 
proaches has been, at best, uneven. In our own sample of 51 overseas 
projects, we made a rough estimate of the degree of local participation, 
with the following results: in 22 percent of cases there was essentially no 
participation of beneficiaries; in 24 percent a low level of participation; in 
36 percent a moderate level; and in only 18 percent a high level of 
participation.5 
z Tendler, Mrning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies, p. 19. 
3 CIDA, Corporate Evaluation Study, p. 80. 
4 de Crombrugghe, et al, 'An Evaluation of CEC Small Development Projects, " p. 23. 
5 There is, of course, a certain degree of imprecision in any such ranking. Our estimates 
were based upon consideration of three factors: breadth of community involvement (i.e., 
just local leaders, or a broader spectrum of the population?); timing of involvement (i.e., in 
which phases of the project); and, as much as possible, intensity of involvement. CIDA, in its 
corporate evaluation, judged the overall level of participation to be slightly higher: in 35 
percent of projects there was a high level of participation, in 46 percent a moderate level, and 
in only 19 percent a low level. See CIDA, Corporate Evaluation Study, p. 90. Differences 
between the two studies are due at least in part to the different samples of projects used. 
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While the ideal of indigenous participation expresses much that is dis- 
tinctive about NGO work, at times it confuses rather than enlightens. 
NGOs often assume that a participatory approach to development is 
positively and uniformly correlated with success: having defined develop- 
ment as a process of participation, they conclude that introducing par- 
ticipatory approaches automatically constitutes good development. 
But, as Judith Tendler argues, what is generally referred to by NGOs and 
their observers as 'participation' actually consists of a variety of opera- 
tional strategies, ranging along a spectrum from 'genuine' representative 
participation of beneficiary populations, through top-down but sensitive 
decision making by a local or foreign NGO, to local elite decision mak- 
ing.6 Nor, she suggests, is effective development associated only with the 
first of these strategies: 
In some cases of success, participation by beneficiaries will have 
occurred; in other cases where the poor were reached and their lives 
improved, strong local elite leadership or the PVO itself will have 
masterminded the activity, with little participation involved.7 
What is participation then, and how does it vary from situation to 
situation? To answer this question, Mary Anderson8 has compiled a set of 
"generic" questions which can be asked of any NGO project. It is instruc- 
tive to apply these questions to our own field evidence, as well as to the 
results of other studies and evaluations. 
Who Participates? 
This is perhaps the key question in the participation debate, and yet it is 
often the one which gives NGOs and other donors most trouble. NGOs 
tend to focus on 'the community', usually defined in geographic terms, as 
the unit of participation. Because of this focus, divisions within that 
community are at times overlooked or downplayed. As Tendler says, 
Because communities are often portrayed ... as internally harmo- 
nious and without potential for class conflict, this may have made it 
easier to assume that decision-making by village elites was the same 
as, and had the same distributional results as, participation.9 
To be fair, most NGO representatives interviewed in the field were aware 
of the danger of reinforcing exploitive relationships within a given com- 
munity. But it is difficult, particularly for expatriate field officers with little 
6 Tendler, Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies, p. 15. 
7 Ibid., p. 9. 
8 Anderson, "Generic Questions for PVO Evaluations," pp. 3-8. See also, Jan van Heemst, 
The Role of NGOs in Development: Some Perspectives for Further Research (The Hague: The 
Institute of Social Studies, 1982), pp. 42-44. 
9 Tendler, 7irrning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies, p. 37. 
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prior knowledge of the community in question, to understand all the 
subtle gradations of income and status within a community which ap- 
pears relatively homogeneous to an outside observer. Moreover, even 
when such divisions are recognized, there is often little choice but to work 
with the community's natural or pre-selected leaders - in effect the 
community elite. Even when the entire community is free to choose its 
own representative to work on a project committee, the person thus 
chosen will often be a traditional community leader; and if training is 
involved, it is almost inevitable that community representatives will be 
chosen who belong to an educated elite. 
There are, however, ways to overcome this situation, at least in part. An 
NGO in Haiti, for example, had the community at large evaluate the 
performance of their representatives. To help the people in the unfamiliar 
task of confronting a leader, the NGO provided additional literacy and 
administrative training (e.g., basic financial skills), and as much as possi- 
ble attempted to spread responsibility among various individuals. Sim- 
ilarly, in a community development project in Jamaica, women were 
encouraged to join actively in group meetings, where previously the 
views of a few strong, vocal male members had held sway. The lesson in 
all of this seems to be that a certain degree of intervention may be 
indispensable to effective participation; rather than merely accepting 
existing divisions as immutable facts of life, NGOs must offer community 
members realistic alternatives to reliance on existing elites. 
In Which Project Phase? 
Community participation in the implementation or construction phase of 
projects is now something of a commonplace, not only for NGOs, but also 
for official donors working in community development. In 74 percent of 
projects visited in the field for this study, beneficiaries were involved in 
some way in the process of project implementation. In most cases where 
they were not involved it was usually because the project did not lend 
itself to community participation - for example, a project that sent 
teachers to Zimbabwe, one that supplied newsprint for textbooks in 
Jamaica, or other projects that involved service delivery. For the most 
part, however, participation in implementation means supplying 'volun- 
tary' labour; the people have little or no control over the project. At times 
this amounts to little more than an exploitive way of financing develop- 
ment activities, since the voluntary labour is usually supplied by the 
poorest members of a community, who have no other resources to 
contribute. In many of the projects visited for this study, the use of 
voluntary labour was seen as a means of decreasing costs and speeding 
implementation rather than as critically contributing to the success of the 
project. Where this is the case, projects may be successful, but the local 
population's ability to further its own aspirations without external 
assistance is often left unchanged. 
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Real participation also implies active community involvement in decision 
making, and hence at other stages in the project cycle: needs identifica- 
tion, design, monitoring and evaluation. But participation at these stages 
is more difficult to achieve, and therefore far less prevalent. While benefi- 
ciaries are often 'consulted' during needs identification and design, and 
'surveyed' in evaluation and monitoring, their degree of active participa- 
tion in such processes is often slight. As Figure 7.1 shows, in projects 
surveyed in the field only 36 percent involved active participation by 
beneficiaries in the design phase, and just 26 percent involved beneficiar- 
ies in evaluation. There are, of course, examples of effective participation: 
in the community development project in Jamaica mentioned above for 
instance, members of a cooperative have steered the project through each 
stage, including designing and undertaking a participatory evaluation of 
preliminary results. 
How Much? 
This is the most difficult question to answer with any precision, since 
judging the extent of participation requires a thorough understanding of 
the history of a project and the dynamics of a given community. A few 
comments can be made, however. First, intensity of participation is not 
necessarily equivalent to frequency of participation. Other things being 
equal, it is preferable to have more rather than fewer community meetings 
or public forums - in other words, more opportunities for beneficiaries to 
express their views (although it should always be kept in mind that 
participation carries with it certain costs for the participants, particularly 
for women and the poor, who generally have the least time for consulta- 
tion). But the crucial variable is how much opportunity there is to 
influence the course of a project, which depends at least as much on the 
style of decision making adopted as the frequency of consultation. 
Second, as with other aspects of the participation debate, the amount and 
type of participation which is feasible and desirable varies from project to 
project. 
With What Results? 
This leads to the final point. What difference does participation of benefi- 
ciaries make to the ultimate impact of a given project? Analysts generally 
suggest that participation, particularly in the design phase of a project, 
affects project impact in three ways: it increases the likelihood of attaining 
a project's stated objectives; it increases the sustainability of a given inter- 
vention; and it promotes a more equitable distribution of project benefits. 
In our own field study, it was only possible to place attention on the first 
two of these advantages, but all three are of undoubted importance. 
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Figure 7.1 
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As Figure 7.2 shows, evidence from the field does suggest a correlation 
between participation of beneficiaries in project design and project suc- 
cess, both in terms of the achievement of stated objectives and the sus- 
tainability of projects over the long term. Projects in which beneficiaries 
were actively involved in defining their needs and designing strategies to 
meet these needs were slightly more likely to achieve their stated objec- 
tives, and significantly more likely to be sustainable once external funding 
ceases. 
Yet the relationship is not entirely clear-cut. While certain projects com- 
bined high participation levels with a high rate of achievement of objec- 
tives, the opposite was often true as well: projects which were relatively 
non-participatory at times showed considerable ability to achieve stated 
objectives. There are two explanations for this. First, participation, while 
important, is not sufficient to overcome deficiencies in project design or 
management. Second, as mentioned earlier, much depends on the type of 
project in question: many of the large-scale service delivery projects 
implemented by expatriate NGOs can achieve their immediate objectives 
without substantial community involvement in decision making. A rural 
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Figure 7.2 
Relationship Between Participation of Beneficiaries in 
Design Phase and Project/Program Success 
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road maintenance project in Bangladesh, for example, was very suc- 
cessful in attaining its objectives of road maintenance and employment 
creation for destitute women, despite the fact that there was no involve- 
ment of the women in decision making. Similarly, two separate water 
supply projects visited in Peru enjoyed a high success rate, despite the fact 
that beneficiaries had at best limited input in the design phase. It should 
be noted however that if projects do not enlist participation at the design 
stage the skills, experience and knowledge of implementors become more 
critical than ever. Moreover, part of the logic of participation is the 
freedom to make mistakes; as local communities take over control of 
aspects of a project, they must be allowed to work at their own pace and 
on their own initiative, even if this means delays in achieving stated 
objectives. 
The correlation between participation and benefit sustainability is 
stronger, but even here there are some exceptions. Some 65 percent of 
projects which involved beneficiaries in project design showed consider- 
able likelihood of sustainability. But almost half of the projects which 
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were not participatory could make the same claim. This suggests that the 
relationship between benefit sustainability and participation is more 
ambiguous than is often assumed. According to accepted theory, par- 
ticipation is important to sustainability because it allows beneficiaries to 
develop the skills to take on project activities once external assistance 
subsides, and because it promotes a sense of community 'ownership' of a 
project, so that beneficiaries will contribute their own time, energy and 
resources to ensure that benefits are lasting. But as was pointed out in 
Chapter 6, the primary constraint upon the sustainability of NGO projects 
is not a lack of human resources or community support, but the more 
mundane problem of ensuring that adequate financial resources are 
available to cover ongoing costs. In certain types of projects, this may 
depend more on the availability of local government funding, or the 
implementors' ability to design effective income-generating schemes, 
than on the degree of popular participation. 
As in other areas, participation is perhaps best seen as one factor in 
promoting equitable distribution of benefits: on its own, it is neither 
sufficient, nor even in all cases necessary. Tendler in particular notes that 
in certain cases, sensitive elite leadership can go hand in hand with a fair 
distribution of benefits, particularly where there is a tradition within a 
community of patron-client relationships in which the privileges of lead- 
ership are offset by corresponding responsibilities. Again, much depends 
upon the type of project in question, and the types of benefits flowing 
from it: some outputs are essentially indivisible 'public goods' (e.g., 
roads, health clinics) which are not susceptible to elite control; others are 
more divisible (livestock, agricultural credit, fertilizers and other inputs) 
and thus can be appropriated by a local elite. 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that participation, while not a 
panacea, does have important effects on project impact in certain cases, 
and subject to the constraints of project design and staff quality. Even 
more importantly, it is clear that if local communities are excluded from 
the design and implementation of development activities, they have less 
opportunity to learn from these interventions, and so are less able to 
further their own goals without external assistance; while project impact 
and participation may not always be closely related, participation is 
clearly central to a process of endogenous development. 
NGOs' efforts at instituting participatory development processes have 
been uneven. What factors account for this - or, to put it differently, what 
must NGOs do to support participatory approaches? 
As has been said, to a certain extent the feasibility of a participatory 
approach depends on the community within which the NGO is working. 
In some communities, the existence of structures for citizen participation 
make the NGO's job much easier: in Lima, for example, one of the 
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squatter communities which ring the city has a highly developed system 
of block committees, women's organizations, and citizen's groups - the 
remnants of government attempts in the mid-1970s to promote popular 
participation. As a result, community organization and animation there 
are easier than in other squatter communities. Similarly, when an agency 
is working with a homogeneous group of clients - women's organiza- 
tions, unions in a particular industry - rather than a geographically- 
defined community their task may be simplified. Beyond this level, 
however, one can also point to a number of factors relating to the strategy 
adopted by the funding NGO. 
First is the degree of flexibility in implementation, particularly with 
regard to time schedules. Participation of beneficiaries means working at 
the speed of the community, and being open to changes coming from the 
bottom-up. This means setting relatively open-ended objectives for proj- 
ects, and remaining open to changes in course and unexpected benefits as 
well as costs. In fact, there is a certain contradiction between participation 
and the type of formalized, quantitative evaluation procedures practiced 
by some NGOs, or demanded by government funders. To this extent at 
least, a rigid 'project format' - as opposed to an approach stressing a 
longer-term process of development - may be inimical to participation. 
Second, the autonomy of field staff or local partners is crucial. The more 
authority field personnel is given to discuss and make changes as com- 
munity circumstances evolve, without constantly having to refer to the 
head office, the more the project will be able to tap local initiatives. 
However a simple 'laissez-faire' attitude is rarely a workable alternative. 
In our field study, it was possible to isolate three different approaches to 
the issue of local autonomy: a carte blanche approach, where the imple- 
menting agent has almost total control; a 'controlled' approach where 
autonomy exists, but within pre-set limits and subject to close monitor- 
ing; and a 'planned and managed' approach, where on-the-ground 
control is carefully built into the whole process of project selection, 
implementation and evaluation. Of the three approaches, it is the first 
which is perhaps the least desirable: in one project in Bangladesh, de- 
volution of responsibility to local staff, without any means of ensuring 
communication with the funding agency, resulted in inadequate monitor- 
ing, and a consequent failure to compensate for flaws in the original 
project design. 
This leads to the final factor. In the field, the importance of skilled, 
experienced and sensitive implementors has been proven time and time 
again. Indeed, a shift to a participatory approach probably puts greater 
demands on implementors than non-participatory techniques - skill 
requirements are higher, but the emphasis is on facilitative skills, rather 
than the capacity to 'do' development. Perhaps even more important is 
the familiarity with the local context. In this area, locally engaged staff or 
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local NGOs probably have an advantage over expatriate staff. In the 
majority of cases, donor NGOs have chosen to work via local NGOs, or to 
gradually integrate local staff into positions of responsibility. In a signifi- 
cant minority of projects, however, top-level positions remain in foreign 
hands, particularly where this involves financial control. All too often, 
the words of an aid worker in Mali ring true: "with the presence of 
expatriates, the local people keep filling in the forms, but never have the 
key to the safe." On the other hand, working through local staff or an 
indigenous NGO is not in itself a guarantee of effectiveness, nor does it 
obviate the need for ongoing monitoring by the funding NGO. 
The Gender Agenda: The Participation of Women 
Since the mid-1970s, donor agencies and development theorists have 
increasingly stressed the important role of women in the development 
process, and the shortcomings of aid projects which overlook them. A 
growing body of evidence suggests that the integration of women is 
important not simply for reasons of equity, but also on efficiency grounds: 
effective development, we have learned, cannot take place if women are 
excluded. Yet the record for involving women remains disappointing as 
one article remarked, 
it is evident that project implementation has lagged far behind 
achievements in research and policy ... a welfare orientation has 
prevailed in the execution of projects for low income women 
throughout the decade.10 
Some analysts suggest that the record of NGOs in dealing with the issues 
of women in development may be better than that of other donors: Robert 
Cassen, for example, argues that NGOs "have particularly important parts 
to play in addressing women's situations."" But while our research 
suggests that NGO performance in this regard has been positive in at least 
some respects, there are clear barriers to the better integration of women 
(and women's concerns) into NGO projects. 
In 25 (49 percent) of the overseas projects we surveyed, there had been 
a deliberate effort to involve women as beneficiaries and/or staff. In 
23 projects (46 percent) activities had been planned to take into account 
women's needs, often through a special component for women. But in 
few projects (16, or 33 percent) were local women involved in project 
design. This result suggests that despite the increasing attention paid to 
women in development planning, project designers often adopt a pater- 
nalistic attitude toward women - designing activities for women rather 
10 Mayra Buvinic, "Projects for Women in the Third World: Explaining Their Mis- 
behaviour," World Development (May 1986), p. 653. 
11 Cassen et al, Does Aid Work, p. 61. 
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than working with them. In part, this simply reflects the low levels of 
beneficiary participation outlined in the previous section, but it is also 
clear that women are, on the whole, far less actively involved in program 
design than men. Of the 16 projects in which women were involved in 
design, six were projects specifically geared to women. Thus, while 
participation rates were high in 'women's projects' (only one of seven of 
such projects failed to involve women in design), only 21 percent of 
projects not specifically targeting women involved women in project 
design. 
The implications of failing to ensure participation of women are by now 
becoming well known.12 Projects which aim at boosting agricultural 
productivity by introducing new crops or technologies may save time, but 
often result in what was a formerly unpaid activity being taken over by 
men for pay. And if the time saved is spent in working longer hours in the 
fields, a project may actually increase women's productivity without 
giving them any more control over their lives. Too often, women's con- 
cerns are treated as an 'add-on', with the result that women spend more 
time carrying out the additional tasks - or in the task of participation itself 
- without any compensating reduction in their regular workload. Finally, 
long-term sustainability of projects may often be frustrated by a failure to 
adequately understand the gender division of labour within a com- 
munity. In Peru, a maintenance manual for rural water supply systems, 
jointly produced by an NGO and the Ministry of Agriculture, did not 
feature a single woman in its illustrations, despite the fact that women 
were responsible for much of the day-to-day maintenance (and were 
being encouraged by project implementors to take part in local mainte- 
nance committees). 
Perhaps the most frequent response to the poor integration of women into 
development efforts has been the design of specific projects (or project 
components) for women. Match International, an Ottawa-based NGO 
founded in 1976, focuses entirely on small-scale projects for women. 
Other NGOs such as CUSO, Development and Peace and OXFAM-Canada 
support a variety of animation and income-generating activities via local 
NGOs and women's groups. But attention to women's needs has not, as a 
rule, spilled over to the NGO community at large. As a result, the CIDA 
evaluation of the NGO program notes, there remains 
a strong tendency for most of the projects directed to women to be in 
the field of social welfare, home economics, child care and nutrition, 
or in a narrow range of jobs stereotyped as being good for women 
only. 13 
72 See, for example, Anderson, "Generic Questions for PVO Evaluations." 
13 CIDA, Corporate Evaluation Study, p. 87. 
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Even where this is not the case, women's projects are at times hampered 
by their small scale, and isolation from other development efforts. Unfor- 
tunately, community development programs often neglect to integrate 
women's concerns: the CIDA evaluation found that in the majority of 
cases, 
beneficial effects for women were ... moderate and indirect, largely 
a trickle-down from the overall beneficial effects of the projects on 
the community. 14 
One reason for the often disappointing record of NGOs with regard to 
women may be the internal structures of donor NGOs and local partners. 
As Table 7.1 shows, women are over-represented in support staff positions 
in Canadian NGOs (representing 85 percent of such positions), but con- 
stitute only 38 percent of management positions. This is higher than the 
rate for the Canadian labour force as a whole, where women made up 
only 31 percent of managerial and administrative positions in 198415, but 
still gives cause for concern.16 Women are also underrepresented in NGO 
field staff positions, and many Third World agencies responsible for 
project implementation are dominated by male staff. A 1985 study by the 
International Coalition for Development Action (ICDA) found that the 
underrepresentation of women in Northern NGOs was even more severe 
on decision-making bodies (boards, etc.) than in staff positions. 17 There 
is, of course, no automatic correlation between the involvement of 
women within NGOs and their ability to work effectively with women in 
the Third World, but it stands to reason that women's concerns can be 
furthered by fuller integration of women within Canadian agencies. As a 
first step, further action is needed to remove the systemic barriers to 
greater participation of women in NGOs, through more flexible working 
conditions, better child-care facilities, and adequate parental leave. 
Beyond this, there is a need to regularize and institutionalize NGOs' 
treatment of gender issues. A 1985 survey by CCIC noted that only 
25 percent of NGOs surveyed had planning or evaluation guidelines 
dealing with the involvement of women, despite the fact that 70 percent 
14 Ibid., p. 87. 
15 Statistics Canada, The Labour Force (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, December 
1984), p. 51. 
16 Involvement of women is even lower at the executive director (or equivalent) level. Of 
130 respondents to a questionnaire to agency directors, only some 25 percent were female. 
Furthermore, while aggregate staffing figures do not indicate any significant correlation 
between agency size and representation of women in management positions, this is clearly 
the case for executive director positions. Of the 25 female-headed agencies which provided 
data on agency budgets, 19 (76 percent) had budgets under $1 million in 1984, compared to 
60 percent of all responding agencies. 
17 International Coalition for Development Action (ICDA), The Role and Status of Women in 
Development NGOs, Brussels, March 1985, pp. 6-11. 
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Table 7.1 
Female Staff as a Percentage of 7bta1 Staff, 1984 
(n = 104) 
Staff Category Percentage Female 
Management 38.6 
Support 85.0 
Project Administration 52.1 




Source: Questionnaire data. 
had activities related to women. 18 Recent changes in CIDA guidelines for 
project submissions will require agencies to include information on the 
project's impact on women. In fact, CIDA is widely regarded as being in 
the forefront of the donor community in terms of its attention to gender 
issues, and NGOs could perhaps learn some lessons from CIDA's experi- 
ences. For example, CIDA has concluded that planning guidelines, while 
important, are on their own insufficient, and must be accompanied by 
training in specific skills and approaches. 'Women in development train- 
ing' has now been provided to all of CIDA's head office program staff, as 
well as some field staff and consultants. While certain NGO represen- 
tatives have participated in the CIDA courses, there may be value in a 
more widely available training program for agency personnel. NGOs not 
directly involved in project implementation may also need to take steps to 
sensitize Third World NGOs and other partners to the importance of 
gender issues. 
The Emergence of Southern NGOs 
One of the chief means of fostering participation is to identify and 
strengthen the contribution of indigenous agencies. Certain agencies, 
such as the Red Cross, the YM/YWCA or many of the churches, have long 
supported local voluntary institutions, internationalizing their structures 
by creating and strengthening local counterparts in the countries where 
they work. Since the late 1970s, however, support for local NGOs has 
emerged as a key element in NGO strategy for promoting development, 
18 See Lise Latremouille, "Women in Canadian Development NGOs: An Overview," The 
Newsletter (CCIC), vol. 9, no. 3 (August 1985), pp. 1, 6. 
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with an increasing number of agencies channelling some or all of their 
assistance through the local voluntary sector. In our sample of 51 projects, 
22 (43 percent) were implemented by an indigenous NGO, as compared 
to 15 (29 percent) by a Canadian agency, and 14 (27 percent) by an 
international affiliate. 
The increasing prominence of Southern NGOs results from two separate 
trends. First, the role of indigenous agencies has become more important 
as donor NGOs' perceptions of development have evolved to emphasize 
participation, self-reliance and the empowerment of the poor. These 
ideas, based on a concept of development as a process rather than a simple 
transfer of resources or skills, tend to increase the importance of locally 
based organizations over foreign ones. Paradoxically many of the dis- 
tinctive features of Canadian NGOs which have already been identified by 
this study as areas of weakness, such as staffing and resource constraints 
and limited field presence, have put them in a favourable position to 
promote indigenous Southern agencies. As a result, it is not surprising 
that to a far greater extent than U.S. voluntary organizations, Canadian 
agencies have relied on Southern counterparts to identify and implement 
the projects they fund. 
A second, more significant trend has been the upsurge in the sheer 
numbers of such organizations; whether these originated as offshoots of 
Northern counterpart organizations, or as middle class charities, or as 
organizations started by development activists, it was inevitable that they 
would seek a larger role in the planning and implementation of develop- 
ment projects. Many such organizations have already skillfully used their 
areas of comparative advantage - lower costs, familiarity with local socio- 
political norms, and greater linguistic and cultural affinity - to take over 
larger-scale service delivery programs. BRAC in Bangladesh for example, 
has several thousand employees and a nation-wide training program in 
oral rehydration therapy, while Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka has workers 
active in thousands of villages. 
Unfortunately, on the whole the notion of partnership between Northern 
and Southern NGOs has up to now been more rhetorical than real. 
Motivated by both cost considerations and their own limited field capac- 
ity, donor agencies 'use' Southern NGOs as channels to disburse funds, 
(and in return receive progress reports), or undertake occasional moni- 
toring visits. Either way the relationship is almost entirely a financial one, 
with little exchange of experiences, information or skills. The CIDA 
evaluation notes that of those projects in which a Canadian agency 
funded a NGO, less than half involved any direct personal contact; where 
this did occur, it usually took the form of visits to the project by donor 
agency staff, visits by Southern NGO personnel to Canada were far less 
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prevalent. 19 Where the recipient indigenous agency is receiving funding 
from a variety of sources, from Canada and other countries, the rela- 
tionship may be even more arm's length. 
The overseas projects selected for this study were assessed for the degree 
of support for indigenous agencies and it was found that 27 projects (53 
percent) aimed to strengthen a local voluntary organization. Canadian 
support for some Southern NGOs (Proshika in Bangladesh, Sistren in 
Jamaica, DESCO in Peru) has been crucial. But in many cases the ability of 
Canadian agencies to strengthen their local counterparts is seriously 
constrained by the one-dimensional relationship (involving only finan- 
cial transfers) and the lack of practical development skills and experience 
among so many Canadian NGOs. The CIDA evaluation of the NGO 
program concluded that only about 25 percent of projects resulted in 
significant strengthening of a local voluntary institution; the most fre- 
quent positive outcome was "an enhanced reputation" for an already- 
established agency20 rather than a transfer of skills from Canadian to 
indigenous agency. In fact, because of their limited capacity to identify 
projects and/or partners, many Canadian agencies prefer to work with 
established indigenous NGOs; the result is that a few local agencies with 
proven track records receive funds from as many as half a dozen Canadian 
NGOs, as well as various European or American agencies. 
Southern NGOs are beginning to press for a re-orientation of their rela- 
tionship with Northern NGOs, toward a two-way exchange of informa- 
tion and experience, and an ethos of mutual accountability. For Canadian 
agencies, closer contacts with implementing agencies may help to im- 
prove project monitoring, and provide a valuable resource for develop- 
ment education efforts. But it may also confront Northern NGOs with the 
implications of their oft-repeated claim that their goal is to 'work them- 
selves out of a job', or, more accurately, out of the job which they have 
traditionally filled. 
For those Canadian NGOs that act primarily as funders this does not 
represent such a major shift, but it could have a profound impact on their 
public image. Many agencies in their advertising and fundraising material 
tend to portray themselves as the 'active ingredient in the development 
stew': understandably they highlight their own role as a justification for 
seeking support, particularly during emergency appeals. Many indige- 
nous organizations are beginning to complain that this no longer reflects 
the real division of labour and the growing responsibility which they are 
taking for the development of their own communities. During the recent 
African famine, several Ethiopian visitors to the United States expressed 
19 CIDA, Corporate Evaluation Study, p. 54. 
20 Ibid., p. 71. 
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concern at the demeaning nature of many of the fundraising appeals and 
suggested that less aid might be preferable to entrenching an image of 
Africans as devoid of dignity, hope or ability. That such a concern is well- 
founded is borne out by the finding of the Decima study of Canadian 
attitudes: a majority (73 percent) of respondents expressed doubt that 
African governments, or Africans themselves (53 percent), would do 
everything necessary to improve the situation in Africa. As Decima 
reports: 
these perceptions may be fundamental issue areas for the public, and 
ones that ultimately limit support for famine relief in the absence of a 
strong and emotional media presence.21 
Decisions concerning which projects are to be funded are still made 
mainly by donor organizations. Only a few agencies have brought over- 
seas representatives onto their boards, and fewer still onto their project 
selection committees. For most agencies the authority to approve proj- 
ects, to spend money, rests in Canadian hands. Some progress in institut- 
ing a more equal relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs has 
been made. The churches, confronted by strong and assertive church 
organizations in the South, pioneered various forms of power-sharing, 
through structures such as the Asia Partnership for Human Development 
(APHD). Over a dozen secular agencies followed suit with the South Asia 
Partnership, which was set up in 1981 with two overriding objectives: to 
identify and support small locally based community groups, and to share 
decision making over the allocation of resources with people in the south 
Asian countries in which SAP operates. 
The experience of APHD, SAP, and other such efforts demonstrates that 
beyond the rhetoric of cooperation and shared goals, building a more 
equal relationship demands commitment, trust and adherence to some 
common underlying philosophy of development. If such structures are 
seen by the donor agencies purely as project-processing machines, reliev- 
ing them of the burden of decision making but also of the responsibility 
for the quality of the work, they serve less as steps on the path to more 
equitable relationships than as another way of distancing donors from the 
real and difficult choices which must be made in allocating resources. 
Avoiding this temptation is not easy, In the case of SAP in Bangladesh, a 
significant number of local NGO projects funded by Canadian SAP mem- 
bers suffered from deficiencies in design, monitoring and follow-up. On 
the other hand, the SAP mechanism allowed substantial resources to be 
mobilized by donor agencies which do not have field staff and would not 
therefore have been able to reach small groups. Those agencies which 
have participated have benefited from the greater local knowledge of their 
21 Canadian Emergency Coordinator/African Famine, Canadians and Africa: What Was 
Said, p. 24. 
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Asian counterparts, and in some cases are beginning to move toward the 
longer-term goal, that of developing relations of partnership, in its true 
sense, with some of the local community groups. 
In recent years, several other inter-agency bodies have been formed 
which aim specifically at improving Canadian NGOs' capacities to sup- 
port and work with indigenous Third World NGOs. Solidarite Canada 
Sahel, for example, groups a number of agencies with programs in the 
Sahel countries of West Africa. The most recent example is Partnership 
Africa Canada, formed in 1986 as the successor to Africa Emergency Aid. 
PAC unites some 70 Canadian agencies, and its mandate gives primacy to 
the strengthening of African NGOs "in order that Africans can become 
the agents of their own development. 1122 Eligible activities include human 
resource training, research and analysis, networking, increasing financial 
self-reliance, and enhancing local operational capabilities. As with the 
other groupings, designing such new activities will be difficult, but PAC 
shows considerable promise in helping agencies to overcome the limita- 
tions of small size, and the constraints imposed by the limited information 
base and low field capacity of many Canadian agencies. 
The Direct Finding Debate 
Donor NGOs are not alone in beginning to recognize the growing pres- 
ence and capacity of Southern voluntary development agencies. Gradu- 
ally, official aid agencies such as CIDA have begun to fund Third World 
NGOs directly, bypassing the normal channel in which Northern NGOs 
act as intermediaries between donor governments and Southern agen- 
cies. A 1985 report by the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD noted a small but rapidly growing volume of direct funding from 
member governments to Third World NGOs: from US$10.5 million 
(0.9 percent of total disbursements to NGOs) in 1980, the figure had risen 
to US$37.3 million (2.9 percent of total disbursements) in 1983.23 The 
figure has by all indications risen even more rapidly in the past four years, 
and has spread to a larger number of donor countries: while the United 
States still accounts for the lion's share of direct funding, several other 
countries are also involved, including West Germany, France, Holland, 
the Scandinavian countries, and, to an increasing extent, Canada. Multi- 
lateral agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) have also 
begun to fund Southern NGOs. 
22 PAC Statement, as amended 21 October 1986. 
23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC ), Aid Agency Cooperation with NGOs: Note by the Secretariat, DAC (85 )2 Paris, 
8 January 1985, p. 21. 
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Since 1973 Canadian embassies have been allocated funds (the Mission- 
Administered Fund, or MAF) to be disbursed on a discretionary basis to 
indigenous voluntary efforts and small-scale projects. These funds have 
grown over the years and now represent in some countries quite signifi- 
cant amounts, as much as $350,000 in countries like Peru or Bangladesh. 
As the administration of these funds grew more onerous, missions turned 
to locally hired staff, or even to field officers of Canadian agencies like 
CUSO, to facilitate the identification of worthy projects. The MAF has had 
the advantage of being flexible, rapid, and visible; it has also led to closer 
direct links between Canadian embassy officials and indigenous volun- 
tary organizations. It was not long before CIDA began to appreciate the 
potential of some local NGOs to play a greater role in assisting CIDA to 
meet its program objectives in human resource development and related 
fields. 
This coincided with the renewed emphasis given by CIDA's president at 
the time, Marcel Masse, to the social and cultural aspects of development, 
and the greater freedom given to CIDA project planners in the selection of 
delivery mechanisms. The apparent success of small-scale community 
initiatives of the sort preached by NGOs for so long, the evident failure of 
more ambitious infrastructural schemes, and frustration at the un- 
willingness or inability of some Canadian NGOs to boost their project 
funding in the manner or at the rate desired, all led CIDA to adopt direct 
funding of 'micro-realisations' carried out by community groups. Simul- 
taneously, planners in the CIDA Asia Branch were attracted, not by the 
potential for small projects, but by the capacity of some of the larger and 
more experienced indigenous agencies to execute quite substantial rural 
development schemes. Organizations in Bangladesh (Proshika-Kendra, 
Proshika-Comilla), and Thailand (the Community Development Associa- 
tion), were seen as viable in their own right, with no need for a Canadian 
agency to act as an intermediary between them and the Canadian govern- 
ment. Similar cases of direct CIDA funding of indigenous NGOs followed 
with other Thai agencies and in the Philippines. 
As of November 1986, there were only nine in existence, in six countries 
(Rwanda, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Bolivia and Peru), but 
the volume of funding involved is considerable, with total project value 
for the nine schemes reaching almost $50 million. Individual programs 
range from an $8,000 grant to an indigenous NGO in Rwanda, to a three- 
year, $11 million program of direct funding to indigenous NGOs (as well 
as local government agencies and private businesses) in Negros province 
of the Philippines.24 The level of funding will probably expand further in 
the near future, with similar initiatives being explored in other countries, 
including Sri Lanka, Zambia, South Africa, Jamaica and Indonesia. 
24 Letter from CIDA to CCIC dated 21 November 1986. 
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The implications of direct funding deserve careful reflection. Most impor- 
tantly, direct funding forces indigenous NGOs into a relationship with 
governments, whether Northern, Southern or both. On the positive side, 
this could help to avoid situations in which Southern NGOs work in 
isolation from (or even at cross-purposes with) governmental bodies, and 
thus promote more effective information-sharing and replication of 
successful NGO projects. Yet it also entails substantial risks. 
As with government funding of Canadian NGOs, the scope of direct 
funding could overload the administrative and managerial capacity of 
indigenous agencies, many of whom are small, and unfamiliar with the 
administrative requirements of official aid agencies. It also renders them 
vulnerable to funding decisions made within Northern governments' aid 
agencies - where they have none of the countervailing political power 
enjoyed by donor NGOs, and where the prospects of shared decision 
making are even less than in their relations with donor NGOs. Third, 
administrative cost constraints may lead official aid agencies to fund a 
limited number of relatively large programs with established agencies, 
rather than grappling with the more difficult task of strengthening the 
implementation capacity of small agencies. This, combined with govern- 
ment aid agencies' caution regarding the political stances of some indige- 
nous NGOs, could drastically limit the range of agencies which govern- 
ments will fund - a situation already apparent in the Philippines, where 
tension exists between agencies included and excluded from CIDA's direct 
funding schemes. 
Finally, direct funding exposes local NGOs to the scrutiny of their own 
governments. This can lead to hostility, when the government itself is 
competing with local NGOs for bilateral funds needed for its own pro- 
grams; it can influence projects away from basic but sensitive issues of 
land redistribution, or leadership training, into safer areas of service 
delivery; and it relies on the sensitivity, tact and political awareness of aid 
and embassy personnel, who may be neither familiar with nor interested 
in the particular circumstances and needs of local NGOs. Any of these 
factors could seriously weaken indigenous voluntary activity, and have 
repercussions lasting well beyond the current donor interest in funding 
Southern NGOs. 
On the other hand, the attractions of direct funding, for both governments 
and indigenous NGOs, are undeniable. Ultimately, it is for Southern 
NGOs to determine the balance of risk and opportunity represented by 
such links, a calculation which requires greater political sensitivity and 
sense of strategy than can be brought to bear by most outsiders. Canadian 
agencies are correct to point out from their own experience the potential 
dangers of government funding, and the advantages of working via donor 
NGOs. But unless they can make a more convincing case for the alterna- 
tive - by promoting more equitable sharing of responsibilities with 
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Southern partners, and by proving their capacity to be more than a 
conduit for funds - official Northern donors and Southern NGOs may 
increasingly see benefits in direct relationships. In an era when govern- 
ment funding of Northern NGOs is increasing steadily, Canadian NGOs' 
opposition to direct funding can easily be interpreted as a self-interested 
protection of their own 'turf. 
Counterpart Funding 
An additional, but distinct, source of CIDA funding for NGO work is the 
use of counterpart funds. These are funds generated within a Southern 
country by the sale of Canadian commodity aid (grain, fertilizer, etc.) ; the 
proceeds, while legally belonging to the recipient country, are used for 
developmental activities mutually acceptable to it and the Canadian 
government. With Canadian commodity aid reaching 20 percent of total 
ODA, very substantial counterpart funds can accumulate in some coun- 
tries. The attraction for CIDA officials of using counterpart funds is that, in 
a sense, they are 'free' - they have already appeared in the government's 
accounts as having been disbursed when the commodities were pur- 
chased and shipped. Spending them twice expands aid impact without 
any increase in CIDA's budget. In most cases (Rwanda, Burkina Faso, 
India, Pakistan, Tanzania, E1 Salvador) counterpart funds are spent 
through a Canadian NGO, but in some cases (Bolivia, Peru) they are going 
directly to an indigenous agency or group of agencies. As of November 
1986, only 12 NGO projects were being funded using counterpart funds. 
With the exception of Francophone Africa, however, average project size 
is high by NGO standards (eg. $76.7 million for oilseeds development in 
India through the Co-operative Union of Canada, $19.5 million for social 
development in Pakistan, $8.9 million for indigenous voluntary activity 
in El Salvador through the Canadian Hunger Foundation), as is the total 
volume of funds involved. 
Counterpart funding, at its best, is an innovative way to free up very 
substantial resources for socially relevant programming. In a strange 
reversal, one of the most criticized components of official aid - tied to 
Canadian goods, and sometimes determined more by domestic political 
or economic considerations than recipient country priorities - is har- 
nessed to one of the most lauded, the promotion of grass-roots initiatives 
through NGOs. Nevertheless, counterpart funding, while in most cases 
not involving direct contact between CIDA and indigenous NGOs, gives 
rise to some of the same fears as direct funding. The criticism centres on 
the fact that these counterpart funds belong to the recipient country 
government, and therefore any use of them by indigenous NGOs requires 
that government's involvement and approval. In many countries this is 
not a problem, but in those where government policy is inimical to 
equitable development or popular participation, or the political climate is 
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highly polarized, closer government/NGO links may be counterproduc- 
tive or even dangerous. In Jamaica, in 1983 to 1984 three indigenous 
agencies elaborated an ambitious rural development program in response 
to CIDA's expressed interest in supporting such a long-term, integrated 
scheme; when it became apparent that CIDA would only agree to finance 
it using counterpart funds, they withdrew their proposal, arguing that in 
the politically charged Jamaican environment no indigenous NGO could 
afford to be seen to be receiving government funds directly, regardless of 
the party in power. In 1986 (in a rare example of prior consultation) a 
meeting was held in Peru between CIDA bilateral staff and Peruvian and 
Canadian NGOs to explore the setting up of a $2 million fund; the 
response was unenthusiastic, despite the good relations which then 
existed with the new government, on the grounds that changes of policy 
(or of government) could jeopardize the long-term interests of indigenous 
voluntary bodies. The justness of these concerns was demonstrated when 
a member of the Peruvian Congress, accusing NGOs of harbouring sub- 
versive elements, launched an official enquiry into the operations of 
foreign and Peruvian NGOs only two months after the CIDA meet- 
ing. While none of the allegations of improper conduct could be substan- 
tiated, the enquiry exemplified the latent tension between NGOs and 
governments in many Third World countries. 
Linkages: Beyond the Aid Relationship 
As Canadian NGOs have begun to move to new relationships with 
beneficiary populations, some have also come to see that this can bring 
with it new methods of working with Canadians. Increasingly, some 
agencies are looking to so-called 'linkage' programs as a way of promot- 
ing a more direct link between Canadians and the people of the Third 
World, which emphasizes the mutual learning which can take place 
when communities interact as equals. 
Promoting links between Canadians and the Third World is of course not 
new. This was always the aim of sponsorship programs, which have long 
recognized the desire of Canadians for direct, personal contact with 
people overseas. Similarly, twinning programs such as Adopt-a-Village 
are founded on the recognition of the need for the kind of personal 
contact which traditional aid projects make difficult or impossible. Recent 
linkage programs, however, are distinguished from earlier attempts to 
bridge the gap between Canadians and the Third World in that the 
relationship is explicitly between equals - Canadians learn from Third 
World communities, not just the other way around. Linkage programs 
inherently stress the exchange of views and experiences - as, for example, 
in a program linking disabled people in Kingston, Jamaica and Kingston, 
Ontario in order to work on income-generating programs and public 
policy advocacy in both countries. As a result, linkage work is geared as 
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much to education and action within Canada as to the support of devel- 
opment assistance efforts. Thus, for example, a program on women, 
health, and the pharmaceutical industry involves research on a broad 
range of issues, including the pharmaceutical industry in Canada; a 
program between farmers from Dominica and the Canadian Prairies 
examines the issues of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides in 
both North and South. 
To date, only a few agencies have become involved in such work. For it to 
be successful, there must be a basis for linkage work which is relevant to 
both Northern and Southern groups. In some cases, this basis may be 
political or ideological, as with the various exchange programs linking 
Canadians and Nicaraguans, organized by Canadian agencies and soli- 
darity groups, but increasingly, the basis is practical, functional exchanges 
between communities. An exchange between Western farmers and 
Nicaraguan counterparts for example, has been successful (and has 
endured) not solely because of political sympathies, but because of com- 
mon problems faced by the two groups. 
However, such programs are difficult to organize: effective linkage work 
demands several skills and resources which may be in short supply in 
some NGOs: links to Third World NGOs; well-developed information and 
communication structures; and, perhaps most important, a domestic 
base of public support interested not only in funding overseas activities, 
but also in exploring the global dimensions of domestic issues, and in 
pursuing appropriate action within Canada.25 Linkages can work with 
small as well as larger agencies. The Farmers Helping Farmers group in 
P.E.I., for example, started when a number of Third World farm leaders 
attending an international consultation on the crisis of the small farm (in 
Canada and overseas) in 1979 were hosted by Island farm families. 
Exchanges of farmers took place afterward between P.E.I. and Kenya and 
Tanzania, in both directions, and over a quarter of a million dollars has 
been raised by Island farmers for small agricultural projects proposed by 
farmers' groups in the East African countries. As important as the finan- 
cial support, perhaps, is the close relationships which have developed, 
and the awareness of common problems facing farmers in rich and poor 
countries. 
Although they will at best grow slowly, linkage programs may warrant the 
considerable investments of time and energy required. They offer several 
potential advantages to Canadian NGOs. First, they are a potent means of 
constituency-building in Canada, providing links to new groups, such as 
the women's movement, farmers' associations, or labour unions. Second, 
they provide an opportunity to bridge the gap between overseas and dev. 
25 See, for example, Selena Tapper, "Linkages: an unequal exchange?", CUSO Journal 
(1986), pp. 12-14. 
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ed. activities, both within and among agencies. And, finally, they make 
possible new forms of interaction between Canadian and Third World 
NGOs, which go far beyond mere project funding. 
Conclusion 
During the 1970s, the concepts of self-help and self-reliance dominated 
discussion of NGO programs. Clearly, however, changes in the reality of 
development needs often outstripped the ability of agencies to modify 
their programs, and many agencies continued to provide aid in ways 
which did not promote self-reliance. Indeed, many of the lessons of self- 
help have still not been totally or uniformly absorbed into NGO program- 
ming. 
In the 1980s, the 'buzz-word' of the NGO community is partnership. The 
word captures much the same range of beliefs as the earlier emphasis on 
self-reliance: a faith in the capacity of people to confront their own 
problems; a belief in the necessity of popular participation in develop- 
ment; and a conviction that the role of Northern NGOs lies less in'doing' 
development than in facilitating development by their Southern partners. 
Yet the way in which such convictions are expressed has changed dramat- 
ically. Whereas NGOs in the 1970s tended to stress the importance of 
small, self-supporting projects, the ethos of partnership stresses support 
for long-term programs, institutions, and networks. As the final chapter 
will point out, straightforward financial transfers may in the future be 
only one type of many interactions between Northern and Southern 
NGOs, including staff exchanges, training, and networking. And even 
where financial transfers remain, their form may change dramatically, 
with an emphasis upon program support and institution-building rather 
than the funding of individual projects. 
As was the case with self-reliance and self-help, however, acceptance of 
the concept of partnership has not always been accompanied by new 
types of NGO activity. This is less an indication of failure on the part of 
NGOs, than a reflection of the difficulty of bridging the gap between the 
concept of partnership, and the reality of partnership as an organizing 
principle of NGO work. 

Part III 
Into the Future 

145 
8 Summary: Making a Difference 
Those who are busy doing the urgent things rarely have time for the 
important things, viz. to think out the philosophical implications of their 
activity. 
Denis Goulet, The Myth of Aid 
A Mixed Record 
Throughout this study we have used the NGOs' self-perceptions, the so- 
called articles of faith, as a context in which to assess their effectiveness. 
The answer to "how well do they measure up to their self-image?" is, on 
the whole, encouraging: NGOs have enlisted the support and participa- 
tion of millions of Canadians for humanitarian work and international 
cooperation - through their education activities, project funding and 
direct work opportunities in Canada and overseas. In their development 
work overseas, as indicated in Chapter 6, they have demonstrated a 
generally impressive record of funding or implementing projects - usu- 
ally small-scale, community-based and low-cost - which have succeeded 
in meeting their objectives. 
In Canada, too, the non-governmental community has helped to create a 
climate of opinion which sees a strong, constructive role in North-South 
issues and a concern for international justice as a distinctively Canadian 
contribution to building a more equitable and peaceful world. Canadian 
NGOs have been in the forefront of development education, and have 
pioneered a variety of new approaches, ranging from the network of 
learner centres established in the 1970s, to more recent activities which 
'link' Canadian and Third World communities and organizations. 
There have been weaknesses as well. Canadian NGOs have demonstrated 
a concern for efficiency, for example, but this has often been defined as 
keeping costs low rather than efficiently using resources to maximize 
impact; as a result, Chapter 6 noted, the crucial tasks of staff development, 
project design and monitoring are often neglected. Within Canada, a 
competitive fundraising arena has led many NGOs to emphasize mass- 
marketing techniques, rather than attempting to educate Canadians in 
support of constructive change. Moreover, in Chapter 7, it was noted that 
while participation of beneficiaries in the implementation of NGO projects 
is indeed impressive, the same is not always true in the important design 
and evaluation phases of projects. Similarly, a significant minority of NGO 
projects continue to be dependent on long-term infusions of foreign 
funds, with limited possibilities for financial sustainability. Even more 
important, examples of replication or scaling-up of successful NGO efforts 
beyond the level of the community are few and far between. 
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Yet despite these shortcomings, the NGO record on the whole has been 
positive, and their achievements have been widely acknowledged. Donors 
and governments alike have increased their financial support and in 
recent years NGOs have been looked to as key actors in the development 
process. CIDA, in particular, has moved beyond its traditional'responsive' 
or matching grant program to create a variety of new channels for NGO 
funding. As a result, the number of NGOs has continued to grow, and 
their level of programming has increased exponentially. As Chapter 2 
noted, NGOs are no longer 'bit players' in the development game: they 
account for some 10 to 12 percent of official development assistance, and 
over 20 percent of combined public and private aid spending. 
The Challenge of Impact 
In short, based on the criteria of numbers of projects undertaken, range of 
public support or volume of government funding, Canadian NGOs have 
grounds for pride in their achievements. But with greater resources and 
higher visibility come new expectations and new responsibilities. Despite 
three decades of aid, conditions in many countries, especially the poorest, 
have worsened: the accelerating and mutually reinforcing trends of abso- 
lute poverty, environmental degradation, conflict and repression chal- 
lenge NGOs to strive beyond the limited objective of project success, 
measured by outputs achieved, to meet the more onerous test of long- 
term, sustainable impact. 
On the evidence of this study, meeting this challenge will require Cana- 
dian NGOs to re-examine their goals and methods, and some of their 
most cherished tenets. The process will raise a basic question: how 
relevant are the articles of faith as a guide for NGOs in meeting their 
present-day responsibilities? 
The reality of today's development climate forces NGOs to pay more 
attention to the impact of their activities. The international development 
field has now become a marketplace, with educational institutions, com- 
mercial firms and a growing number of voluntary agencies competing for 
government and public support, for overseas projects, but also for infor- 
mation and awareness activities in Canada. In this situation, it is not 
enough for NGOs to protest that others are infringing on their 'turf; they 
must demonstrate to government and private donors alike that their 
approach is effective and merits continuing support. 
For NGOs the key to achieving greater impact lies in adopting a more 
strategic approach to their work. In part, this means remedying some of 
the weaknesses outlined earlier: adopting a new perspective on the 
relationship between costs and cost-effectiveness; building in sources of 
income so that projects can become self-sustaining; documenting and 
sharing successful experiences so that other actors in the development 
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field can benefit. But a strategic approach also demands that NGOs take 
on a new role, as catalysts to leverage the resources of institutions such as 
governments, media, banks or schools to bring about lasting change. This 
requires not just a detailed knowledge of development processes in a 
given country but also a wider range of skills and resources other than 
money. 
This new role poses a challenge to organizations that have become 
accustomed to acting merely as financial brokers. It is a truism, though 
one which donor agencies naturally tend to overlook, that money is not 
the only solution to development problems. It is not always appropriate to 
work only at the grassroots - especially if there are elephants trampling 
the ground. There is of course a continuing need for small-scale 
community-based activities of the kind which NGOs have traditionally 
supported; indeed this is the level at which practical change and 
empowerment of the poor often must begin. But a strategic approach 
implies that it is no longer possible to isolate NGO activities from their 
larger political and economic contexts. Maurice Strong has pointed out, 
referring to recent experience in Africa: 
the root causes of the crisis are essentially systemic in nature. That is 
to say the cause and effect relationships take place within a complex 
system of interactions in which no single element can be isolated 
from the whole. Ignoring this simple truth is, in my view, one of the 
principal root causes of the failures of past development that have 
produced the current crisis.' 
A strategic orientation means that NGOs must acknowledge the complex- 
ity of development and the reality of a more interdependent world, and 
attempt to define a relevant and distinct NGO role within this context. 
There are some indications that NGOs in Canada and elsewhere are 
beginning to adjust to the need for a strategic orientation. Chapter I 
charted NGOs' gradual, uneven, but steady reorientation away from 
welfare toward a more developmental approach. A similar evolution is 
underway now, propelled as before by a concern to ensure longer-term 
impact. Indigenous development agencies in the South are often in the 
lead: training government extension workers in ways to reach the small 
farmer, facilitating access to subsidized credit for the poor, or providing 
legal aid and education for women, landless peasants and exploited 
workers; these voluntary organizations use their unique skills, contacts 
and information to access the greater financial resources and power of 
other institutions. 
I Maurice Strong, "Increase in Government Reliance on Voluntary Action: Crisis or 
Challenge?" Remarks to INTERPHIL II Conference, Venice, Italy, 26 September 1985, p. 15. 
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For Canadian organizations too, a similar shift is taking place. New forms 
of cooperation with government, the promotion of linkage activities 
which establish direct contacts with overseas groups tackling similar 
problems, and a number of interagency ventures ranging from Part- 
nership Africa Canada to the consortium program for Mozambique all 
attest to an openness to new approaches. Activities such as motivating 
and assisting bodies like the National Farmers' Union, the Canadian 
Crafts Council or the Canadian Teachers Federation, as well as schools 
and media, to integrate a global perspective into their everyday concerns 
magnifies the impact of development work at home. 
Relationships between Canadian NGOs and their Southern counterparts 
(whether direct or mediated by an international 'parent' body) with few 
exceptions still tend to mirror the inequity of North-South access to 
power and resources. Canadian agencies have argued - with some suc- 
cess - for greater flexibility in the terms of government funding of their 
own programs, but as yet they have been unwilling to provide 'core or 
capacity-building support to Southern NGOs, even though the weak- 
nesses of the project format are by now well known.2 This is not surpris- 
ing; it is no easier for NGOs to share power than for other institutions, and 
many plausible justifications are advanced (accountability to donors, 
greater expertise, etc.) for maintaining the status quo. 
At the same time, NGOs are beginning to define a new balance between 
project work overseas, building public awareness in Canada, and ad- 
vocating suitable policies for a more just and sustainable future. Effective 
grass-roots development requires appropriate institutional and policy 
support; work in advocacy and education therefore are integral to project 
work. But the gap between NGOs primarily involved in one or other of 
these activities is still wide, and most will need to develop new skills in 
research, policy formulation and communication. Ironically, some of the 
factors which now make NGOs effective at the project level may constrain 
wider impact: a problem-solving orientation which leads to greater suc- 
cess in alleviating symptoms than tackling underlying causes; competi- 
tive fundraising approaches which feed on the novelty of new projects at 
the expense of continuity; and reliance on the use of external resources, 
based on what donors can command rather than on what beneficiaries 
can sustain. 
Meeting the Challenges 
What do Canadian NGOs need if they are to develop a more strategic 
orientation? At the most basic level, they face four key challenges. 




In Chapter 3 it was pointed out that many agencies' rely on intermediary 
bodies rather than on direct contact with the organizations and people 
with whom they are working: this weakens their understanding of Third 
World needs and their sensitivity to the social, political and economic 
context of their work. These Canadian NGOs play little or no role in 
project design and implementation and therefore have little opportunity 
to test theory against action. While a division of labour between NGOs 
doing fundraising and those primarily involved in project implementa- 
tion has lowered costs for the former and led to efficiencies of scale, it has 
deprived many organizations of the 'hands-on' experience so necessary to 
their work. 
Inadequate information has two consequences. First, it hampers an 
agency's capacity to place its own work in the context of broader develop- 
ment efforts and problems, (for example, is lobbying for debt relief for 
Bolivia more important than agricultural training for Bolivian peasants?). 
Second, it means that an organization misses lessons that would guide its 
future actions and enrich its capacity for educating the public. 
The increasing decentralization of CIDA operations and decision making 
will further challenge Canadian NGOs to improve their knowledge of aid 
contacts in the field. The traditional argument that 'NGOs are closer to the 
people' will be contradicted by the reality that CIDA will have more staff 
operating at field level, will be able to develop closer relations with local 
voluntary groups, and will have more relevant and up-to-date informa- 
tion than many Canada-based NGOs. The implications are clear: as CIDA 
acquires the local knowledge and contacts and its decision-making pro- 
cedures become more flexible and sensitive, it is bound to question (as 
will many Southern NGOs) the need to channel funds through relatively 
remote and uninformed Canadian organizations. Yet as Chapter 3 pointed 
out, the solution to Canadian NGOs' deficiency in information is not an 
increase in individual agency field staff, but a gradual devolution of 
responsibility to Southern NGOs, a process already firmly underway in 
most parts of the world. Though there will still be a role for individual 
agency staff in the short-term, and for new arrangements such as shared 
field staff and joint monitoring of projects, Canadian agencies should 
promote a more active role for their Southern partners in decision making 
not just regarding individual projects, but on matters of broader agency 
policy as well. Rather than following CIDA's lead, Canadian NGOs should 
build on their own strengths. 
Autonomy 
Closely allied to the issue of information is that of autonomy. As was 
pointed out in Chapter 4, the true basis of NGO autonomy rests not 
150 
merely on the freedom to carry out or fund isolated projects, but on a 
distinctive set of values and a unique knowledge of the authentic needs 
and aspirations of local people. It is in this context that the rapid increase 
in government funding to NGOs gives cause for concern. 
The evidence gathered in the course of this study suggests that the net 
result of government support for Canadian NGOs to date has been mostly 
positive: by providing funding in a flexible and responsive manner, it has 
increased their capacity to pursue their own objectives, with minimal 
interference. Forums for sharing responsibility, ranging from CCIC's Re- 
habilitation and Reconstruction fund to AEA and PAC, bridge the gap 
between CIDA and the non-governmental community, and are serving as 
important learning experiences for both sides. But further increases in the 
level of dependence on CIDA entail a growing risk that NGOs' program- 
ming will reflect donor preferences rather than beneficiary needs, that 
they will become more vulnerable to policy shifts by government, and 
that their capacity to plan and set their own priorities will be sapped. In 
short, many agencies could become little more than CIDA contractors. 
Ultimately government assesses development agencies in terms of their 
capacity to administer aid programs. This is an important part of NGOs' 
mission, and there is a need for agencies with the specialized skills to do it 
well. But the NGO community as a whole has a broader mandate - to 
promote development in its fullest sense; it devalues the task of NGOs to 
define them simply as mini-aid agencies. 
A more serious consequence of the trend toward greater dependence 
on government arises from the fact that most of the growth in funding 
is in 'non-responsive' areas. From funds for country focus projects to the 
special funds set up for specific countries or purposes - for the 
Philippines, or for immunization - these constitute a hybrid 'directive/ 
responsive' category which increasingly sets the program agenda for 
NGOs. Though CIDA's intentions are benign, the NGOs risk surrendering 
leadership rather than asserting the primacy of their own analysis of 
development needs. Indeed, for agencies with limited staff the effort to 
deal with so many distinct sets of funding criteria and procedures 
squeezes out any possibility of planning. 
The remedy for this is a renewed emphasis on private fundraising. But this 
has its own risks. Competition for donor dollars, as we have seen, can 
encourage Madison Avenue slickness and convey an image that bears 
little resemblance to the real work done by an NGO. There is a very North 
American tendency for agencies to stress quick results, and 'success' 
stories in their fundraising appeals, and to measure performance by the 
bottom line of growth in revenue or numbers of projects supported. These 
are poor indicators of achievement: development, especially when it 
involves the poor, unorganized and powerless, is slow, unsteady and risky. 
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To a large degree, it is outside the control of donor agencies, especially 
external ones with limited influence within a poor country. Minimizing 
the difficulties inherent in the development process, or overemphasizing 
an NGO's capacity to apply a quick fix, inflates public expectations of a 
'solution' to problems which are clearly long-term and intractable, and 
thereby contributes to what has been called 'compassion fatigue' (a more 
accurate description might be 'fundraising cynicism'). Overreliance on 
impersonal mass-marketing devices such as direct mail, especially when 
it plays on a sense of obligation or compassion, further exacerbates this. 
Discussion of the overall funding of NGOs also raises the perennial ques- 
tion of the limits of their 'absorptive capacity'. Most recently, the report of 
the Winegard Committee referred to evidence it encountered in Africa of 
"the practical limitations on the ability of NGOs effectively to absorb a 
rapid and major expansion in funding, owing to a lack of long-term 
presence and experience in Africa and a shortage of managerial and 
administrative resources. '3 While this study supports this assessment, it is 
important to distinguish between different kinds of absorptive capacity: 
for operational agencies, the major constraint is most often the unpredic- 
tability of funding (especially where there is a high dependence on 
government sources) which makes increased levels of planning and 
personnel management impossible; for the majority of non-operational 
agencies, however, the chief difficulty is in identifying viable projects and 
Third World counterparts - when the sheer pressure to spend money can 
overwhelm fundamental development considerations. 
The conclusion of the Winegard Committee is to recommend a steady 
growth in real terms of CIDA's responsive program, and continuing access 
for agencies to other channels, such as country focus. This seems sound. 
The former should protect NGOs' capacity to develop their own priorities 
and approaches, especially if it is progressively placed on a multi-year 
program basis for those agencies with a proven track record. The latter 
allows for some 'scaling-up' of projects, reflecting the fact that many 
Third World agencies already operate at a level which is beyond the 
funding capacity of all but the largest Canadian organizations. It is 
imperative, of course, that CIDA maintain a sound upper limit upon the 
growth of non-responsive funding so as not to swamp NGOs' capacity for 
effective management and independent decision making. But the ulti- 
mate responsibility rests with individual NGOs. They must realize that 
non-responsive funding is largely beyond their control and to some extent 
unpredictable. They need self-discipline to determine an appropriate 
funding 'mix' which maximizes agency results while maintaining finan- 
cial independence - a decision which can perhaps better be exercised by 
independent boards of directors than by staff alone. 
3 Canada, House of Commons, For Whose Benefit? p. 109. 
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Coordination 
The strong links which exist between many Canadian fundraising organi- 
zations and their international affiliates, have in the past acted as a barrier 
to inter-agency collaboration among Canadian-based agencies. For many 
organizations, also, there is a pervasive concern that coordination would 
involve a loss of autonomy or a submerging of individual identity which 
could eventually lead to lower public visibility and support. Furthermore, 
the widespread predilection - almost amounting to an ideology - for 
smallness, contributes to isolationism. The preference for smallness arose 
out of the traditionally limited resources of most NGOs and as a reac- 
tion against the large-scale and capital-intensive projects favoured by 
government-to-government assistance. But for some, smallness has be- 
come virtually an end in itself. Today, even though the resources of 
individual agencies are still limited, the collective strength and potential 
impact of the NGO community as a whole is far from negligible. By 
persisting in seeing their interventions as 'small', NGOs excuse them- 
selves from the responsibility that comes from being taken seriously; they 
may choose to remain marginal partly out of a justifiable suspicion of 
power and of those who wield it; but partly - for some - it is out of a desire 
to remain unsullied by the real-life compromises and conflicts which are 
inevitable when dealing with the use and allocation of resources. 
Gradually, a concern for efficiency is promoting more inter-agency col- 
laboration. Joint programs, such as Solidarite Canada Sahel or the South 
Asia Partnership, owe much to the incentive provided by generous CIDA 
funding; however they are proving to be rich fields for experimentation - 
in shared decision making, greater integration of project funding and 
domestic education, and more involvement of Third World people in the 
deliberations of Canadian NGOs. There are still many areas of improve- 
ment possible, of course, and one or two early evaluations have indicated 
the danger that individual agencies are slackening in their responsibilities 
for project monitoring and quality control. Several innovations are now 
coming from inter-agency coalitions, probably because of the relatively 
greater flexibility of their funding criteria as well as the inter-agency 
synergy which they generate. It may be debatable whether joint CIDA- 
NGO funding mechanisms, such as Africa Emergency Aid or the CCIC- 
managed Rehabilitation and Reconstruction fund, are less costly than 
regular internal CIDA administrative processes, but it is clear that they 
offer much greater opportunity for NGO learning and for the growth of a 
sense of 'collective responsibility' for work funded or carried out by 
Canadian agencies. 
It is also increasingly important for individual NGOs to ensure that their 
programs are coordinated as far as possible with the activities of other 
actors and institutions. Coordinating programs, and designing projects to 
fit into local development priorities, need not lead to NGOs subordinating 
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their principles or independence of action. The historic preference for 
independent action, which has at times verged on isolationism (some 
governments might say anarchy), must be balanced by the need to tap the 
resources of larger institutions and to integrate specific activities into 
regional and national plans. 
Management 
Staff of Canadian NGOs, by and large, no longer regard 'management' 
with suspicion as a threatening concept embodying notions of hierarchy 
or technocratic efficiency inimical to their own values. Yet many agencies 
continue to mistake weak management for 'flexibility' and show a pre- 
dilection for what has been called an "organizational culture of crisis 
management.114 Inadequate planning is explained away by the unpredic- 
tability of needs, especially relating to emergencies, and - even more so - 
by the uncertainties of funding. 
A more competitive environment, along with the increased accounta- 
bility which accompanies substantial government funding, is placing a 
premium on effective management. The challenge facing NGOs is to 
develop a style of management which reflects their unique philosophy. 
Too often, as was noted in Chapter 5, 'professionalism' is confused with 
what is in reality simply a technocratic orientation marked by the squeez- 
ing out of volunteers by development 'experts'. A relevant definition of 
'professionalism' for NGOs is one which promotes effectiveness and 
efficiency and at the same time enhances participation, the sharing of 
information, and flexibility. The contradiction between a participatory 
program philosophy and an authoritarian management style creates 
difficulties for voluntary organizations. While encouraging participation 
may be more difficult - and undoubtedly requires different management 
tools - than a more technocratic approach, it is central to a development 
agency's capacity to extend participation overseas and foster cooperation 
at home. And while participation, (as was pointed out in Chapter 7) is not 
always a condition of success for development projects, it is often the key 
to long-term sustainability. This is true for voluntary organizations 
as well. 
Creative Change? 
As NGOs become more prominent they lose the 'security of obscurity' 
which has sometimes protected them in the past; the media, politicians, 
and others will be quick to identify mistakes and weaknesses, just as they 
have been with official aid agencies. Demands for greater accountability 
4 See Piers Campbell. "Overview of NGO Management Issues," in NGO Management and 
Raining: Recent Experiences and Future Possibilities, Report on a Seminar for Southeast Asia, 
Tagaytay City, Philippines, 18-23 January 1987, p. 20. 
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and more thorough scrutiny will grow. The effectiveness of their work and 
the support of the public together justify the contribution made by 
government to NGOs; the loss of either or both of the former would 
inevitably entail loss of the latter. Thus the key to the continuing health 
and vitality of the voluntary sector is in the constant effort to enhance 
agency effectiveness, rather than in promoting an appealing public image 
or cultivating government support. 
This study has argued that many factors are forcing a radical redefinition 
of the role of Canadian NGOs in development. A more strategic orienta- 
tion will exploit their unique skills, experience and capabilities, and 
enhance their contribution to building a more just and humane world. 
This shift in approach, like the earlier shift from relief to development, has 
implications for NGO thinking and programming. It is likely to be charac- 
terized by a new division of labour between Northern and Southern 
NGOs, a more integrated linking of grass-roots activities with macro-level 
policy interventions, and the development of a variety of new skills. It will 
require better feedback mechanisms, improved communications, and an 
ability for NGOs to learn from their own experience. Except where 
governments are anti-developmental or repressive, it will result in a 
variety of new forms of collaboration, recognizing that development 
problems cannot be solved in the aid ghetto. The shift confronts Canadian 
NGOs with a huge challenge. Are they capable of making such changes? 
Paradoxically, some of the weaknesses of Canadian agencies make them 
in some ways particularly well-placed for such a shift. Because they lack 
extensive hands-on project management experience, they have less inves- 
ted in terms of people and expertise in maintaining a direct operational 
role than do, for example, U.S. voluntary organizations. They are already 
accustomed to seeking suitable Third World NGOs to implement projects 
or for other forms of collaboration. In some cases they also have consider- 
able experience in mobilizing support for non-project work such as 
international lobbying efforts or domestic education and advocacy. But to 
meet the new challenge for change, great flexibility will be needed. 
NGOs have always regarded themselves as flexible, and are often so 
regarded by others. In truth, however, that flexibility may be more a 
characteristic of the NGO community as a whole rather than of any 
particular organization. New agencies spring up ineluctably to give ex- 
pression to new perceptions or approaches, and in turn influence existing 
organizations. The Canadian NGO community has become complex as 
individual agencies have become increasingly specialized. This should be 
a source of strength, allowing the diversity that ensures flexibility and 
adaptation to change. 
The term NGO no longer refers only to constituency-based bodies such as 
the churches, Save the Children, or to fundraising organizations like 
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PLAN and CARE. Other types of NGOs have emerged. Some, which 
might be termed 'social entrepreneurs' (e.g., WUSC, CECI), compensate 
for limited fundraising capacity and constituency by competing ag- 
gressively for contracts and program opportunities, in the process devel- 
oping new skills and areas of expertise. Other organizations act as cata- 
lysts, mobilizing other institutions to play a role in international 
development. It may be that this new diversity of approaches and strat- 
egies best provides NGOs with the capacity to adapt to the challenges they 
now face. 
Change takes place because the inadequacy of outworn approaches, and 
old ways of seeing and interpreting reality can no longer be ignored. It 
needs a new vision to command legitimacy, and countervailing power to 
dislodge the status quo. That power is now represented by the growing 
strength of Southern NGOs, who are challenging their Northern counter- 
parts to re-define their role and to demonstrate their relevance. Southern 
NGOs have more and more access to direct funding from bilateral and 
multilateral sources, breaking their dependence upon Northern NGOs 
and laying the foundations for something more akin to the real notion of 
'partnership' which Northern NGOs have so often invoked. Already, 
some Southern NGOs are laying out their own criteria for relating to 
donor NGOs, including such things as evidence of accountability, relevant 
development skills (not simply financial brokering), setting agreed goals 
and mutual agreement on the respective roles each is to play in meeting 
them. 
Canadian NGOs are not unique in having to confront increasing com- 
plexity. Barbara Ward wrote,"the chief environmental insight is that all 
things are linked; but if all things are linked, where is the thread which 
will lead us through the maze?" Freedom to experiment, to advocate 
currently unpopular views and to seek unconventional approaches, offer 
the best guarantee of finding some of the threads to weave a new and 
more effective development paradigm. Because such freedom is not 
typically found in large institutions or rule-bound bureaucracies, herein 
may lie the real 'comparative advantage' of the voluntary sector. The 
uniqueness of NGOs rests less in their capacity to fund isolated projects 
than in their potential for turning the current - and failing - model of 
development upside down (which is to say, right side up): transferring its 
focus from the exclusive right of governments to set priorities and allocate 
resources, to that of the rights of people, individually and collectively, to 
determine and act on their visions for the future, in short, to democratize 
development. 
It is sometimes difficult for governments to distinguish between the 
interests of the state and those of the regime in office: by offering the 
advantages of pluralism, decentralization and responsiveness, NGOs can 
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have a corrective function, not substituting for governments but helping 
to ensure their accountability. 
There is no single path to the future. It is the mission of development 
agencies to give form and focus to human hopes for change: how they 
translate idealism into strategy will determine their continued relevance. 
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Appendices 
1 Questionnaire Respondents 
Action Matadi-Luozi Inc. Alma, Quebec 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency Oshawa, Ontario 
African Medical and Research Foundation Pickering, Ontario 
Aga Khan Foundation Canada Toronto, Ontario 
Arusha Centre Calgary, Alberta 
Assistance medicale internationale Montreal, Quebec 
Association of Kinsmen Clubs Cambridge, Ontario 
Association quebecoise des organismes de cooperation internationale 
Montreal, Quebec 
Barbara Ward Centre St. Paul, Alberta 
Call of the Poor St. Norbert, Manitoba 
Canada-Caribbean Central America Policy Alternatives Toronto, Ontario 
Canada World Youth Montreal, Quebec 
Canadian Association for Ethiopian Jews Toronto, Ontario 
Canadian Baha'i International Development Services Ottawa, Ontario 
Canadian Baptist Overseas Mission Board Toronto, Ontario 
Canadian Crossroads International Toronto, Ontario 
Canadian Friends Service Committee Toronto, Ontario 
Canadian Home Economics Association Ottawa, Ontario 
Canadian Hunger Foundation Ottawa, Ontario 
Canadian Jesuit Missions Toronto, Ontario 
Canadian Labour Congress Ottawa, Ontario 
Canadian Lutheran World Relief Winnipeg, Manitoba 
Canadian National Institute for The Blind Toronto, Ontario 
Canadian Organization for Development Through Education Ottawa, Ontario 
Canadian Organization for Rehabilitation Through Training Montreal, Quebec 
Canadian Red Cross Society Toronto, Ontario 
Canadian Save the Children Fund Toronto, Ontario 
CARE Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
Carrefour Canadien International Montreal, Quebec 
Carrefour International Montreal, Quebec 
Carrefour Tiers-Monde Quebec, Quebec 
Cause Canada Montreal, Quebec 
Centre amistad de solidarite international de la region 
de 1'Amiante Thetford Mines, Quebec 
Centre canadien d'etudes et de cooperation internationale Montreal, Quebec 
Centre de solidarite internationale Alma, Quebec 
Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et I'Afrique 
australe Montreal, Quebec 
Centre de solidarite internationale Alma, Quebec 
CESO Toronto, Ontario 
Christian Children's Fund of Canada Toronto, Ontario 
Christian Farmers Federation of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta 
Christian Missions in Many Lands Canada Inc. Toronto, Ontario 
Christian Reformed Work Relief Committee of Canada Burlington, Ontario 
Citizens for Public Justice Toronto, Ontario 
Club 2/3 Inc. Montreal, Quebec 
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Collaboration sante intemationale Quebec, Quebec 
Compassion of Canada London, Ontario 
Comite de solidarite de Tiers Monde Pois Rivieres, Quebec 
Cooperation nord-sud en education Montreal, Quebec 
Co-operative Union of Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
CREDI-Lanaudiere Joliette, Quebec 
Crossroads Christian Communications Toronto, Ontario 
CUSO Ottawa, Ontario 
Developing Countries Farm Radio Network Toronto, Ontario 
Development Education Centre Toronto, Ontario 
Development Education Co-ordinating Council of Alberta Calgary, Alberta 
Development Education Program, Centre for International Programs, 
University of Guelph Guelph, Ontario 
Disabled Peoples International Winnipeg, Manitoba 
Emmanuel International Stouffville, Ontario 
Energy Probe Toronto, Ontario 
Entraide Missionaire Inc. Montreal, Quebec 
Ethiopia Airlift/Adopt-a-Village Halifax, N.S. 
Federated Women's Institute of Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
Fondation Jules et Paul-Emile Leger Montreal, Quebec 
Fondation de la Salle Lachine, Quebec 
Fondation TAB, Inc. Lac St. Jean, Quebec 
Foster Parents Plan of Canada Toronto, Ontario 
Global Ed-Med Supplies (Canada) Inc. Toronto, Ontario 
Global Village (Nanaimo) Nanaimo, B.C. 
Horizons of Friendship Cobourg, Ontario 
Institute for Development Education Through the Arts Ottawa, Ontario 
Institute for the Study and Application of Integrated Development Toronto, Ontario 
Inter Pares Ottawa, Ontario 
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America Toronto, Ontario 
Inter-Church Fund for International Development Toronto, Ontario 
Inter-Cultural Development Education Association Winnipeg, Manitoba 
International Association for the Ttansformation of Man Victoria, B.C. 
International Centre, Queen's University Kingston, Ontario 
International Child Care (Canada) Inc. St. Catharines, Ontario 
International Defence and Aid Fund For Southern Africa Ottawa, Ontario 
International Development Education Resource Association Vancouver, B.C. 
International Development Office, Association of Universities and Community 
Colleges Ottawa, Ontario 
International Education Centre, Saint Mary's University Halifax, N.S. 
JMJ Children's Fund of Canada Inc. Ottawa, Ontario 
Jeunesse du Monde Quebec, Quebec 
The Leprosy Mission of Canada Don Mills, Ontario 
London Cross-Cultural Learner Centre London, Ontario 
Manitoba Council for International Cooperation Winnipeg, Manitoba 
Manitoba Interchurch Committee for World Development Education Winnipeg, 
Manitoba 
The Marquis Project Brandon, Manitoba 
Mennonite Central Committee (Canada) Winnipeg, Manitoba 
Mission Aviation Fellowship Guelph, Ontario 
One Sky The Saskatchewan Cross-Cultural Centre Inc. Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
Operation Eyesight Universal Calgary, Alberta 
Organisation canadienne pour la solidarite et le developpment Montreal, Quebec 
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Organization for Co-operation in Overseas Development Winnipeg, Manitoba 
Overseas Missionary Fellowship Toronto, Ontario 
OXFAM-Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
OXFAM-Quebec Montreal, Quebec 
Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada Toronto, Ontario 
Plan NAGUA Charlesbourg, Quebec 
Plenty Canada Lanark, Ontario 
Presbyterian World Service and Development Committee Don Mills, Ontario 
Pueblito Canada Toronto, Ontario 
Rotary Clubs of Canada Guelph, Ontario 
The Salvation Army Toronto, Ontario 
Saskatchewan Council for International Cooperation Regina, Saskatchewan 
Save a Family Plan/St. Peter's Seminary London, Ontario 
Save The Children Fund of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C. 
Secours aux lepreux (Canada Inc.) St. Laurent, Quebec 
Service Monde-Ami Montreal, Quebec 
Seva Service Society Vancouver, B.C. 
SIM Canada Scarborough, Ontario 
Sir Edmund Hillary Foundation Toronto, Ontario 
SOPAR Gatineau, Quebec 
SOS Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
South Pacific Peoples Foundation of Canada Victoria, B.C. 
South Saskatchewan Committee for World Development Regina, Saskatchewan 
Terre des Hommes St. Laurent, Quebec 
Third World Resource Centre Windsor, Ontario 
Tibetan Refugee Aid Society Vancouver, B.C. 
Tools for Peace Ottawa, Ontario 
Unisphere Learner Centre Medicine Hat, Alberta 
United Church of Canada Toronto, Ontario 
USC Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
Victoria International Development Education Association Victoria, B.C. 
World Citizens Learner Centre Lethbridge, Alberta 
World Federalists of Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
World Food Day Association Ottawa, Ontario 
World University Service of Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
World Vision of Canada Mississauga, Ontario 
YMCA: National Council of YMCAs of Canada Ottawa, Ontario 
Young Women's Christian Association of Canada (YWCA) Toronto, Ontario 
Note: Four organizations (Association of Canadian Community Colleges, Association 
of Universities and Colleges of Canada, Canadian Home Economics Association, and 
Canadian Labour Congress) responded to the questionnaire, but were excluded from 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 Development Education Agencies Interviewed 
Arusha Centre Calgary 
Canada-Caribbean Central America Policy Alternatives Toronto 
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace Montreal, Toronto 
Canadian Red Cross Society Toronto, Vancouver 
CARE Canada Ottawa 
Carrefour de Solidarite Internationale Sherbrooke 
Carrefour Tiers-Monde Quebec 
Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et 1'Afrique australe 
(CIDMAA) Montreal 
Club 2/3 Inc. Montreal 
Common Heritage Programme Ottawa 
Cooperation Nord-Sud en Education Montreal 
CUSO Ottawa 
Development Education Centre (DEC) Toronto 
Entraide Missionnaire Montreal 
GATT-Fly Toronto 
Global Community Centre Waterloo 
Hope International Vancouver 
Inter Pares Ottawa 
Inter-Church Committee for Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA) 7bronto 
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAFSA) Ottawa 
Latin American Working Group (LAWG) Toronto 
The Marquis Project Brandon 
Mennonite Central Committee Canada (MCCC) Winnipeg 
OXFAM-Canada Ottawa 
St. John's OXFAM Committee St. John's 
South Saskatchewan Committee for World Development Regina 
Ten Days for World Development Toronto 
Victoria International Development Education Association Victoria 
World Food Day Association of Canada Ottawa 
Young Women's Christian Association of Canada Toronto 
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